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Summary report 
Introduction 
Addressing unemployment has always been a key concern of modern welfare states. From 
early on in its evolution, the welfare state has made efforts to foster labour market participation 
and offered help to re-integrate unemployed individuals into the labour market. For this aim 
states have developed and implemented a variety of different public policies interventions. 
Early interventions are the introduction of an unemployment insurance that compensates for 
income losses and the establishment of public employment services (PES) to overcome 
problem of information asymmetries and facilitate the matching of labour demand- and 
supply. Recently, unemployment policy has undergone fundamental changes (Bonoli, 2010; 
Weishaupt, 2010). Western welfare states have to deal with new risks emerging from the 
transformation of the labour market towards a service economy and process automatization. 
They are confronted with seemingly ever growing unemployment rates and at the same time 
tightening financial means. This development has put pressure on existing unemployment 
compensation arrangements (Sol, 2005) and called for an adjustment of the respective policies. 
As a reaction, governments all over Europe and beyond have replaced passive safety nets 
through activation policies that place high emphasis on activating jobless individuals and 
bringing them back into work. This so called activation turn includes the introduction of 
measures of active labour market policies (ALMPs) (Martin and Grubb, 2001) but also changes 
in the governance of the PES with intensification of placement efforts (Sol, 2005; Weishaupt, 
2010) and a more demand-oriented service involving employers (van der Aa and Berkel, 2014).  
Different academic disciplines have investigated the consequences of this activation turn on 
the micro and macro level. The effects of ALMP interventions, such as training courses, 
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employment programmes or wage subsidies, have been thoroughly evaluated by labour 
economist. These econometric evaluations focus mainly on the effect of a specific measure on 
labour market participation of the participants. Meta-analyses of the numerous evaluations 
show that the effects are at best slightly positive, depending on the type of programme. For 
some programmes, especially employment programmes, some evaluations even find negative 
effects and the effect seems to vary across different sub-groups (Card et al., 2010). 
It is puzzling that measures intended to improve the labour market situation of individuals 
have only a small or even negative effect on their labour market chances. We know that some 
interventions work better than others but we do not really know why this is the case. Is it 
because they fail to provide the relevant skills or alter participants’ behaviour in a positive 
way? Or has it something to do with how employers perceive participants of such measures? 
To solve this puzzle, this thesis sheds light on how employers perceive specific measures of 
public interventions for their hiring decisions.  
There are at least three reasons why it is important to look at employers hiring behaviour when 
it comes to the effect of ALMPs. First, so far evaluations have focused solely on data on the 
supply side, which allows capturing the overall effect on labour market participation but not 
why the effect occurs. What is neglected is that employers’ hiring behaviour contributes to the 
overall effect of these interventions. Knowing how employers perceive these interventions 
might help to explain some of the contradicting results found by previous research. Second, 
employers are the main gatekeepers to employment as they ultimately decide who to hire and 
therefore who has access to the labour market and who does not. Employers’ behaviour 
therefore contributes to an important extent to the stratification of the labour market and the 
resulting inequalities (Reskin, 2000). Third, ALMP interventions target exactly the part of the 
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population that is usually avoided by employers. It is therefore interesting to investigate in 
how far interventions designed for individuals suffering from the consequences of hiring 
decision are able to influence exactly these decisions. In order to be successful, employment 
policies should have a positive effect on employers’ hiring behaviour and counteract the 
disadvantage caused by unequal hiring behaviour.  
Research has focused on the two fields, employment policies and employers’ hiring behaviour, 
separately but not much on their intersection. This thesis addresses this gap in research and 
aims to contribute to a better understanding of how public policies can influence employers’ 
hiring behaviour. Therefore, it contributes to several stands of the literature. First, it 
contributes to the literature on policy evaluation by investigating to what extent the effects of 
ALMP interventions are caused by employers’ hiring behaviour. Second, it relates to the 
literature on activation by demonstrating that the effect on employers’ hiring behaviour varies 
for different ALMP measures and across the candidates’ distance to the labour market. Third, 
it relates to the literature on employers’ hiring behaviour by showing the degree to which it is 
influenced by different kind of information available to them.  
The focus of this thesis will be on short term interventions targeted at the unemployed 
individuals, other, more structural policies such as demand management or industrial policy 
will not be addressed. In what follows, I will outline how public employment policies evolved 
historically and discuss the literature on employers’ hiring behaviour. I will briefly review the 
existing literature on employers’ hiring behaviour in relation to employment policies before I 
formulate some expectations about the kind of effects employment policies can exert on 
employers hiring behaviour. The testing of the formulated expectations will then be pursued 
in three separate chapters, which constitute this thesis. Each chapter will be briefly 
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summarized before I conclude with a discussion of the contribution of this thesis for research 
and policy and a critical reflection of the results.  
Public interventions to address unemployment  
Public employment services (PES) are early interventions of the state into the labour market 
to match the demand and supply of labour and coordinate the workforce. Some countries 
established PES as early as in the late 1800s as local collaborations between employers’ 
association, municipalities and labour unions (Weishaupt, 2010) or as a reaction to eliminate 
low-quality private employment agencies doing malpractices (Lee, 2009). PES can be seen as 
intermediaries in the labour market that reduce job search costs and uncertainty for both sides, 
jobseekers and employers. In the 1990s, with the persistence of high unemployment, the PES 
became increasingly under pressure as liberalization, privatization and contracting out 
became new trends in organizing public services (Weishaupt, 2010). Countries such as the UK, 
Australia and the Netherlands were forerunners in contracting out placement services, in 
particular for specific groups such as hard-to-place or long term unemployed (Sol, 2005) but 
in many other counties the matching function of labour supply and demand remained among 
the core tasks of the PES.  
Another important development in the area of labour market policies is the shift towards 
active labour market policy (ALMP). ALMPs aim at re-integrating jobless individuals into the 
labour market by providing job search support, training, work experience or wage subsidies 
to unemployed individuals in combination with job search requirements and benefit 
conditionality. The policies are administered by the PES, who is allocating unemployed to the 
different measures but is also imposing benefit reduction and other sanctions in case of non-
compliance (Bonoli, 2010). During the last three decades, most OECD-countries have devoted 
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growing shares of public finances to ALMPs, however, as illustrated in figure 1, countries 
differ widely in their level of spending on ALMPs and the share devoted to active and passive 
labour market policies. Denmark and the Netherlands have the highest level of spending. In 
Denmark the larger share of the total spending is devoted to activation policies, while in the 
Netherlands the picture is reversed with a larger share spent on passive protection. The 
Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden have similar levels of spending for activation policies. 
Germany, a conservative welfare state, devotes more means to passive protection. Finally, 
Italy and the liberal US spend little on both policies.  
 
Figure 1: Spending on active and passive labour market policies in selected countries 
 
Initially, ALMPs were a genuinely social democratic policy that was implemented in Sweden 
in the early 1950s as part of the macroeconomic strategy to achieve balanced, noninflationary 
growth and full employment with a solidarity wage policy in an open economy (Toft, 2003). 
To secure the goal of full employment ALMPs were introduced as micro-economic policies 
aiming at enhancing labour market mobility at the occupational and geographical level and 
enabling people to take new job opportunities when they arise (Armingeon, 2007). The idea 
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was to reallocate labour from declining to expanding parts of the economy (Anxo and 
Niklasson, 2006) by providing training opportunities and mobility allowances. The model was 
put forward by two trade-union economists, Rhen and Meidner. The economic power of the 
trade unions and the political power of the social democratic party allowed the 
implementation of a costly and effective system of labour market policy (Bonoli, 2010).  
Sweden’s labour market policy has been extremely successful and in the face of labour market 
problems arising in the 1990s and on initiatives on the supranational level, ALMPs have 
diffused to other countries and across different welfare state regimes. Despite its origin as a 
social democratic policy, ALMPs have been widely accepted by conservative and liberal 
politicians. Since ALMPs are market enabling and do not sort to redistributive measures, 
ALMPs fit a liberal ideology (Armingeon, 2007).  
While originally mainly concerned with re-training and upskilling of laid off workers, ALMPs 
had to deal with a new problem in the 1970s; the one of mass unemployment. In the context of 
short labour demand, traditional ALMPs were of little help. To address this problem a new 
type of ALMP emerged; occupational programmes that were meant to occupy unemployed 
individuals (Bonoli, 2010). Finally, in the 1990s, ALMPs were reoriented towards their present 
form and to what we now call “activation”. The main challenge is the oversupply of unskilled 
labour, which is addressed by ALMPs by providing work incentives and employment 
assistance (Bonoli, 2010). Pushed by initiatives at the supranational-level such as the OCED’s 
Job Strategy launched in 1994 or the Employment Strategy by the European Union in 1997, 
many countries reformed their labour market policy towards activation (Goetschy, 2001; 
Martin and Grubb, 2001). Denmark and the Netherlands took a pioneering role in 
implementing activation polices. The so-called “felxicurity model”, a strategy to enhance 
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labour market flexibility and at the same time provide social security (European Commission, 
2019) spread to other countries. In the UK, the new Labour government introduced activation 
measures based on a centrist approach also known as the “Third Way”. Sweden, where ALMP 
originated, has also adopted a more pro-market employment orientation of ALMPs (Bonoli, 
2010).  
Even with the often mentioned convergence of labour market policies and efforts at the 
supranational-level for a common employment strategy, ALMPs remain a broad category, 
measures differ widely in terms of their content and objective and there exist considerable 
cross-country variation (Bonoli, 2010). They range from extensive vocational training 
programmes in the Nordic countries to workfare approaches, which combine placement 
services with job search requirements and sanctions in Anglo-Saxon countries. Bonoli (2010) 
distinguishes between policies that invest in human capital and those with a pro-market 
employment orientation. Along these two dimensions four types of ALMPs can be 
distinguished; occupational ALMPs such as job creation schemes and non-employment 
related training, incentive reinforcement with benefit conditionality, employment assistant 
consisting of placement services and job subsidies and finally, upskilling through job-related 
vocational training. There is considerable cross-country variation in the spending on different 
types of ALMPs. Sweden and Denmark invest more in training while Germany spends more 
on occupational measures and the Anglo-Saxon countries put the emphasis on benefit 
conditionality (Bonoli, 2010). Welfare-to-work programmes, especially those in the UK and the 
US, are also criticized for producing a labour supply for insecure work by pushing people into 
low paid employment and placing the responsibility for unemployment entirely to the 
individual (Peck and Theodore, 2000).  
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More recently, many countries have started to involve employers into the implementation and 
provision of ALMPs and adopt more demand-led polices (Bredgaard and Halkjær, 2016; 
Ingold and Stuart, 2015; van der Aa and Berkel, 2014). A small but growing literature is looking 
at employers’ motive to participate in measures of ALMPs. Employers become involved for 
various reasons; some see ALMPs are a source of labour or want to lower hiring costs, while 
others see participation as a social responsibility. 
While high hopes have been put into ALMPs, evaluation results show that ALMPs are only an 
imperfect solution to address the unemployment problem. Meta-analyses of the numerous 
evaluations of various programmes show that the picture is not entirely rosy. The best results 
are achieved by job search assistant programmes, class-room- and on the job training 
programmes show positive effect only in the medium run and subsidized public sector 
employment programmes seem to be ineffective (Card et al., 2010). Programme effects are 
influenced by the time horizon, the effect are mostly around zero in the short run but positive 
after 2-3 years. Programmes focusing on human capital intervention show larger gains, 
women and participants from long-term unemployment profit more from programme 
participation (Card et al., 2015).  
What these evaluations cannot capture is the different mechanisms through which 
programmes unfold their effects. Programmes can change participants search behaviour, for 
example by making the search more efficient or putting job search requirement on them, 
increase their human capital, or provide signals with respect to a candidate’s productivity, 
which are used by employers to sort applicants (Lalive et al., 2009). Moreover, ALMPs and 
particularly the PES can also been seen as labour market intermediaries between jobseekers 
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and employers, potentially assuming human resources roles and facilitate employers’ 
recruitment of disadvantaged individuals (Ingold and Valizade, 2017).  
While the existing research has thoroughly evaluated the effects different activation measures 
have on the participants it is puzzling how little is known about how these policies actually 
influence the demand-side of the labour market. Most studies exclusively address the effects 
on the supply-side and ignore the demand-side of the labour market. However, at the end it 
is employers who decide who they will hire or not and thereby acting as a gatekeeper to the 
labour market. It is therefore important to know what employers think of this important area 
of social policy as their behaviour effects the policies’ effectiveness. Effective ALMPs require 
that employers hire candidates coming from such activation schemes (Bredgaard, 2017). 
Participation in ALMPs might influence and change employers’ hiring behaviour either 
through direct substantive effects such as increasing participants’ human capital or decreasing 
wage costs or through signalling effects by providing information about a candidate’s 
productivity or other desirable worker characteristics.  
Hiring behaviour of employers 
In this section I provide a short overview of the existing theories that have emerge in different 
academic disciplines for explaining employers’ hiring behaviour and discuss the different 
factors that have found to impact hiring outcomes. In particular, these are educational 
credentials, social networks and group membership such as gender or ethnicity. From a 
sociological perspective, understanding employers hiring behaviour is important since the 
allocation of jobs is a main source of social stratification and inequality (Bills et al., 2017). 
Despite its importance in shaping the social structure, the hiring process is still the least 
understood process of the employment relationship (Petersen and Togstad, 2006). The 
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literature addresses the topic of labour market inequality mainly from a supply-side 
perspective. However, employers play an important role in shaping employment outcomes. 
Eventually, labour market inequalities can be seen as a macro result of micro level decisions 
by employers (Jackson, 2007). In order to understand employers’ hiring behaviour one must 
understand on what kind of information employers rely on when taking these decisions. They 
are characterized by uncertainty since a candidate’s productivity is not directly observable and 
actors are not directly connected to each other (Burt, 1998; Rees, 1966; Spence, 1973). To reduce 
this uncertainty employers rely on various kind of information. Bills et al. (2017) provide an 
encompassing overview on employers’ hiring behaviour and identify human-, social, and 
cultural capital as the sources of information employers rely on in the hiring process.  
Educational credentials are seen as the main determinant for occupational attainment and the 
literature distinguishes different mechanisms of why education matters to employers. First, 
human capital models focus the learning aspect of education. Education provides necessary 
skills that are valued by employers (Becker, 1993). Second, signalling theory assumes that 
educational credentials reflect productivity differences that were present already before 
acquiring the education and schooling serves as sorting mechanism (Spence, 1973). According 
to signalling theory, employers rely on educational credentials since they are believed to tell 
something about a candidate’s productivity level. Sorting models of education combine both 
approaches; they allow for learning but at the same time focus on how schooling serves as a 
signal. The effect of an additional year of schooling is a combination of an additional year of 
learning and of being identified as someone who completed one year of additional schooling 
(Weiss, 1995). Research has shown that role played by educational credentials is overestimated 
and context dependent. This illustrates that employer must not only be provided with 
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information but this information must be received in a context of the social infrastructure that 
ensures the trustworthiness and relevance of this information (Miller and Rosenbaum, 1997). 
In countries with a closer connection between education and labour market, for example 
through Vocational Education and Training like this is the case in Switzerland, Germany or 
the Netherlands, employers might rely more heavily on educational credentials. These 
countries rely heavily on skill certification. Social closure theory stresses the importance of 
skill certification as a mean to secure access to specific occupations since access is restricted to 
those with the matching educational credentials. Indeed, Di Stasio and Van De Werfhorst 
(2016) show that there are various reasons why and how employers rely on education for 
screening and that sorting applicants and the mechanisms at play depend on the institutional 
context. Their results show that employers are more responsive to years of schooling in the 
Netherlands than in England. Dutch employers also use the field of study as a filter of subject-
specific knowledge. Employers in England instead value grades as a signal for trainability. In 
line with social closure theory, dropping-out is more damaging in the occupational labour 
market of the Netherlands than in England. Overall, education in the Netherlands matters to 
employers due to the human capital and social closer while in England education is used as a 
screening device for trainable employees.  
Miller and Rosenbaum (1997) show in qualitative interviews that employers in the US, 
mistrust information provided by the educational system and instead rely on information 
from social networks, another source for social closure and the next important factor of labour 
market inequality. The relevance of social network for employment outcomes is well-
documented in the sociological literature. In his seminar work about how men find work in 
the US Granovetter (1974) shows that social networks, and in particular weak ties 
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(Granovetter, 1973), are the most important source for finding employment. Since then an 
encompassing literature about the features and consequences of social networks has 
developed. The effect of social networks on labour market outcomes has mainly been 
approached from a supply-side perspective but research focusing on the demand-side has 
shown that employers often turn to informal recruiting (Behrenz, 2001) and rely on referrals 
(Rubineau and Fernandez, 2015; Rees, 1966; Montgomery, 1992). The importance of referrals 
from current employees has been documented by various firm case studies, where the 
outcomes among a pool of applicants for candidates with and without referrals were 
compared. Generally, these studies find that referred candidates had higher success rates than 
candidates without referral (Petersen et al., 2000; Fernandez et al., 2000; Fernandez and 
Weinberg, 1997; Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo, 2006). Experimental evidence exist for 
referrals from business partners; in a factorial survey Di Stasio and Gërxhani (2015) show that 
employers rated candidates that were described as being referred by a business partner more 
favourable than those without such a referral. Besides the empirical evidence, little is known 
about the mechanisms causing preferences for referred candidates. Several signalling-related 
explanations are suggested (Rubineau and Fernandez, 2015; Castilla et al., 2013). Castilla et al. 
( 2013) describes both, resources and signalling mechanisms, which often complement each 
other, to explain the influence of social network on employment outcome. Social networks 
constitute resources since they provide information, facilitate learning, and provide influence. 
However, when it comes to explaining an employers’ preference for a specific candidate, 
signalling-related explanations might be more appropriate. Employers might draw inferences 
about a candidate’s ability, status, and trust after observing a candidate’s network relationship 
(Castilla et al., 2013). When associated with low-performing or low-status actors, signals about 
ability can also be negative. Other signalling-related explanations are provided by Rubineau 
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and Fernandez (2015); that of homophily and trustworthiness. The first relates to the tendency 
of similar people to become friends with each other meaning that referred candidates are 
similar to the referrer – someone the employer already knows and potentially employed. The 
mechanism of trustworthiness is described by Gërxhani et al. (2013), the authors argue that the 
fact someone is referred reflects his or her position in an informal information network 
characterized by higher levels of trustworthiness, which makes employers prefer referrals. 
Moreover, employers might trust referrals from their social networks since the referrer is 
concerned about his or her reputation and will therefore only recommend suitable candidates 
(Fernandez et al., 2000).  
The drawback of the importance of social networks is that they are associated with social 
closure as those without social ties are excluded (Bills et al., 2017). Part of the disadvantage 
experiences by women and ethnic minorities stems from a gender and ethnic minority bias in 
social networks (Petersen et al., 2000; Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo, 2006; Fernandez and 
Sosa, 2005; McDonald, 2011). Network disadvantage of specific groups might be compensated 
by the existence of labour market intermediaries that connect jobseekers and employers 
(Autor, 2009; Holzer, 1999; Fernandez, 2010). The PES can potentially play an important role 
in this respect by matching supply- and demand of labour. Harsløf (2006) for example, shows 
that in countries with encompassing welfare state arrangements that provide measures 
facilitating job-matching processes, social networks are less important for job search.  
However, research has also shown that even when controlling for different network ties, 
disadvantage against minority groups does not entirely disappear. There exists an extensive 
literature addressing the persistent disadvantage of women and ethnic minorities and show 
that part of it can be attributed to discriminatory hiring behaviour of employers. Women and 
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ethnic minorities seem to suffer from discriminatory practices resulting in lower hiring 
chances, lower wages, and less promotion. It is beyond the purpose of this summary to review 
the extensive evidence on labour market discrimination, especially since this has been done 
elsewhere (for ethnic minorities see Zschirnt and Ruedin, 2016; for gender, age, and ethnic 
minority see Riach and Rich, 2002; for an extensive overview of experimental evidence see 
Neumark, 2016). Furthermore, some studies have also investigated the effect of sexual 
orientation (Weichselbaumer, 2003; Baert, 2015), family status and children (Ridgeway and 
Correll, 2004; Correll et al., 2007; Oesch et al., 2017). Others documented discrimination against 
homosexual applicants and mothers. Other signals that have been found that employers rely 
on when hiring are volunteering and hobbies (Rooth, 2011; Baert and Vujic, 2016) or 
appearance (Agerström and Rooth, 2011; Rooth, 2009; O’Brien et al., 2013).  
Finally, employers do not only use signals to spot desirable candidates but likewise might also 
use negative signals to avoid candidates that are believed to be unproductive. Such 
stigmatizing screens might entail information about unemployment spells (Eriksson and 
Lagerström, 2006; Oberholzer-Gee, 2008), job hopping or gaps in the CV (Bills et al., 2017), or 
being available for a wage subsidy (Burtless, 1985; Baert, 2016). Negative screens are also 
important for ALMPs as these are typically attributed to low-skilled individuals further away 
from the labour market and therefore might be used by employers to identify and exlude weak 
candidates. Eventually, ALMPs and the PES should have an influence on employers’ hiring 
behaviour when they are able to reduce uncertainty with regard to a candidate’s productivity 
and to act as a connector between the two actors. However, their effect is not necessarily 
positive but can also be negative when employers draw negative inferences about the  
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Existing literature 
This section discusses the small but growing literature on employers’ perception of ALMPs 
and how these policies have been found to influence hiring decisions. The existing literature 
has approached the issue from three different perspectives: First, comparative research 
addresses the employers’ role in the implementation of social policies to explain differences in 
ALMPs across countries. Second, literature investigating employers’ involvement in and 
perception of ALMPs at the single country level. Third, studies examining how individual 
ALMP participation of candidates affects employers hiring behaviour.  
From a comparative perspective, scholars have stressed the importance of employers in the 
implementation process of ALMPs by attributing cross-country differences in these policies to 
different modes of organization of business interests. These contributions show that even with 
a convergence of policy ideas, as this is often claimed to be the case with ALMPs, welfare state 
regimes and historical legacies play an important role for shaping the actual implementation 
of these policies. Martin (2004) starts from the fact that the wide adaption of activation measure 
by the majority of OCED countries has brought a large amount of policy convergence across 
various welfare state regimes. The differences between countries emerge at the level of policy 
implementation with some countries having much higher levels of involvement of employers 
than others. The aim of her contribution is to explain why participation rates in ALMPs are 
much higher among Danish employers than among their British counterparts. The findings 
show that the former hold a much more positive view of ALMPs and especially of unemployed 
people than British employers. While Danish employers participated to access training 
benefits or a new pool of labour and out of social responsibility, British employers did so 
because they felt political pressure to participate and to access cheap labour. Moreover, the 
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institutional variables play out differently in the two countries. While membership in an 
employer’s association is a positive determinant of employers’ involvement in ALMPs in 
Denmark, it has a negative impact in ‘pluralist’ Britain. Martin (2004) concludes that even with 
convergence of policy ideas the underlying assumptions about social protection in each 
welfare state regime and historical legacies persists and significantly influence how such a 
policy is implemented.  
Similarly, Nelson (2013) shows from a two cases study with Denmark and Germany that the 
form of business organization mode plays a crucial role for investment in ALMPs. Her results 
show that neocorporatist modes of organizations are associated with higher level of ALMP 
spending than firm-level organisation of business interests. Neocorporatist organizations are 
linked to a higher level of compassion and trust among actors and provide the capacity to 
coordinate and solve collective action problems at the national level while firm-level 
organization solve problems at a sub-national level, which leads to a lower support of policies 
at the national level. Employers in Germany, the country with stronger firm-level 
organization, have lower participation rates than Danish employers, where business interests 
are organized at the national level. These results show that the social infrastructure, in which 
a policy is implemented matters for its success.  
Concerning employers’ relation to existing ALMPs, two approaches can be distinguished; 
employers can differ in their attitudes towards ALMPs as well as in their participation or 
involvement in ALMPs. Along these two lines Bredgaard (2017) develops a typology of four 
different types of employers and their role in ALMP provision; the passive, the committed, the 
dismissive, and the sceptical employer. The committed and dismissive employers have 
congruent attitudes and behaviour of participation in ALMPs. The former has positive 
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attitudes and participates in ALMPs while the latter has a negative attitude towards ALMPs 
and is therefore not participating. The passive employer has a positive attitude towards ALMP 
but does not engage in them. The most puzzling type is the sceptical employer. Despite the 
employer’s negative attitude she or he is still involved in ALMPs. The motivation to participate 
in ALMP is explained by strategic accommodation (employer receives favours on other issues) 
or selective incentives (access to services). Bredgaard (2017) then analyses survey data from 
Danish employers to identify the most common types of employer. Surprisingly, the most 
common type of employer is the dismissive one. Almost half of the employers would not 
recruit through the jobcentre, would not hire long-term unemployed, candidates with a wage 
subsidy or available for a flex-job. Another third of employers can be classified as passive 
employers, while only a minority seems to fall into the category of the committed employer. 
These findings raise some doubts about the prevailing idea that Danish employers are 
comparatively more supportive of ALMPs and participate more actively in these measures 
than their peers in other countries as this has been found by other authors (Martin, 2004; 
Nelson, 2013). Similarly, Bredgaard and Halkjær (2016) show that only a very selective sample 
of firms is willing to participate in providing subsidised jobs; those with many unskilled 
workers, a deteriorating economic situation, covered by collective agreements or those active 
in the public sector.  
Regarding employers’ involvement in ALMPs, the literature shows that employers have 
different motives to participate in ALMPs. van der Aa and Berkel (2014), investigating 
employers’ involvement in demand-led ALMPs, which focus on employers’ willingness to 
hire unemployed, find three different groups of employers, the first becomes involved for 
facilitating recruitment of new workers, the second group participates to reduce wage costs 
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and the third out of social responsibility. Moreover, the authors show that involving 
employers as co-producers in ALMPs raises their satisfaction with the policy. Studies focusing 
on the UK mostly find that employers become involved because of economic advantages such 
as access to cheap labour (Gore, 2005). Based on survey data collected among employers in 
two disadvantaged labour market regions in England, Ingold and Stuart (2015) show that only 
a minority of employers are recruiting participants from the ‘Work Programme’, UK’s flagship 
welfare-to-work-programme. The main reasons for not participating were that employers did 
not know the programme or had a negative perception of the labour supply. This negative 
perception of the candidates from ALMPs is not uncommon and seems to be the main reason 
why employers are not getting involved in ALMPs. Studies focusing on employers’ perception 
of ALMPs and/or candidates that participated in specific measures support this conclusion. 
Generally, employers express concerns about the skills and personal attributes of candidates 
coming from specific ALMP measures. Belt and Richardson (2005) investigate whether 
training programmes that aim to provide low-skilled unemployed with the necessary skills to 
perform social labour, which requires communication skills and personality, rise the 
employability of these candidates. By conducting qualitative interviews with employers in 
North England, the authors find that employers are often reluctant to hire from pre-
employment training programmes due to the risk involved in employing unemployed people 
in terms of reliability. Moreover, employers state that the content of the training does not 
match their skill demand. Other authors have found similar negative effects for candidates 
coming through the PES (Larsen and Vesan, 2012; Bonoli and Hinrichs, 2012). This negative 
perception of the PES is caused by employers’ negative view of (long-term) unemployed 
individuals. As Larsen and Vesan (2012) elaborate, employers do not trust candidates from the 
PES as these candidates are perceived as the least productive ones. The PES is caught in a low-
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end equilibrium of the labour market. Similarly, Bonoli and Hinrichs (2012) find that 
employers perceive candidates referred by the PES as lacking motivation and applying only 
out of obligation. Sissons and Green (2017) stress the fact that it is not only important to look 
at employers’ engagement when it comes to the hiring of unemployed through ALMPs but 
also at the job quality of the match, as ALMPs and the PES are often used as a source for cheap 
labour. The authors show that getting employers involved into increasing skills and 
advancement of low-skilled workers is difficult as this contradicts the very nature of the low-
skilled labour market, where ALMPs participants are most likely to end up.  
Finally, a small number of studies address how participation in ALMPs influences employers’ 
actual hiring behaviour towards the participants. Burtless (1985) shows that welfare recipients 
available for a wage subsidy were less likely to find employment than those without such a 
subsidy. The most likely explanation for this unexpected result is that the availability of a wage 
subsidy had a stigmatizing effect and allowed employers to identify disadvantaged 
jobseekers. A similar negative signalling of wage subsidies was found by Baert (2016) for 
disables jobseekers in Belgium. In a field experiment, where application of fictional candidates 
with and without wage subsidy where sent to real employers, the author shows that the call-
back rates between the two groups do not differ in a statistically significant way. The same 
result was found by Deuchert and Kauer (2013) for young adolescence from sheltered 
Vocational and Training Programmes in Switzerland. The positive financial incentive of wage 
subsidies is likely to be offset by a negative signalling effect as it reveals limited productivity. 
Ingold and Valizade (2017) conceptualize ALMPs as labour market intermediaries (LMI) and 
investigate how employers’ involvement in ALMPs influences their likelihood to hire from 
disadvantaged groups. Their results show that the influence is marginal. Hiring from ALMP 
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measures did not fully compensate for employers’ selection criteria and the positive effect 
decreased dramatically when firm size was included in the statistical models. The authors 
conclude that ALMPs can act as information provider but not necessarily as matchmaker.  
Other measures that have been analysed are placement efforts of the PES by the means of 
referrals. In a factorial survey experiment van Belle et al. (2018) find that applicants that apply 
under a vacancy-referral system, where the employer is informed about the fact that the 
unemployed individual was referred by his or her caseworker to apply for the job, are 
evaluated less positively than candidates without such a referral. However, this negative result 
might also have to do with the configuration of the system; once caseworker and jobseeker 
agreed that the vacancy is suitable for the person, the jobseekers is obliged to apply and the 
employer is informed about this obligation. This obligation might influence an employers’ 
view of candidates negatively.  
Overall, the here discussed literature shows that employers attitudes towards ALMPs is 
shaped by their perception of unemployed individuals. In countries where employers assume 
that they are able to find skilled or suitable candidates within this population, perception of 
and attitudes towards ALMPs are more positive than in countries where being low-skilled and 
unemployed is more stigmatizing. Concerning the actual behaviour of employers, there is 
evidence that ALMPs that put a strong emphasis on pushing people into employment might 
be perceived negatively by employers. Given their importance in regulating the access to the 
labour market, employers’ behaviour towards candidates that participated in ALMP measure 
is underexplored. ALMP have the potential to influence employers’ hiring decision by 
delivering crucial pieces of information that are used by employers to take their decisions. So 
far, the existing studies investigate mostly the effect of wage subsidies, measures which 
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address the demand-side of the labour market. However, ALMPs consists of a much more 
diverse set of measures including training- or temporary employment programmes and 
placement efforts addressing the supply-side. The different chapters of this thesis deliver 
insight into this research gap.  
ALMPs and the PES in Switzerland 
As the empirical analysis in the first two chapters focuses on the Swiss case, the present chapter 
provides some information about the particularities of the Swiss system and, as these are 
important to understand, the mechanisms through which specific interventions influence 
employers’ hiring behaviour. Switzerland has a comparatively strong labour market 
performance with a unemployment rate that reached on average 2.5% in 2018 (Seco, 2019a). 
Activation in Switzerland is characterized by a generous benefit system combined with a strict 
job-search control and strong incentives to move into jobs. The expenditures on ALMPs are 
comparatively high and the Swiss PES is well equipped to intervene in the unemployment 
spell (Duell et al., 2010).  
Services related to unemployment are delivered mostly at the cantonal level by the 142 
regional employment offices (REO) (Behncke et al., 2010). In order to obtain benefits, 
unemployed individuals have to register at the REO and meet on a regular basis with their 
caseworker. The first meeting usually takes place within the first two months of 
unemployment and subsequently the same caseworker and the unemployed individual are 
required to meet at least once a month (Behncke et al., 2008). Caseworkers provide counselling 
services, refer clients to measures of ALMPs, and carry out placement services. They have 
considerable scope in the choice of their reinsertion strategy and can apply whatever strategy 
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they think is best for their client. Caseworkers at the REO can assign clients to the programmes 
they think are most suitable to speed up labour market integration.  
Switzerland has developed a comprehensive system of ALMPs with a wide range of different 
measures. The largest share of ALMP expenditures is devoted to supported employment and 
rehabilitation followed by training programmes, a smaller share is spend on employment 
incentives (Duell et al., 2010). Training courses include collective courses organised by private 
or public providers, which are exclusively for clients referred by the PES, or individual courses 
offered on the private market. The majority of unemployed follows a collective course. Other 
important categories are practice firms that offer work experience and temporary employment 
programmes. The later are often attributed towards the end of the eligibility for 
unemployment benefits (Gerfin and Lechner, 2002) and are also used as sanctioning tool by 
caseworkers and thereby include stigmatizing effects. When a caseworker assigns a client to 
an ALMP, participation is mandatory and non-compliance can be subject to sanctions in the 
form of benefit reduction.  
An important aspect of the caseworkers’ activity is to establish and maintain contacts with 
local employers as these contacts are an important placement strategy for caseworkers. Since 
employers are not obliged to register open vacancies to the PES1, caseworkers have to provide 
good quality service to employers in order to get information about vacancies and to be valued 
as a source of labour (Behncke et al., 2008a). Caseworkers have considerable discretionary 
power in their decision of whether they want to refer a client to a specific vacancy or not. 
                                                          
1 Sine July 2018 there is a job registration requirement for occupations with an unemployment rate of at least 8% 
to the local REO. Before it can be advertised elsewhere, the job vacancy has to be published exclusively on the 
online job portal of the REO that can only be accessed by jobseekers registered with the REO for the first five 
working days (Seco, 2019b).  
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However, since employers are an important partner for pursuing an effective placement 
strategy, it is important for caseworkers to be selective in their referrals as otherwise employers 
will not work with them in the future.  
The performance of each RPO and each single caseworker is evaluated using a benchmarking 
system giving strong incentives for a quick reintegration of the unemployed. The performance 
is monitored at the federal level by the State Secretariat for Economic affairs (SECO) using four 
indicators: the speed of reintegration (50%), prevention of benefit exhaustion (20%), 
prevention of long-term unemployment, and prevention of repeated registration (10%) taking 
into account differences in the local economic structure of each canton (Duell et al., 2010). The 
ranking of the single RPO is meant to exert peer-pressure on RPO to improve their 
performance. The performance indicators are assumed to have an important influence on the 
activation strategy of caseworkers as they favour quick labour market integration (Duell et al. 
2010).  
Theoretical mechanisms and expectations 
Given the strong focus on activation in many countries, it is not uncommon for unemployed 
individuals to participate in an ALMP measure or to be referred by the PES. While 
participation in ALMPs might have an effect on the unemployed individual itself, for example 
by providing new skills or improve job search behaviour, ALMPs might also influence 
employers hiring behaviour. ALMPs intervene in the matching process of the demand and 
supply of labour by revealing information about a candidate’s productivity or skills and add 
the caseworker as a third actor into the game.  
The main reason why labour market policies should influence employers’ hiring behaviour is 
due to the uncertainty that characterizes the labour market induced by a situation of 
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information asymmetry. A candidates’ productivity is not directly observable and often 
employers and jobseekers are not directly connected to each other. Public interventions can 
address these deficits by delivering information that reduces the uncertainty associated with 
a candidate’s productivity and by connecting the two actors. Employers are likely to use and 
interpret all kind information in order to select the best candidate. ALMP might provide 
relevant information to employers as participation can serve as a signal for productivity or 
other important capabilities of the candidates. This signalling effect of ALMP is an unintended 
consequence of a specific policy arising due to labour market asymmetries and employers’ 
need to reduce uncertainty. Essentially, the effect of ALMP interventions on employers’ hiring 
decisions can only occur in a situation of labour oversupply. In such a situation, employers 
can be particularly picky in choosing candidates and, as they are concerned with choosing the 
best candidate, they are likely to consider the information provided by ALMP participation. 
The signalling effect of ALMPs is ideally positive, but can also be negative when it allows 
employers to identify and stigmatize vulnerable groups or reveals a lack rather than an 
improvement of relevant skills depending on the exact policy design (see for example van der 
Belle et al., 2018 or Falk et al., 2007 in the literature review above).  
Similarly, the PES can deliver relevant information but also act as a labour market 
intermediary by connecting otherwise disconnected workers and act as a matchmaker (Bonet 
et al., 2013). A long line of research has demonstrated the importance of social networks for 
employment outcomes (Granovetter, 1974; Pellizzari, 2010; Lin, 1999; Marsden and Gorman, 
2001; Fernandez et al., 2000). Social networks have the advantage that they connect otherwise 
disconnected actor and can provide trustworthy information (Castilla et al., 2013). However, 
they also put those with a weak social network at disadvantage and it has been showed that 
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returns to social networks vary between groups (Bonoli and Turtschi, 2015). To the extent that 
the PES is able to create connections between employers and jobseekers, it fulfils as similar 
function as social contacts in the labour market. This might be especially relevant for otherwise 
disadvantaged and vulnerable groups as they usually have less access to social contacts.  
Is it necessary that employers’ know about the functioning of the ALMP- and PES-system in 
order to use and interpret the information entailed in them? Not necessarily, even when 
employers do not know about how participants are allocated to ALMP programmes, they 
might have some beliefs about how programme allocation works and base their interpretation 
on their assumption about how they believe programmes are assigned. When programme 
participation is revealed to an employer, they are confronted with this kind of information and 
are likely to interpret it.  
Micro-economic evaluations of ALMPs show that there are considerable heterogeneous effects 
of ALMPs, meaning that their effects vary among different sub-groups. It can be expected that 
part of this heterogeneous effect arise because employers interpret ALMP participation 
depending on other candidate’s characteristics. Generally, it can be assumed that ALMP and 
PES recommendations are more important for groups that are more distant to the labour 
market. As the productivity of these groups is less certain, the information entailed in the 
ALMP participation is more important to diminish the uncertainty. ALMP interventions might 
compensate for the difficulties caused by low education or migration background, while for 
individuals that are closer to the labour market the stigmatizing effect of these interventions 
might prevail.  
Not only unemployed individuals but also employers are a heterogeneous group and it is 
likely that the interpretation of ALMP participation varies across them. Depending on 
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employers’ beliefs of how ALMPs are attributed to participants, the signalling value of such a 
programme can vary. For recommendations of the PES, previous contact with the PES and the 
frequency of the contact might influence how employers value such a recommendation. In 
cases where a trustful relationship could be established, such recommendations are likely to 
be more successful.  
Another factor that is likely to influence employers’ evaluation of ALMPs is the recruitment 
context. In sectors with high unemployment and consequently many individuals participating 
in ALMP, as this is for example the case in low-skilled occupations, the stigmatizing effect of 
ALMPs might be less sever and due to the oversupply of labour ALMPs might be more 
important for the sorting of candidates. Finally, whether a policy has a positive or negative 
effect on employers’ hiring behaviour depends on the specific policy design and how well it 
fits the actual requirements of a specific job.  
The following thesis examines the different aspects of how public interventions of activation 
polices influence employers’ hiring behaviour and sheds some light on the interaction between 
policy design, characteristics of the unemployed and the job they are recruited for. 
The first chapter focuses on the ability of public policies to create connections between 
jobseekers and employers and to what extent these connections can substitute connections 
created by social contacts. In particular, the chapter investigates how employers value 
recommendations from caseworkers at the PES and compares it with recommendations from 
social networks. A crucial factor for referrals to be a source of valuable information is that the 
referrer can be selective in who she refers to vacancies. This is usually the case for social 
contacts but not necessarily for the PES. Since caseworkers in Switzerland have considerable 
discretionary power in their activation strategy and also in their decision to refer clients to 
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vacancies (Duell et al., 2010), caseworkers are in a similar position as social contacts when it 
comes to the selectivity of recommendations.  
Since the benefits of social networks are distributed unequally, otherwise disadvantaged 
candidates often have a less beneficial network (see e.g. Bonoli and Turtschi, 2015) with lower 
returns (Marsden and Gorman, 2001). Therefore, recommendations of the PES can be an 
alternative source for improving labour market outcomes of disadvantaged groups. I find that 
recommendations by the PES have a positive effect on employers’ rating of candidates but in 
a selective way, namely in instances of higher uncertainty, while recommendations from social 
contacts are valued consistently in all instances.  
The second chapter looks at how different measures of ALMPs, such as training, employment 
programmes and wage subsidies are used by employers to sort candidates. It is investigated 
whether candidates that participated in a specific programme are evaluated better or worse 
than candidates without programme participation and whether the effect differs for specific 
groups and over occupations. We argue that programme participation reveals information 
about a candidate’s productivity. This signalling effect can be direct by providing information 
about a candidate’s ability or skills, for example, by showing that the candidate was able to 
complete a certain training programme or accepting the harsh working condition of an 
employment programme, or indirect, by providing information about a caseworker’s 
evaluation of a candidate. Participation in a specific programme is often decided by the 
caseworker and therefore reflects the caseworker’s evaluation of a candidate. Some 
programmes are used as sanctioning tools (employment programmes) and might reveal 
behavioural problems or low productivity (wage subsidy). These signalling effects are often 
unintended consequences of a specific policy. We show that programmes are useful for 
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candidates further away from the labour market in terms of education and migration 
background and for those applying to low-skilled occupation but entail negative signalling 
effects for those closer to the labour market.  
A particular challenge when studying employers’ hiring behaviour is that data on hiring 
processes is difficult to obtain and, if at hand, with observational data it is difficult to address 
the problem of endogeneity as employers might base their hiring decisions on factors that are 
unobservable for the researcher (Mouw, 2003). To better understand employers’ hiring 
behaviour and what is cause and what is consequence, experimental methods constitute a 
fruitful alternative (Gërxhani, 2017) as they provide the advantage of control. Researcher have 
full control over the information available to the employer, which eliminates the biases due to 
unobserved confounders (Jackson and Cox, 2013), therefore, one is able to isolate the 
mechanisms leading to an employer’s decision.  
The first two chapters of this thesis rely on factorial survey experiments or vignette study. 
Such experiments have become increasingly popular to study employers’ behaviour (Biesma 
et al., 2007; Di Stasio and Van De Werfhorst, 2016; Damelang and Abraham, 2016; Di Stasio, 
2014). In factorial survey experiments employers are confronted with fictional hiring scenarios 
and are asked to judge fictional candidates that vary on several dimensions. In this case, 
among other factors, whether the candidates were recommended by someone and whether 
they participated in an ALMP. The random combination of the different dimensions allows 
disentangling their effects.  
Compared to traditional surveys, factorial surveys have several advantages (Wallander, 2009; 
Auspurg et al., 2014; Auspurg and Hinz, 2015). First, by giving a concrete description of a 
situation one can study the context and conditions that affect a judgement. Second, because 
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the different elements of vignettes are varied at the same time, the respondents are less aware 
of the manipulation and their answers less bias due to social desirability. Third, compared to 
other experimental approaches, such as field experiments, the experimenter is able to collect 
additional data about the respondent. Overall, factorial surveys seem particular suitable for 
studying sensitive issues and are less prone to social desirability bias than traditional survey 
research (Auspurg et al., 2014).  
Finally, the third chapter takes a qualitative approach and examines the underlying motives 
and reasoning employers apply when considering ALMPs for their hiring decisions. While the 
results from survey experiments show whether a certain type of information, such as 
education or the participation in an ALMP, have an influence on employers’ hiring behaviour, 
these results tell us little about the reasons why this is the case. Therefore, the third chapter 
presents findings from semi-structured interviews with employers in the hotel- and retail 
sector. Employers were asked about their experience with candidates from ALMP measures 
and how and why participation in such a measure influenced their impression of the 
candidates. The aim is to understand employers’ motive to consider ALMP participation of 
candidates when taking hiring decisions. We developed a theoretical argument of how 
employers interpret ALMP participation and identify assumed agency, i.e., whether 
employers believes that the agency for initiating ALMP participation lies with the jobseeker 
(voluntary participation) or the job centre (mandatory participation), as a crucial factor that 
determines whether their evaluation of ALMPs is positive or negative.  
33 
 
Conclusion 
Discussion of the contribution  
The three chapters have shed light on different aspects of employers’ perception of public 
interventions to address unemployment. Such interventions mainly target individuals that 
suffer from the consequences of employers’ hiring decisions. The question therefore arises 
whether such interventions can successfully influence employers’ hiring behaviour. So far, 
little research has focus on the employers’ perception of these policies. However, employers’ 
evaluations of these measures contribute to an important extent to their overall effectiveness. 
The main finding emerging from the three chapters is that employers’ evaluation of candidates 
participated in ALMPs or are recommended by the PES depends on other characteristics of 
the candidates. Generally, for candidates further away from the labour market ALMP 
participation can improve hiring outcomes while for those closer to the labour market 
stigmatizing effects might prevail, especially those of employment programmes. Similarly, 
recommendations from the PES could narrow the gaps in the rating between some groups, as 
for example between natives and non-natives or between candidates with a general and a 
vocational education. However, the interaction effects between the type of recommendation 
and the specific characteristics were in most cases not statistically significant. The fact that in 
many cases the interaction effects were not statistically significant might be due to the low 
number of cases in each category. Ideally, one would run the survey on a bigger sample of 
employers in order to increase the number of respondents.  
The qualitative work in chapter 3 delivers important insights to explain the findings of the first 
two chapters. In chapter 1, I find that employers rated candidates that were recommended by 
the PES more favourable than candidates with no recommendation. This finding is in contrast 
with other studies that find that employers were reluctant to hire candidates from the PES 
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(Larsen and Vesan, 2012; Bonoli and Hinrichs, 2012). These contrasting findings might have to 
do with the form of the recommendation. In the vignette study in chapter 1, the candidates 
were personally recommended by a caseworker, while in previous studies employers were 
asked more generally about their view of candidates being sent by the PES, suggesting a less 
personal relationship between caseworker and employers.  
From the qualitative interviews in chapter 3 it emerged that those employers with a close 
personal contact at the PES, with whom they interact on a regular basis, were more likely to 
turn to the PES for recruiting new staff and had in general a more positive view of the PES. 
This illustrates that investing in personal contacts with employers is an important strategy for 
caseworkers to place their clients in employment. This is also supported by the findings of 
Behncke et al. (2008) who show that caseworkers who maintain direct contacts with employers 
achieve higher re-integration rates. Other employers see the PES as last resort for labour and 
turn to the PES only when they were not able to successfully recruit candidates through other 
channels or when they have to recruit a large number of employees, for example when opening 
a new site.  
However, the quantitative analysis in chapter 1 does not reveal any differences between 
employers that announce their position to the PES and those who do not. This might have to 
do with the setting up of the vignettes. In the experimental setting, employers might assumed 
that the recommendation is coming from a caseworker they know. Here the limitation of the 
experimental survey methodology becomes apparent, while we can control for the kind of 
information respondents get, we cannot know why they interpret the piece of information in 
a certain way. I therefore believe that it is important to complement findings from 
experimental research with insights from qualitative research.  
35 
 
This is also true for the signalling value of ALMPs investigated in chapter 2. The quantitative 
results showed that employers interpret the information of ALMP participation and use it to 
sort candidates but it does not reveal why this is the case. Chapter 3, which looks more closely 
into employers’ motive to use ALMP participation when hiring candidates, reveals that the 
majority of employers does actually not know much about how participants are allocated to 
ALMPs. However, to interpret this kind of information, it is not necessary to know how the 
system works but the interpretation depends on employers’ beliefs about how system works. 
Different beliefs about ALMP allocation lead to a different interpretation of ALMP 
participation. However, interpreting the information entailed in ALMPs requires that 
employers generally trust in the system of ALMPs. The fact that ALMPs are used and 
interpreted when evaluating candidates, as found in chapter 2, means that employers 
generally trust in the current ALMP system in Switzerland and consider this information as 
useful. Otherwise, ALMP should not have an effect on their hiring behaviour. Future research 
should take these differences in beliefs about the functioning of labour market policies into 
account and control for this variable in the analysis.  
In this thesis, I have looked at ALMPs and PES recommendations separately; however, these 
two factors are often entangled. It is likely that many unemployed individuals participate in 
ALMPs and are subsequently recommended by their caseworker. The data from the survey 
experiment in chapter 1 entails the two variables, ALMP participation and PES 
recommendation and therefore allows looking at their interaction. The contrasts of predictive 
margins displayed in figure 2 show that recommendations from the PES are relevant only for 
the groups with no ALMP participation and the interaction effect is not statistically significant.  
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Figure 2: Contrast of predictive margins of PES recommendations over ALMP participation 
Notes: Dependent variable: rating on an 11-point Likert scale. Horizontal bars represent the 
95% confidence intervals (available from the author on request).  
 
For candidates participating in an ALMP a recommendation by the PES does not significantly 
improve the rating of the candidate. This finding might be a consequence of the low number 
of cases in each ALMP category per type of recommendation (only about 200 for each 
combination of the ALMP and recommendation variable). Unfortunately, the sample was too 
small to run further sub-analysis such as for example between natives and non-natives with 
ALMP participation and recommendations or over occupations with different skill-levels. 
However, the interplay between different measures of ALMPs and then subsequently being 
recommended by the PES would be interesting to investigate further, especially, because such 
a combination is not uncommon.  
Another main finding emerging from the three chapters is that employers appear to be a 
homogenous group. In both survey experiments we also captured variables at the employers’ 
level such as education, position, age, or migration background. However, when controlling 
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for these factors the results regarding PES and ALMPs did not change. The experiment for 
chapter 2 was run exclusively among employers in the hotel sector. The level of variance in 
the rating of the candidates that can be attributed to the respondents-level is around 30 per 
cent (30 for the cleaning position, 27 for the receptionist position). The survey experiment in 
chapter 1 was run with HR-professionals from different sectors and hiring for different 
positions, consequently, the level of variance in the rating of the candidates that can be 
attributed to the respondents-level is somewhat higher, namely 45 per cent. However, 
controlling for these factors did not have any influence on the results2. Surprisingly, whether 
a respondent’s firm announces open positions to the PES or not does not matter for the 
influence of ALMPs or PES recommendations.  
The same result emerges from the qualitative interviews, although the number of respondents 
was smaller; there were no obvious differences in terms of respondent’s gender, age, 
nationality, or the sector of activity in the responses. The recruitment strategy of employers 
seems to follow a common pattern. Of course, the positions for which employers were asked 
to imagine hiring someone were all in the low- to mid-skilled sector; however, it can be 
assumed that recruitment patterns are similar for other positions. What we did not capture in 
these experiments were attitudinal variables. A recent study (Wilson, 2017) shows that 
recruiters with a more egalitarian attitude were more likely to hire youths from disadvantaged 
background for apprenticeship positions.  
Significance of findings  
The findings of these three chapters help us to better understand employers’ hiring behaviour 
and how public policy interventions might influence employers’ selection of candidates as 
                                                          
2 See the results for the fixed-effects models as well as models with control variables in chapters 1 and 2.  
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well as to understand the different mechanisms through which ALMP programmes unfold 
their effects. This thesis contributes to the literature by combining the research on employers’ 
hiring behaviour and the one on effectiveness of ALMPs by investigating the policies’ effect 
on the demand-side. From the different contributions three main findings emerge; first, 
employers interpret and consider carefully the information provided in a CV, also 
participation in ALMPs, when assessing candidates. Second, part of the effect of ALMPs is 
generated through the behaviour of the demand-side, which is important to take into account 
for the overall effectiveness of these programmes. Third, public policy interventions do not 
produce uniform effects but interact with other characteristics of applicants. Generally, public 
interventions are more helpful for individuals further away from the labour market, thus, 
those that suffered from the selectivity of employers hiring behaviour in the first place. I will 
elaborate on these three points in more detail below.  
Compared to a whole CV, that was carefully build by choosing the adequate education and 
accumulating work experience, participation in a measure of ALMP or a recommendation by 
the PES might seem like a minor detail, however, as shown in this thesis, this kind of 
information is not unimportant for employers’ hiring decisions and thus directly affects a 
candidate’s chances on the labour market. This illustrates that the hiring process is 
characterized by a lack of information, which employers are keen to reduce as they would like 
to know as much as possible about the expected productivity of a candidate. Public policy 
interventions are an important source that contributes to the reduction of this uncertainty.  
The fact that employers use the information about ALMP participation shows that an 
important part of the effect of ALMPs is produced through the demand-side. Even though 
measures are often intended to upskill or change the behaviour of the supply-side, the 
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demand-side should be taken into account when evaluating the effect of these policies. Effects 
that are generated through the demand-side’s hiring behaviour might also be able to explain 
some of the puzzling results found by ALMP evaluations, which show that sometimes 
programmes indented to improve jobseekers chances on the labour market sometimes do not 
work out and produce negative effects. Employers might use the information that someone 
participated in an ALMP programme to identify and avoid weak candidates. When evaluating 
the effects of public policies it is important to distinguish the different effects generated 
through affecting either the behaviour of the supply- or the demand-side. It might be possible 
that these two effects are contradictory and cancel each other out or one mitigates the other. 
Disentangling these effects might help us to understand the puzzling effects found for some 
programmes.  
It is important to know that public policy interventions do not produce uniform ratings of 
candidates but interact with other characteristics and proxies employers use when assessing 
the suitability of candidates. How ALMP participation is interpreted depends not only on the 
type of intervention but also on how informative other characteristics and signals are and on 
the level of uncertainty. For example, in the first chapter it has been showed that 
recommendations from the PES have a positive effect on the rating of a candidate when 
uncertainty of higher, which is the case for candidates with general education, migrant 
background, and applicants to higher-skilled positions. Similarly, the second chapter 
demonstrates that ALMPs are more helpful for individuals further away from the labour 
market such as low-skilled and migrants, and when applying for low-skilled occupations. 
Moreover, in an companying study (Auer et al., 2019), we found that employers apply a 
matching hierarchy strategy by combining ethical and occupations rankings and prefer 
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migrant candidates for low-skilled jobs but Swiss applicants for mid-skilled jobs. Similarly, in 
an additional study, we (Fossati et al., 2018) found that employers give less favourable ratings 
to migrants when they present signals of cultural attachment to their country of origin.  
There are complex interactions between different characteristics of the candidate as well as the 
occupation and public interventions. In sum, information provided by the PES or ALMPs are 
considered as positive when either uncertainty about a candidates is high or for those it is well 
known that they struggle on the labour market, like migrants or low-skilled. For such 
candidates, public policy intervention can be seen as common. However, programme 
participation might turn out to have a negative effect for candidates that appear closer to the 
labour market, as new information about their productivity is revealed in a negative way.  
Policy implications  
These findings are relevant beyond academic purposes and have some implications for policy. 
Since employers’ interpretation of ALMP participation varies between different groups, one 
should carefully consider who to assign to which programmes. ALMP seem particularly 
helpful for individuals further away from the labour market. Unfortunately, as we show by 
analysing data from evaluation studies in a systematic review, those individuals that 
potentially benefit the most from ALMPs from an employers’ perspective, the migrants and 
low-skilled, are often excluded from the most effective ALMP interventions (Bonoli and 
Liechti, 2018) This is not only unjust but can also be seen as an inefficient allocation of publicly 
financed means. Caseworkers should thus be trained and instructed in how to assign their 
clients to programmes. While every unemployed client should get the best possible treatment 
including ALMP measures and recommendation for vacancies, it is important to leave 
discretionary power to caseworkers in the choice of their reinsertion strategy. Especially, for 
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the recommendations to employers it is important for caseworkers that they can be selective 
in referring candidates for establishing and maintaining a trustful relationship with 
employers. Such an individualized strategy requires that caseworkers thoroughly evaluate 
their clients’ competences and meet with them on a regular basis.  
A particular challenge for public policy interventions is that measures designed to help 
disadvantaged jobseekers eventually help employers to identify them as such and produce 
negative signalling effects. However, sanctioning tools and benefit conditionality are a key 
element of ALMPs to ensure job-search effort. While some interventions such as employment 
programmes might be important for the supply-side , for example for proving a structured 
course of the day or as a sanctioning tool to ensure job search effort, and are therefore needed, 
they should not necessarily be revealed to employers when applying for a job as they might 
be interpreted negatively. The same is true for training programmes that might reveal a lack 
of relevant skills. Again, when to reveal what kind of programme depends on the other 
characteristics of the candidate as well as the occupation and is not an easy to answer question. 
However, it is important that caseworker at the PES are aware of this dilemma and that 
programmes suitable to their clients should not necessarily be revealed to employers.  
The most promising avenue is to design programmes that are directly relevant for the job and 
signal a positive motivation, as found out in the third chapter (Fossati et al., 2018). The 
involvement of employers into the provision of ALMPs might be a promising way since this 
helps to create connections between unemployed and employers and might reduce employers’ 
biases against and reluctance to hire certain candidates. However, this is challenging as this 
entails the danger of unintended negative signalling effect once employers are aware that 
certain measures are used as sanctioning tool or targeted to unproductive candidates. ALMP 
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interventions should not only be targeted to change the behaviour of the supply-side but also 
include the demand-side perspective by influencing employers’ condition to hire certain 
candidates.  
Challenges and Limitations 
Of course this thesis does not come without limitations and room for improvement. In this 
chapter I critically discuss these limitations and the decisions made during data collection. The 
limitations refer to the scope conditions as well as to the applied methodology and choices in 
the design of the experiment.  
Let us first discuss the scope conditions. All studies were conducted in Switzerland, although 
chapter 3 adds a comparative perspective by also looking at Sweden. A discussion of the scope 
conditions is necessary when considering the limitations of this work and the generalizability 
of the results. Switzerland is a country with a traditional low unemployment rate and 
consequently being unemployed might be more stigmatizing than in contexts with higher 
unemployment. How does this affect employers’ perception of ALMP participants and the 
PES? On one hand, the overall good labour market situation might facilitate the PES to 
establish contacts with employers and find appropriate vacancies for their clients. On the other 
hand, employers might be more reluctant to hire through the PES, as they think only the least 
productive workers are registered at the PES. In countries with higher unemployment rate, 
this stigmatizing effect might be smaller and consequently, the positive effect of PES referrals 
and ALMP participation is more pronounced. This might be reinforced by the fact that 
Switzerland can be characterised as a continental welfare state with a liberal face (Armingeon, 
2001), in which interventions into the labour market are regarded somewhat sceptical.  
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Another important scope condition is the configuration of the Swiss ALMP system. Miller and 
Rosenbaum (1997) show that employers only consider information received in a context that 
ensures trustworthiness. Although, state interventions are perceived sceptically and 
employers have in general little knowledge about ALMPs in Switzerland (chapter 3), the fact 
they employers use participation in ALMP measures (chapter 2) and information by the PES 
(chapter 1) demonstrate that they generally trust the system, as otherwise they would not 
consider this information as trustworthy. The specific institutional setting might influence the 
trustworthiness of information and consequently whether employers use it for evaluating 
candidates. It would be interesting to run the same study in other contexts with a different 
organization of unemployment policy to test for the influence of different institutional settings. 
To a limited extent this thesis addresses different country contexts in a qualitative perspective 
by including the case of Sweden. These results indicate that employers’ view and knowledge 
of ALMPs does not significantly differ between the two countries. However, in terms of 
existing ALMP measures Sweden and Switzerland are comparative.  
Another difficulty that arises when studying employers is the access to a sample of employers. 
Employers are a difficult population to survey (Di Stasio, 2013) and generally response rates 
are low (Damelang and Abraham, 2016). This is a particular challenge for running vignette 
studies as one would ideally get access to a large representative sample of employers. 
Collaboration with employers’ association, as we have chosen to do in the first two chapters, 
might be the most promising strategy to approach this kind of population.  
Next, the limitations steaming from the applied methodology are discussed. Survey 
experiments have many advantages. They are less biased than item-based questions and are 
characterized by a high internal validity (Auspurg et al., 2014). Experiments are considered as 
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a useful tool to study employers’ hiring behaviour (Gërxhani, 2017), especially, because 
observational data on this sensitive issue is not easily available. However, the shortcomings of 
the method are that respondents are put into an artificially created situation. Employers are 
aware of the fact that they are in a fictional setting and their decisions have no real life 
consequences and they are forced into a specific setting. In reality, whether a candidate is 
chosen or not does not only depend on the characteristic of the candidate but also on who else 
applies. The pool of applicants in vignette studies is artificially created and consists of 
relatively few applicants. However, even when the choices in vignette studies might not reflect 
real hiring decisions, their results reveal whether a certain piece of information is used by 
employers to sort candidates and might influence the latter’s position in the labour queue.  
Another limitation results from the choice of the vignette dimensions. In the two vignette 
experiments presented here all candidates were presented as short-term unemployed and this 
unemployment was involuntary due to the closure of the firm the candidates previously 
worked at. It can be assumed that employers are more sceptical about hiring a candidate the 
longer he is unemployed (Oberholzer-Gee, 2008) and when the reason for unemployment are 
less attributable to externals factors such as the closure of the firm. What does this mean for 
employers’ evaluation of ALMP participation and PES recommendations? As our results 
show, candidates further away from the labour market profit more from public interventions. 
It can therefore be assumed that ALMP participation and PES recommendations get more 
important with the length of the unemployment spell and other reasons for unemployment 
than involuntary ones. To test these assumptions these dimensions could easily be added and 
varied in a vignette study. However, since adding too many dimensions entails the danger of 
cognitive overload of the participants (Auspurg and Hinz, 2015), these dimensions were not 
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tested in the two surveys. Which bring us to the next shortcoming; in vignette studies one can 
only test the influence of the dimensions included in the vignettes, in reality, employers might 
have more detailed information about candidates, on which they base their decisions. In our 
experiments, for example, we did not vary experience and previous employers, two factors 
that might influence employers’ hiring decisions. However, as this thesis is mainly focused on 
low-skilled positions, it can be assumed that experience is less important than in more 
qualified positions.  
Moreover, even if the information presented in vignettes should be as precisely as possible, 
there is always room for interpretation. Concerning recommendation from the PES and social 
contacts investigate in chapter 1 this means that the person giving the recommendation was 
not further specified. Whether an employer trusts in a recommendation also depends on the 
relationship with the referrer, who the referred person is, and how frequently the two parties 
interact.  
Future research should look more into the relationship between the three parties. For example, 
the qualitative interviews for chapter 3 show that employers trust more in recommendations 
from caseworkers with whom they established a personal contact. Similarly and as discussed 
above, employers’ beliefs about ALMP allocation remain unknown in a vignette study. 
However, as shown in chapter 3, they are crucial for the way employers interpret ALMP 
participation for their hiring decisions. Future contributions could therefore ask questions 
about ALMP allocation processes and use these as control variables. Vignette studies deliver 
information about which dimensions matter for employers hiring behaviour and in which 
direction but do not tell us why employers interpret information in a certain way. Therefore, 
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complementing results from quantitative analysis with insights from qualitative studies can 
be a promising strategy.  
Concluding remarks  
The chapters of this thesis were concerned with the question in how far efforts made by the 
state to re-integrate individuals into the labour market in the form of public policies have an 
influence on employers’ hiring behaviour. This is important to know in order to design and 
implement effective policies. The results of this thesis illustrate that the effect generated by 
public interventions are complex and that they are depended on other factors such as the skill 
segment of the labour market or other candidate’s characteristics. Overall, the results show 
that measures of activation policies such as ALMP programmes and PES recommendations 
are particularly relevant for individuals that are more distant to the labour market while those 
with good labour market prospect might suffer from ALMP participation. From a policy 
perspective it is important to carefully consider these different effects and avoid interventions 
that stigmatize unemployed jobseekers. The construction of measures that combine control 
mechanisms and that are perceived positively by employers is the key challenge of an effective 
public policy. From an inequality perspective it is important not to create social division 
through stigmatization and not to prioritize employment by legitimizing employers’ to offer 
low-wages and insecure jobs social inclusion over individual well-being.  
Future research needs to look into how difference in the institutional contexts and social 
infrastructure play out. It can be expected that different forms of how actors coordinate with 
each other might have an influence on how employers perceive measures of public policies. 
The same measures might play out differently in coordinate than in liberal market economies. 
Moreover, labour market disadvantage has multiple dimensions that can be influenced 
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differently by the same ALMP. Focusing on how these aspects play out on the demand-side of 
the labour market is important to fully understand the effects and consequences ALMPs have 
on individual labour market outcomes.   
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Chapter 1 
Connecting employers and workers: Can recommendations 
from the public employment service act as a substitute for social 
contacts?  
Fabienne Liechti3 
Forthcoming in Work, Employment and Society 
Abstract  
This article investigates how employers value recommendations from the public employment 
service (PES) compared to recommendations from a social contact for their hiring decision. 
The importance of social contacts in the labour market creates inequality by putting those with 
a weak social network at disadvantage. It is therefore important to know if public agencies 
designed to act as labour market intermediaries (LMI) can compensate for this disadvantage 
by successfully connecting jobseekers to employers. This question is investigated by means of 
a factorial survey experiment conducted among Swiss HR-professionals. The results 
demonstrate that employers value recommendations from social contacts but the influence of 
recommendations from the public employment service is more selective and compensates only 
partially for the disadvantage experienced by certain groups.  
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Introduction 
Social networks have been proven to be an important determinant of individual labour market 
outcomes (Castilla et al., 2013; Granovetter, 1995; Oesch and von Ow, 2017; Pellizzari, 2010; 
Rubineau and Fernandez, 2015). This is because they reduce uncertainty (Castilla et al., 2013) 
and connect otherwise disconnected actors (Burt, 1992; Rees, 1996). While social networks 
yield many advantages, their importance in the hiring process is also held accountable for 
causing job segregation and labour market inequality, since social capital is distributed 
unequally (Castilla et al., 2013; Behtoui and Neergaard, 2010; Lin, 2000; Marsden and Gorman, 
2001).  
Against this background, this article considers the question of whether public agencies, such 
as the public employment service (PES), can provide a substitute to network contacts for 
jobseekers, especially those who are poorly connected. Some scholars argue that social policy 
should focus on ‘creating connections’ between disadvantaged jobseekers and employers to 
remediate networks deficits (Fernandez, 2010; Holzer 2009; Ingold and Valizade, 2017). 
Policies designed as labour market intermediaries (LMI), which means agencies that stand 
between jobseekers and employers, could be a valuable strategy to ameliorate the labour 
market prospects of disadvantaged groups and create equal employment opportunities. While 
research confirms that employers value recommendations from social contacts (Di Stasio and 
Gërxhani, 2015; Fernandez et al., 2000; Neckerman and Fernandez, 2003), little is known about 
what they think of recommendations by the PES or other public agencies. In other words, it is 
not known whether connections created by public agencies that act as LMIs are an effective 
substitute for social contacts in the labour market.  
61 
 
By addressing this issue, this article relates to several strands of the sociological and labour 
market literature. First, it connects to the literature on social networks, by investigating 
whether formally created connections can act as a substitute for social contacts. Little is known 
about how the type of connector, i.e. the agent standing between jobseeker and employer, 
influences the value of a recommendation. The knowledge of whether social contacts can be 
replaced by other types of connections is especially relevant for groups suffering from labour 
market disadvantage due to a weak social network. Second, it relates to the literature on the 
PES and LMI, by investigating the demand-side’s view of such services. This is important to 
know, because more recently many countries have made attempts to adapt activation policies 
and services to the needs of employers, with some countries having contracted out these 
services to private providers. There is growing scholarly and practical interest in the 
recruitment of disadvantaged groups and how public services can be made attractive to 
employers (van Berkel et al., 2017; Bunt et al., 2007; van der Aa and van Berkel, 2014). 
Therefore, employers’ perception is important for the overall effectiveness of these services, as 
they require candidates coming from the PES to be assessed positively. Third, it contributes to 
the literature on activation, which so far has paid little attention to the potential of social 
networks and their substitute for the reintegration of unemployed jobseekers into the labour 
market.  
These research gaps are addressed by means of a factorial survey experiment among HR-
professionals in Switzerland. The experiment tests how employers rate job applicants who are 
recommended either by a social contact or by the PES. In addition, it examines whether 
recommendations can compensate for the labour market disadvantage of certain groups.  
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Connections in the labour market 
The labour market is characterized by uncertainty and structural holes, meaning that employer 
and jobseekers are not directly connected to each other (Burt, 1992; Rees, 1966). Third parties 
that stand between jobseekers and employer can solve these problems by providing 
information and connecting these actors. The benefit of social networks is that they convey the 
rich and trustworthy information that employers seek (Marsden and Gorman, 2001) and 
eventually reduce the cost of selection errors (di Stasio and Gërxhani, 2015). While the benefits 
of social contacts in the labour market are well-known, their importance is also causing 
inequalities, since those without or only a weak social network are put at disadvantage 
(Behtoui and Neergaard, 2010). Moreover, social networks leave employers vulnerable to 
stereotypes and favouritism (Marsden and Gorman, 2001). Here, public institutions can play 
an important role by taking over the role of connecting jobseekers and employers and thereby 
act as an LMI. The presence of public LMIs might reduce the importance of social networks 
since they fulfil similar functions by providing information and acting as matchmakers (Autor, 
2009; Bonet et al., 2013). Harsløf (2006), for example, demonstrates that in countries with 
encompassing welfare state arrangements, social networks are less important for job search as 
the former facilitates job-matching processes. The question arises of whether employers value 
information provided by public agencies such as the PES for their hiring decisions. The 
following section outlines the theoretical mechanism of how social contacts and the PES 
influence employers’ hiring decisions and expectations are formulated on their basis.  
Social contacts 
Informal search via other people is the most successful search channel  not only for jobseekers 
but also for employers (Behrenz, 2001). According to Fernandez et al. (2000), there are several 
mechanisms through which social contacts can reduce uncertainty with regard to employers’ 
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hiring decisions. First, since individuals who recommend someone are concerned about their 
reputation, they will only recommend suitable applicants. This ensures that recommendations 
are perceived as trustworthy. Second, social networks are characterised by homophily - the 
tendency of similar people to befriend each other - which allows the employer to infer the 
characteristics of the recommended person. Third, recommendations can pass on information 
that is hard to observe otherwise. Moreover, social networks provide signals about a 
candidate’s productivity; an employer may not only consider the content of a recommendation 
but also the connectors’ reputation and draw inferences about the jobseeker’s ability or status 
depending on who the connector is (Castilla et al., 2013). Since connectors are assumed to be 
concerned with their reputation, they are highly selective in who they refer. To the extent that 
connectors share information selectively, based on assumed productivity-related 
characteristics, connectors implicitly provide signals that are valued by employers (Fernandez 
et al., 2000; Rubineau and Fernandez, 2015). The results of several studies, drawing on data 
from the applicants’ pool within a firm, document clear advantages for jobseekers referred by 
an incumbent employee compared to those who are not referred (e.g. Fernandez et al., 2000; 
Neckerman and Fernandez, 2003). Altogether, it can be assumed that recommendations from 
a social contact have a positive impact on an employer’s evaluation of a candidate.  
The role of PES 
Historically, the PES plays an important role in coordinating the workforce and can be seen as 
an early form of LMI. Most countries established such institutions in the early 1900s with the 
main purpose of reducing job search cost and informational asymmetries (Bonet et al., 2013; 
Lee, 2009). The PES also plays an important role in governing and delivering labour market 
services. Recently, the PES has been subject to substantial reforms and deregulations. 
Contracting out services and the establishment of a quasi-market seems a major trend with 
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Australia, the Netherlands and Great Britain as forerunner countries (Finn, 2005; Sol, 2005). 
The role of the PES and other similar providers is not only to connect unemployed jobseekers 
to employers but also to provide other services, such as counselling or training, in order to 
facilitate labour market reintegration. This article, however, focuses solely on how information 
(recommendations) provided by the PES are interpreted by employers and therefore focuses 
on the PES’s role as an information or matching provider (Bonet et al, 2013). It can be expected 
that the mechanisms explored here also hold for private providers as long as their function of 
matching unemployed individuals to employers is concerned.  
The PES as a connector 
Surprisingly, little is known about how employers perceive the PES or similar actors that 
potentially reduce disadvantage and offer hiring opportunities for vulnerable individuals. The 
PES could provide important information to both sides of the labour market. Since 
caseworkers have to evaluate their clients and meet with them several times in order to deliver 
the right service to them (Duell et al., 2010), they often know the capabilities and skills of their 
clients. Moreover, in many countries, the PES has made attempts to provide a valuable service 
to employers and position itself as the main source for labour (Behncke et al, 2008; Bunt et al., 
2007). For such a strategy to work, caseworkers must be concerned with their reputation and 
only recommend suitable candidates, as otherwise they would not be able to place clients in 
the future. This requires that caseworkers can be selective in their choice of which candidates 
they recommend. Obviously, the extent to which this strategy can equalise chances is limited, 
as candidates further away from the labour market are less likely to be recommended, which 
excludes the most disadvantaged (Bonoli and Liechti, 2018). However, there are reasons to 
believe that employers might draw negative inferences about candidates referred by actors 
that are associated with low-performing workers (see also Castilla et al., 2013). As argued by 
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Larsen and Vesan (2012), employers perceive candidates sent by the PES negatively. 
According to the authors, the PES is caught in a low-end equilibrium of the market because it 
is obliged to help all workers, including the less productive ones. Therefore, employers cannot 
trust the quality of the referred workers. This reasoning is reinforced by the fact that the 
unemployed are often perceived as the most unproductive workers, since it is assumed that 
they have been laid off first. As most countries require unemployed jobseekers to register at 
the PES in order to obtain benefits, the employer knows that the PES has many potentially 
unproductive candidates in their database. Knowing that the PES is obliged to also help the 
least suitable worker, employers therefore avoid hiring through the PES. The authors support 
their theoretical argument by data from qualitative interviews illustrating that employers are 
reluctant to hire candidates sent by the PES as these candidates are assessed as unsuitable. A 
similar finding is provided by Bonoli and Hinrichs (2012), who present evidence from 
qualitative interviews showing that employers consider candidates sent by the PES as less 
motivated. However, these studies do not directly ask about recommendations from the PES 
but rather ask about employers’ impressions of candidates who apply through the PES. It is 
possible that the negative evaluation of the PES is in fact a negative assessment of unemployed 
candidates and not of the PES per se. Other studies more closely examine how employers’ 
actual hiring behaviour is influenced by agencies that stand between (unemployed) jobseekers 
and employers. Ingold and Valizade (2017) conceptualize active labour market policies 
(ALMPs) as LMI, i.e. as actors standing between employers and jobseekers, and test whether 
these influence employers’ likelihood to hire from disadvantaged groups. Their results 
indicate that compared to employers’ selection criteria and firm size, ALMPs play a negligible 
role in the hiring of disadvantaged groups. Other studies suggest that social policy 
interventions focusing on creating contacts between jobseekers and employers are actually 
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effective. Holzer (2009) summarises that intermediaries, which bring together workers and 
employers, can overcome employers’ resistance to hiring disadvantaged workers. Relying on 
data from a pool of applicants, Fernandez (2010) establishes that applicants with institutional 
connections are more likely to be offered jobs and to be hired than other applicants. Research 
shows that caseworkers at the PES are aware of the importance of employers and that direct 
contact with them is an effective strategy to place their clients in employment (Behncke et al., 
2008; Bellis et al., 2011) This is the case for local employment partnerships developed by 
Jobcentre Plus in the UK. In their evaluation, Bellis et al. (2011) find that these partnerships 
were perceived as effective by employers due to the worth-of-mouth and their direct contact 
to the Jobcentre Plus staff. Similarly, Behncke et al. (2008) demonstrate that caseworkers in 
Switzerland that maintain direct contact with firms achieve higher reintegration rates than the 
colleagues. These findings indicate that the PES seems to be able to create and maintain 
valuable contacts with employers in different country contexts.  
Heterogeneous effects of recommendations 
The reason why the results from previous research do not lead to a clear conclusion of how 
employers perceive candidates coming through the PES might be because the effect of 
recommendations is heterogeneous and depends on other factors that affect employers’ 
evaluation of a candidate. It can be assumed that the influence of recommendations on the 
evaluation of a candidate depends on the uncertainty associated with the candidate. First, 
reducing uncertainty is especially important when the costs of making a poor decision are 
high. In terms of hiring, this means when salaries and turnover costs are high and when the 
position entails responsibilities where mistakes are costly (Marsden and Gorman, 2001; Di 
Stasio and Gërxhani, 2015). This situation is usually the case in higher-skilled occupations. For 
these positions, the importance of recommendations from a current employee might be 
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reinforced by the fact that higher-skilled employees might be perceived as delivering more 
trustworthy information. This is the case because these employees anticipate that wrong hiring 
decisions are costly; since they are concerned with their reputation within the company, they 
will only recommend suitable candidates. For the PES, in turn, the negative signalling effect 
described above might be especially pronounced for these positions since the unemployment 
rate of high-skilled is lower than that of low-skilled individuals (Eurostat, 2017). For low-
skilled positions, it is more common to register with the PES, and such recommendations, 
therefore, might not entail a strong negative signal.  
Second, the influence of recommendations depends on how precisely other information 
provided by the candidate signals his or her capabilities (Spence, 1973). The less precise these 
other signals are, the more weight should be given to recommendations. Müller and Shavit 
(1998) describe education as the single most important determinant employers rely on when 
hiring new employees. Di Stasio and Gërxhani (2015), for example, find that referrals from 
business partners matter when education is seen as a noisy signal, that is when employers 
have less trust in the information provided by educational credentials. Switzerland provides 
a good case for testing how the value of a recommendation varies depending on the precision 
of the signal. The Swiss educational system has a strong focus on vocational education and 
training (VET). Most adolescents follow a dual track programme that combines practical 
training in a specific occupation in a company with theoretical classes. Employers thus train 
and educate these young people and are involved in designing their curriculum; as a 
consequence, they are well informed about their skills and competencies. The VET track 
signals high competencies in relevant occupational skills and a strong connection to the labour 
market at a relatively young age (Levels et al., 2014). The other path is to obtain a baccalaureate 
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diploma in general education that provides access to a university education. Although 
following this second track requires good school performance, the skills are less specific to a 
certain occupation, and students are less connected to the labour market. Since employers are 
less certain about the competencies of these candidates, it is assumed that recommendations 
from both types of connectors, a current employee and the PES, are more important for 
candidates who have followed the general track.  
Finally, research demonstrates that a group that particularly suffers from labour market 
disadvantage are non-native candidates (Brekke and Mastakaasa, 2008; Wiborg and Møberg, 
2010). Some of this disadvantage arises due to employers’ discriminatory hiring behaviour 
because of stereotypical beliefs or statistical discrimination (Kingston et al. 2008; Auer et al., 
2019) but also from unequal access to and lower returns from social capital (Behtoui and 
Neergaard, 2010; Bonoli and Turtschi, 2015). The recommendations from current employees 
and the PES could potentially play an important role in counteracting negative stereotypical 
beliefs associated with a foreign background and the PES might be helpful in compensating 
for the network disadvantage of non-natives. For natives, however, PES recommendation 
might have a stigmatizing effect, as they are expected to find employment more easily on their 
own or through their social network.  
Overall, it is expected that recommendations from a social contact have a positive influence 
and are especially relevant for applicants to higher-skilled positions, for those with general 
education and non-natives. Expectations with regard to the PES are less straightforward; 
positive and negative effects are both possible but it is expected that the PES has a positive 
impact for non-native candidates.  
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The PES in Switzerland 
This study relies on data from Switzerland, which is a suitable case to study these questions 
because, first, social networks are important for obtaining employment. Bonoli and Turtschi 
(2015) find that 44% of a sample of previously unemployed people found their job through 
social networks. Second, since unemployed persons have to register at the PES in order to 
access unemployment benefits, the PES plays an important role in re-integrating jobless people 
into the labour market (Duell et al., 2010). The service is decentralized at the cantonal level, 
where each canton has several regional placement offices; in total there are approximately 110 
offices (Behnecke et al., 2008). Compared to other OECD-countries, the benefit system is 
generous but with a strong emphasis on job-search requirements and incentives to move into 
jobs. Caseworkers at the regional PES office play an important role in placing individuals in 
ALMPs but also in supporting them in their job search. Besides monitoring job search efforts, 
the PES provides job brokering services. Employers can report vacancies directly to the PES, 
which can then either transmit information about the job to suitable candidates or directly refer 
specific candidates to the job. An important feature of the Swiss system is that it leaves 
substantial leeway to caseworkers in the choice of the best reinsertion strategy. Caseworker 
can implement an individual strategy for each client. This means that caseworkers can be 
selective in their choice of which client they refer to employers. In contrast to other countries, 
the placement service of the PES has not been outsourced but remains among its key 
competences (Duell et al., 2010). However, since employers are not obliged to register open 
vacancies to the PES, the PES has to aim for an active placement strategy if employers are to 
perceive it as a useful recruitment channel (Behncke et al., 2008). Caseworkers’ performance is 
monitored at an individual level using a benchmarking system1, therefore, they have 
incentives to invest and maintain a good relationship with employers in their regions in order 
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to successfully place clients in the future. Kaltenborn und Kaps (2013) demonstrate that the 
majority of caseworkers are aware of the benchmarking system and that it influences their re-
integration strategies. Moreover, the authors reveal that in all cantons, caseworkers consider 
cooperation with employers as a high priority, and Behncke et al. (2008) find that the 
unemployed counselled by caseworkers who maintain direct contact with employers have 
higher employment probabilities. Given the discretionary power caseworkers have in their 
reinsertion strategy, it can be assumed that they use recommendations selectively in order to 
maintain a trustful relationship with employers to be able to place clients in the future. 
Switzerland has a strong labour market; at the time of the experiment, in June 2016, the 
unemployment rate had reached merely 3.4% (Seco, 2016). On the one hand, this low rate 
allows caseworkers to work more closely with their clients and recommend them only for 
suitable jobs. On the other hand, given the low overall unemployment rate, being unemployed 
might be more stigmatizing than in other countries, since employers might think that 
productive jobseekers would not become unemployed in the first place.  
Data and Method 
Data on recruitment processes are difficult to obtain. Usually, it is not possible to observe who 
applies for a job and it is difficult to control for all confounding factors. As suggested in the 
literature (Di Stasio and Gërxhani, 2015; Mouw, 2003) this article relies on an experimental 
setting, more specifically, on a factorial survey (FS) experiment, to overcome this difficulty. In 
such experiments, respondents are asked to evaluate descriptions of hypothetical situations 
(vignettes). These descriptions consist of different dimensions that can take on different values 
and are varied randomly. FS are widely applied in social sciences (Wallander, 2009) and are 
increasingly popular for investigating employers’ behaviour (Damelang and Abraham, 2016; 
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Di Stasio and Gërxhani, 2015, Liechti et al., 2017). This method captures a stated preference for 
a candidate rather than a real behaviour of an employer. However, Hainmueller et al. (2015) 
demonstrate that stated preferences in experimental settings are close to real behaviour. At the 
same time, the advantage of a FS-experiment is that it reduces the risk of endogeneity, meaning 
attributing the employers’ preferences to a characteristic that is unobserved by the researcher 
but observed by the employer and enables the testing of the influence of several dimensions 
simultaneously. Overall, FS deliver a more valid measurement of attitudes and are less biased 
by social desirability than item-based techniques in standard surveys (Auspurg et al., 2014).  
The experiment 
The experiment consisted of a number of vignettes presenting descriptions that approximate 
schematic CVs of fictional job applicants, entailing information usually disclosed in a standard 
CV in Switzerland. These vignettes were submitted to HR-professionals via an online survey. 
The regional association of the HR-organization sent out the survey link to all their members 
(approximately 4500 individuals) and asked them to participate in the survey. For three jobs 
at different skill levels (high, mid and low skilled), participants were asked to evaluate a set of 
four vignettes for each job (12 vignettes in total) and indicate on an 11-point Likert scale from 
0 to 10 (not at all likely – very likely) how likely they are to invite the candidate for a job 
interview.  
In the experimental setting, the candidates’ descriptions consisted of 11 different dimensions, 
from which the main variable of interest is the type of recommendation (see the technical 
appendix online for all dimensions and examples of vignettes). The values of the dimensions 
were varied randomly. Since the number of possible combinations yields a larger number than 
the number of respondents, a d-efficient sub-sample that minimises the correlation between 
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the different dimensions was drawn from the vignette universe (Auspurg and Hinz, 2015)2. 
From this sub-sample, vignettes were randomly assigned to the respondents.  
The main variable of interest was manipulated in the following way:  
No recommendation (written application): ‘You receive the written application as a response to 
your advertisement from [Name of candidate] by post’ or ‘You received an unsolicited 
application from [Name of candidate] by post’.  
For the analysis the two levels with no recommendations, the application as a response to an 
advertisement and an unsolicited application, were grouped together.  
Employee recommendation: ‘[Name of candidate] was recommended to you by one of your current 
employees’.  
PES recommendation: ‘[Name of the candidate] was recommended to you by the local PES’.  
Before introducing the vignettes, a general description of the situation was presented in which 
all candidates were described as having been unemployed for the last six months due to the 
closure of the firm where they previously worked and as having completed compulsory 
schooling in Switzerland (see technical appendix). Participants were asked to imagine that 
they have an open position for an accountant, HR assistant and caretaker, and were given a 
description of the tasks for each position. These occupations were chosen since they reflect 
different skill levels according to the ISCO-08 classification of occupations and because they 
are found in most companies, meaning that it is likely that the respondents are familiar with 
these job profiles. Of course, in some occupations hiring on recommendations is more common 
than in others. However, studies show that the importance of recommendation is primarily 
influenced by the skill-level, with the low-skilled working class being more likely to use social 
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networks for job search (Oesch and von Ow, 2017). Therefore, it is assumed that the effects 
found here also hold for other occupations with the same skill level.  
The order of the jobs and the order of the vignettes within each job were randomised. The 
study was framed in general terms as a project about hiring needs and could either be taken 
in German or French, the two main national languages. Questions regarding participants’ 
hiring experience, position in the firm and socio-economic variables were also covered. The 
data were collected between June and November 2016.  
Data and estimation strategy 
In total, 712 respondents rated a total of 5,674 vignettes, which yielded a response rate of 
approximately 15%. This low response rate is similar to those of other vignette studies with 
employers (Damelang and Abraham, 2016) and seems to be unavoidable when surveying this 
type of population. Since the sample is a homogenous group of specialised HR-professionals, 
the low response rate still enables meaningful conclusions to be drawn as long as every 
vignette was rated by several respondents, which is the case here. To test how well the firms 
the respondents work in represent the Swiss firm structure, the data obtained were compared 
with statistics on the Swiss firm structure (Federal Office for Statistic, 2015) This comparison 
revealed that in the study sample, medium and large firms with up to 250 employees and more 
are overrepresented. While the majority of Swiss firms have 0-9 employees, in the study 
sample, the majority of respondents worked in a firm with more than 250 employees. This 
result is not surprising, since most medium and large firms have a professional HR service to 
recruit new employees. Since these firms employ approximately 42% of the Swiss workforce 
(Federal Office for Statistic, 2015), their screening and evaluation techniques for applicants are 
relevant to a large share of jobseekers in Switzerland. Another source of bias could result from 
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the overrepresentation of HR professionals working in the public sector; compared to their 
share (9%) in the total labour force, they are overrepresented in the sample (14%). Employees 
in the public sector might be more favourable towards applicants from the PES. Models with 
fixed effects for the respondent were run as a sensitivity analysis to control for this fact. These 
models did not yield different results. A majority of the respondents are female (63%), Swiss 
nationals (87%) and had received tertiary education (54%) (technical appendix).  
To consider the nested data structure, linear models with random intercepts for the 
respondents and clustered standard errors at the respondent level were estimated3 (Auspurg 
and Hinz, 2015; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). To test the effects for different groups, 
models with interactions between the recommendation variable and the vignette variables of 
education, skill level of the job applied to, and nationality respectively were estimated.  
Results  
This section presents and interprets the results from the FS-experiment. First, the main effects 
of recommendations from social networks and the PES are presented, followed by the 
interaction effects between the different types of recommendations and other candidates’ 
characteristics. In a multilevel structure, like this is the case here, variance in the outcome 
variable can come from two sources, the respondents-level and the vignette-level. The 
intraclass correlation coefficient reveals that 55 per cent of the variance in the outcome can be 
attributed to the vignette variables, while 45 per cent can be attributed to the respondents-
level. When adding control variables at the respondents-level (models in the appendix table 
A9), such as age, experience, gender, education, sector, and whether open positions are 
announced to the PES, the main results do not significantly change. The only two variables 
that had a significant effect on the rating of the candidates were the age of the respondent and 
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the sector of activity. Respondents from public administration, consulting, and transportation 
had a more favourable view of candidates and younger respondents judged them more 
positively. Surprisingly, whether respondents announced open positions to the PES or not did 
not influence their rating of candidates sent by the PES.  
 
Figure 1: Effect of a recommendation on the rating of the candidate1 
Notes: Plotted coefficient from Model 1 in the appendix (table A7). Dots represent the difference in 
the rating compared to the reference category, i.e. no recommendation (vertical line). Horizontal 
bars represent the 95% confidence intervals; the vertical segments at the bar represent the 90% 
confidence intervals. 
1 Dependent variable: likelihood to invite the candidate for an interview on a 10-point Likert scale. 
Figure 1 plots the effects of the two types of recommendations on the employers’ stated 
likelihood to invite the candidate for a job interview. In all figures, the vertical line represents 
the reference category (candidates without recommendation). The symbol represents the 
difference in the predicted ratings between candidates without any recommendation and 
those with a recommendation (a table (A6) with the estimated models can be found in the 
appendix). It is evident that employers valued both types of recommendations, those by a 
current employee (rating 7.00) and those by the PES (rating 6.854). Recommended candidates 
received significantly higher ratings than those without recommendation (rating 6.75). 
Employee
PES
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
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Although having a smaller effect than recommendations from a social contact, employers 
valued recommendations from the PES.  
Next, the results from the interaction effects are presented to observe whether there are specific 
groups for which employers value recommendations more than for others. As displayed in 
models 3 and 4 in the appendix (table A7), the interaction effect between recommendation and 
education, nationality respectively, are not significant, meaning that the effect of a 
recommendation does not vary over the two groups. However, as interaction terms are 
difficult to interpret from regression coefficients, the following figures (2-4) show contrasts of 
predictive margins. Predictive margins compute the average response when certain variables, 
in this case the recommendation and education, nationality, or occupation respectively, are 
fixed at a certain value while the other variables are left as they are (see also Jann, 2013 for 
further explanation). Contrasts show the difference in these predicted margins. For example, 
contrasts of predictive margins for education show the difference between candidates with 
and without recommendation, separately for candidates with a vocational or a general 
education (see figure 3). These contrasts reveal that, although the effects of recommendations 
did not significantly differ between groups, especially PES recommendations significantly 
improved the rating of some candidates but not of others. This change minimized the 
difference in the rating between the two groups, for example between those with a vocational 
and a general education, and lead to an insignificant difference between the two groups among 
those recommended, while the difference between the groups is significant among those that 
were not recommended. The contrasts of predicted margins between recommended and not 
recommended candidates over specific groups as well as the contrasts of predictive margins 
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between specific groups over the type of recommendation can be found in table A10 and A11 
in the appendix.  
 
Figure 2: Recommendations and occupation 
Note: Based on model 2 in the appendix (table A7). Horizontal bars represent the 95% 
confidence intervals; the vertical segments at the bar represent the 90% confidence 
intervals. Contrast in table A10.  
 
First, the effects of the two types of recommendations are presented for the three different 
types of occupations. The baseline model (model 1 in the appendix) indicates that, compared 
to candidates applying to the high-skilled position, those applying to the mid-skilled position 
received significantly lower ratings, while those for the low-skilled position received 
significantly higher ratings. It was assumed that recommendations should matter more for 
candidates applying to the high-skilled position, as the cost of wrong hiring is higher and 
therefore reduction of uncertainty is more important. As demonstrated by figure 2, this is not 
the case for recommendations from social contacts. Employers value these recommendations 
Employee
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for candidates to the low- as well as to the high skilled position. The picture changes for 
recommendations by the PES, here only candidates applying to the high(er)-skilled occupation 
received significantly higher ratings.  
 
Figure 3: Recommendation and education  
Note: Based on model 3 in the appendix (table A7). Horizontal bars represent the 95% 
confidence intervals; the vertical segments at the bar represent the 90% confidence 
intervals. Contrast in table A10.  
Next, the results for the interaction between the type of recommendation and education are 
presented. For this purpose, only the vignettes of the high- and mid-skilled positions were 
analysed, since there was no division in general and vocational education in the vignettes for 
the low-skilled occupation. The baseline model (model 1) illustrates that candidates with a 
general education were evaluated more positively than those with a vocational education. It 
was expected that the effects of a recommendation would be bigger for candidates with a 
general education than for those with a vocational education. Turning now to the model with 
the interaction, the coefficient for general education is negative (model 2), meaning that among 
candidates with no recommendations, those with a general education were evaluated 
Employee
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significantly worse than candidates with a vocational one (see contrast table A11). This points 
out that recommendations might matter more for candidates with a general education. The 
contrasts of the predicated margins in figure 3 show that a recommendation from a current 
employee mattered for both candidates, those with a general and those with a vocational 
education. In both cases candidates with an employee recommendation received higher 
ratings than those without a recommendation. The effects of a recommendation for the two 
groups, vocational and general education, are not statistically significantly different from each 
other. However, since candidates with a general education profited slightly more from a 
recommendation, the difference between candidates with a general and a vocational education 
becomes insignificant among those recommended by a current employee (see table A11 in the 
appendix). When looking at the recommendations from the PES, one can see that this type of 
recommendation only improved the rating for candidates with general education. Among 
them, candidates with a PES recommendation were evaluated more positively than those 
without recommendations. For candidates with vocational education a PES recommendation 
did not improve the rating. Again, the effects for the two groups are not statistically 
significantly different from each other but this type of recommendation improved the rating 
of candidates with a general education to a slightly larger extent. This results in an insignificant 
difference between candidates with a general and those with a vocational education (table A11 
in the appendix), while this difference is significant among candidates with no 
recommendation.  
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Figure 4: Recommendation and the origin 
Note: Based on model 4 in the appendix (table A7). Horizontal bars represent the 95% 
confidence intervals; the vertical segments at the bar represent the 90% confidence 
intervals. Contrasts in table A10.  
 
Finally, whether recommendations can compensate for the disadvantage non-natives face in 
the labour market was tested for. The main effect of nationality (model 1) indicates that 
candidates with a foreign background received significantly lower ratings than Swiss 
candidates and it seems that recommendations cannot compensate for this disadvantage. Both, 
natives and migrants profited from recommendations from current employees, as illustrated 
in figure 4. Although the effects of the two groups do not statistically significantly differ, the 
effect is slightly bigger for natives than for non-natives, therefore, the difference between 
migrants and natives remains statistically significant (see contrast in table A11). When 
examining the effect of a recommendation from the PES, such a recommendation slightly 
increased the ratings of non-natives but not those of natives. Again, the difference in the effect 
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for native and non-natives is not statistically significant but, as this type of recommendation 
increased the rating for non-natives slightly more than for natives, this leads to an insignificant 
difference between native and non-natives among those with a recommendation from the PES 
(see contrasts in table A11), while difference between natives and non-natives remains 
significant among candidates with no or a recommendation from a social contact.  
Discussion  
It was assumed that recommendations from a current employee have a positive effect on 
employers’ evaluation of a candidate. Overall, this expected positive influence is confirmed. 
The expectations with regard to recommendations from the PES were more ambiguous; from 
a theoretical perspective, positive and negative effects can be expected and the results from 
previous research do not clearly point in one direction. The results of this article demonstrate 
that, although smaller than the effect of social contacts, PES recommendations had a positive 
influence on employers’ rating of candidates but cannot fully compensate for the disadvantage 
of those with a weak social network. Nevertheless, given the strong importance of social ties, 
it is surprisingly how close recommendations from the PES come to the one of social networks. 
This means that recommendations are an important instrument for a caseworker’s reinsertion 
strategy and it is important that caseworker use recommendations selectively in order to 
maintain employers’ trust and that they use a personalized approach.  
In qualitative interviews5 with employers in the hotel and retail sector, employers revealed 
that the way the PES sends candidates matters to them. Those that have personal contact with 
a specific caseworker at the PES said that they trusted the recommendations from this 
caseworker. These employers did not announce positions to the PES but were approached 
directly by the caseworker when she had a good candidate to place. Employers that have 
82 
 
announced positions to the PES but without having a personal contact there were less satisfied 
with the quality of the candidates sent. This finding illustrates that the way the PES sends 
candidates matters. Selective recommendations from a known caseworker work well, while 
just sending candidates once an employer announces a position is less successful. This is also 
illustrated by the following quotes from the qualitative interviews:  
I already had contact in cases  when they [the PES] have referred candidates to us but 
we do not directly turn to them but leave it a bit open so that they can recommend us 
specific candidates (HR-manager of a hotel, Switzerland) 
[…] but then we approach them [the PES] directly and explain them the situation so 
that they can recommend us someone that they are counselling at the moment if they 
know someone or then [in case of advertising to the PES] we are were specific in our 
requirements so that the applicants are already filtered. (Manager of a hotel, 
Switzerland).  
This differentiation between personal contact and sending candidates might also explain that 
the results found here contradict those of previous studies. Bonoli and Hinrichs (2012) and 
Larsen and Vesan (2012) conclude that employers have a negative view of candidates coming 
through the PES. The authors did not explicitly asked about recommended candidates but 
about candidates that were sent to them after announcing a position to the PES. The negative 
effect in these studies might also arise due to the negative effect of being unemployed per se. 
In reality, unemployed people compete with employed jobseekers, and the former might be 
disadvantaged compared to the latter. The experimental method allows these two effects to be 
disentangled. Once a person is unemployed, the information delivered by the PES is valued 
by employers. This is also supported by the findings of Fernandez (2010) and Holzer (2009), 
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who conclude that intermediaries can overcome employers’ resistance to hiring 
disadvantaged workers. The contradictory result from previous studies might also illustrate 
that the effects of recommendations are not the same for all individuals but are shaped by 
other characteristics of the job or the applicant.  
This article has accounted for these differences by examining the effects of recommendations 
for different sub groups that are expected to have different labour market outcomes. It was 
expected that, for candidates whose productivity was associated with higher uncertainty or in 
situations where wrong hiring decisions were more costly, employers value recommendations 
more. Such a heterogeneous effect cannot be confirmed, the interaction effects between the 
type of recommendation and other variables, such as education, occupation applied to, and 
migrant background, were in most cases not statistically significant. However, while the effect 
of recommendations did not differ between different groups, the contrasts of the predictive 
margins show that recommendations changed the difference in the ratings between specific 
groups compared to the groups with no recommendation. Employee recommendations were 
especially important for candidates applying to high skilled positions but less for those 
applying to low-skilled positions, indicating that in situation where mistakes are more costly, 
reduction of uncertainty is more important. Recommendations from the PES and a current 
employee could also decrease the difference between candidates with a vocational and those 
with a general education. The latter were rated significantly lower than the former when not 
recommended, however, once recommended, the difference between the two groups, 
vocational and general education, becomes insignificant.  
What is concerning from an inequality perspective is that recommendations from social 
contacts were not able to diminish the gap between native applicants and their non-native 
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counterparts. Given the overall higher preference for Swiss candidates, it might be the case 
that a recommendation by a Swiss worker was valued more than one made by a foreign 
employee. Unfortunately, the PES was not able to fully compensate for the disadvantage 
migrants face also due to the weaker returns from social capital. Recommendations from the 
PES indeed increased the rating of migrant candidates and narrowed the gap between native 
and migrants, in such a way that it becomes insignificant. However, when considering the fact 
that natives that can rely more on social networks and migrants that are more likely to rely on 
the PES as they do not have the same beneficial social ties, the PES cannot compensate for the 
overall labour market disadvantage of migrants. Overall, recommendations from a current 
employee had a positive influence on employers’ evaluation of candidates and 
recommendations from the PES could partially act as substitutes.  
Conclusion 
This article investigates whether recommendations from the PES are a valuable strategy to 
connect employers and jobseekers and can act as a substitute for social contacts in the labour 
market, and therefore help to integrate disadvantaged individuals into the labour market. The 
results contribute to a better understanding of whether public policies conceptualized as LMI 
can successfully fulfil the matching function between unemployed jobseekers and employers. 
As many countries have oriented their services to the needs of employers, it is important to 
understand how employers perceive candidates coming through such services. Concerns 
raised by previous research were that employers have a negative image of candidates coming 
through the PES (Larsen and Vesan, 2012). The results of this study demonstrate instead that, 
when the PES is proactive and recommends a candidate, it is able to improve the hiring 
chances for selected groups, although to a lesser extent than social contacts. It is therefore a 
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promising strategy for social policies to focus on the creation of connections between 
unemployed and employers. As a result, it can be argued that, for caseworkers at the PES or 
similar services, it is worthwhile to invest in establishing and maintaining a good relationship 
with employers to successfully help their clients into employment. In the experimental setting 
applied here, it could only be tested how a recommendation by a caseworker who is unknown 
to the employer influences employers’ evaluation of a candidate. In reality, the effect of a 
recommendation might be even stronger when caseworkers and employers know each other 
personally and have established a trustful relationship.  
To what extent can these results be generalised beyond the setting of this study? Although, 
this study focuses on recommendations from the public PES, it can be assumed that the results 
would also hold for private service providers as long as they are concerned with the placement 
of unemployed individuals. In fact, similar as in countries that have contracted out placement 
service, the Swiss PES is subject to strict evaluation criteria, which place high emphasis on 
swift labour market integration, therefore, the aims and challenges for the two providers are 
similar. Other factors that could influence the findings of the study are the low unemployment 
rate and the study’s specific features. In countries with a higher unemployment rate, the PES 
might play a more important role in placing unemployed individuals into the labour market, 
and being unemployed might be less stigmatizing than in the context of an overall good labour 
market situation. Given the general trend towards activation and liberalization of the labour 
market (Bonoli, 2013), it can be assumed that the effects found here, in a country with a 
relatively liberal labour market and strong activation tendencies, are valid beyond the case of 
Switzerland.  
Regarding the specificities of the study, the results might be affected by the unemployment 
duration and the experimental setting. The unemployment duration of candidates in this 
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study was rather short; for long-term unemployed individuals contact with employers 
generated through the PES might become even more important, as their connections to the 
labour market deteriorate with elapsed unemployment duration and employers become less 
sure about the productivity of these candidates. Similarly, other reasons for unemployment 
than the closure of the firm might have a more stigmatising effect, making recommendations 
and contacts to employers even more important. Finally, as the results stem from an 
experimental setting, employers were aware that these are not real but hypothetical decisions 
and so it must be kept in mind that the results reflect what employers intend to do, not what 
they are actually doing. In reality, bias against certain groups might be even higher as they 
combine several disadvantageous characteristics. Due to these considerations, it is assumed 
that the effects found here represent conservative estimates for the effect of social networks 
and the PES but more research is needed to fully understand how different organizational 
structures of the PES play out for different groups and in different contexts. 
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Endnotes 
1) The speed of reintegration (50%), prevention of long-term unemployment (20%), 
prevention of benefit exhaustion (20%), prevention of repeated registration (10%).  
2) The correlation matrix for the vignette dimensions can be found in the supplementary 
data.  
3) A Hausman test for endogeneity was run between a fixed and a random-effects model. 
The test indicates that the coefficients of the two models are not statistically significantly 
different from each other.  
4) The effect for the PES is significant at the 10%-level 
5) In total 31 interviews were conducted between September 2016 and March 2018 (see 
chapter 3 for more details).  
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Appendix 
Supplementary Material for the article ‘Connecting employers and workers: Can 
recommendations from the public employment service act as a substitute for social contacts 
in the labour market?’ 
List of Abbreviations  
ALMP Active Labour Market Policies 
LMI: Labour Market Intermediaries 
PES  Public Employment Service  
VET  Vocational Education and Training  
Vignettes – Construction and Sampling  
Table A1: Dimensions and Levels of the vignettes 
Dimension  Level  
Personal information  
1) Gender Male 
Female 
2) Age  35, 40, 45, 50, 55 years old 
3) Civil status Single 
Married 
Divorced 
4) Children None 
 1 child 
 2 children 
 3 children 
5) Nationality (random 
allocation of names) 
Swiss 
Spanish  
Polish  
Turkish  
6) Mother tongue French/ German (depending on the region) 
French/ German and other language (Spanish/ Polish or Turkish 
for the foreign candidates) 
7) Hobby  Nothing  
Trainer for the local life-saving swimmers 
Chairperson of a Swiss/Spanish/Polish or Turkish cultural 
association  
Volunteering for the Swiss Red Cross 
Work-related experience  
8) Education  Lower  
- Building maintenance: compulsory schooling 
- HR-assistant: apprenticeship (EFZ/CFC) as 
merchandiser 
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- Accountant: apprenticeship as merchandiser and federal 
diploma in Controlling and Accounting 
Higher  
- Biulding maintenance: Apprenticeship (EFZ/ CFC) as 
caretaker 
- HR-assistant: Federal Matura 
- Accountant: BA in business administration  
9)Work experience Private sector 
Public sector  
Labour market related 
information 
 
10) Channel of 
application  
Advertisement  
Unsolicited application  
Referral by the local job center  
Referral by an employee  
11) ALMP participation  Nothing  
Training  
- Building maintenance: further education in facility 
management  
- HR-assistant: Further education in HR management 
- Accountant: CAS in accounting  
Adapted employment programme: participation in a practice 
company 
Non-adapted employment programme: recycling of old clothes 
Subsidy: 40% of the salary is paid by the local job centre for the 
first 6 months  
 
Sampling of the vignettes 
Since the whole vignette universe consist of 307200 combination a d-efficient sub-sample (d-
efficiency = 90.07) of 720 vignettes was drawn from the total vignette universe. A d-efficient 
design maximizes the orthogonality of the profiles and allows to specify which parameters 
you want to be able to identify as some dimensions will be confounded when choosing only 
a sub-sample of vignettes (Auspurg and Hinz 2015). Our design allows us to estimate all 
two-way interactions as well as two three-way interactions. The 720 vignettes were blocked 
into 180 blocks of 4 vignettes each for each job. These blocks were than randomly distributed 
to the survey participants. Every participant rated 3 blocks (one for each job) of 4 vignettes, 
12 vignettes in total. Since we draw a sub-sample of vignettes the vignettes dimensions are 
correlated with each other. In table A3 Cramer’s V for the correlation is reported, all 
correlations are statistically insignificant.  
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Table A2 : Correlation of vignette dimensions  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 ALMP 1                     
2 Channel 0.020 1                   
3 Gender 0.014 0.009 1                 
4 Age 0.019 0.012 0.011 1               
5 Children 0.012 0.011 0.026 0.015 1             
6 Civil 
Status 
0.021 0.008 0.014 0.029 0.009 1           
7 Hobby 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.019 0.011 0.006 1         
8 Education 0.013 0.016 -
0.000 
0.019 0.006 0.014 0.015 1       
9 
Nationality 
0.014 0.012 0.008 0.012 0.019 0.012 0.024 0.006 1     
10 
Experience 
0.006 0.021 0.000 0.010 0.013 0.008 0.006 -
0.006 
0.013 1   
11 Language  0.020 0.009 0.000 0.019 0.010 0.004 0.020 0.000 0.015 -
0.011 
1 
Note: All variables are categorical, Cramer’s V is reported, all correlations are not 
statistically significant.  
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Table A3: Description of tasks  
Occupation Description  
Accountant  Imagine you have an open position for an accountant in the company you 
are working in. The tasks are the following: direct the affairs of factory and 
financial accounting, deliver monthly and quarterly reports as well as 
income and annual financial statement, calculating and visualization of key 
performance indicators. You are involved in the hiring process and are 
asked to evaluate the subsequently described candidates. All candidates 
have completed their education in the German/French-speaking (depends on 
language in which survey was taken) part of Switzerland, are currently 
unemployed for a period of six months and have lost their previous position 
due to the closure of the firm they were previously working.  
HR-
assistant  
Imagine you have an open position for an HR-assistant in the company you 
are working in. The tasks are the following: administrative tasks in the area 
of human resources, furnish particulars to job applicants, preselection of job 
applications, settle wage and social contributions, draft working contracts. 
You are involved in the hiring process and are asked to evaluate the 
subsequently described candidates. All candidates have completed their 
education in the German/French-speaking (depends on language in which survey 
was taken) part of Switzerland, are currently unemployed for a period of six 
months and have lost their previous position due to the closure of the firm 
they were previously working.  
Caretaker  
 
 
Imagine you have an open position for a building caretaker in the company 
you are working in. The tasks are the following: cleaning of stairway, small 
repair work (change light bulb etc.), gardening work (cut the grass, clip the 
hedge, clear of weeds). You are involved in the hiring process and are asked 
to evaluate the subsequently described candidates. All candidates have 
completed their education in the German/French-speaking (depends on language 
in which survey was taken) part of Switzerland, are currently unemployed for 
a period of six months and have lost their previous position due to the 
closure of the firm they were previously working.  
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Table A4: Example of vignette (translated version, original is in German or French) 
Please indicate for this candidate the probability that you would invite this candidate for a 
job interview (0=very unlikely, 10=very likely) as well as the salary that you think is 
appropriate. 
 
Candidate Building Caretaker 
Channel of application Mister Pedro Martinez is recommended to you by PES 
Personal information He is 45 years old, has no kids and is married 
Education He has a vocational training degree as building maintenance 
specialist 
Experience He has 8 years of experience as caretaker in the private sector 
Language Mister Martinez speaks German  
Hobby In his leisure time he engages at the Swiss Red Cross as a driver 
Additional information While looking for a job he is working part time as a cashier in a 
supermarket. 
Invitation Monthly 
gross salary, 
100% 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           ___________ 
 
 
Table A5: Experimental protocol 
First Screen Description of the 1st  job and tasks (see table A3) 
Second 
Screen 
Presentation of 1st vignette for the 1st job(see table A4) 
Third Screen Presentation of 2nd vignette for the 1st job 
Forth screen Presentation of the 3rd vignette for the 1st job 
Fifth screen Presentation of the 4th vignette for te 1st job 
This procedure was repeater for the other two jobs. The order of the job and within the job, 
the order of the vignette was randomized.  
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Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics, Data, Models and Sensitivity Analysis  
Table A6: Descriptive statistics of the respondent 
Gender Female:  
Male:  
62.79% 
37.21% 
Age Mean 
Sde 
45.83 
9.54 
Nationality Swiss 
Italian 
German 
French 
Portuguese 
Spanish 
Serbia 
others 
87.16% 
1.38% 
2.75% 
3.67% 
0.69% 
0.46% 
0.23% 
3.67% 
Education Apprenticeship 
Upper Secondary II vocational 
track 
Upper Secondary II general track 
Federal diploma 
Applied University 
University  
2.97% 
1.14% 
0.68% 
39.50% 
25.11% 
29.00% 
Size of firm Small (0-9 employees) 
Small-Medium (10-49 employees) 
Medium to large (50-249 
employees) 
Large (>249 employee) 
9.72% 
6.90% 
31.19% 
52.19% 
Sector of firm Gastronomy 
Baking and Insurance 
Construction 
Real Estate and Consulting 
Health 
Retail 
Chemistry and Synthetic 
Education 
Metal, Machine, Vehicle 
Electronics and Watches 
Public Administration 
Transportation 
Leather and Wood 
Other 
1.07% 
10.81% 
2.44% 
11.42% 
6.54% 
5.94% 
0.91% 
5.18% 
7.61% 
3.20% 
13.85% 
2.13% 
0.46% 
28.46% 
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Graph A1: Distribution of dependent variable 
 
Note: This graph shows the rating for the different occupations.  
 
Table A7: Multilevel models for the influence of candidate’s characteristics on employers’ rating 
of the candidate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Model 1 
Basic 
Model 2: 
Interaction 
Occupation 
Model 3: 
Interaction 
Education 
Model 4: 
Interaction 
Nationality 
Recommendation (Ref. none)     
Current employee 0.251*** 0.344*** 0.178+ 0.338** 
 (0.056) (0.096) (0.093) (0.111) 
PES 0.102+ 0.258** 0.056 0.081 
 (0.054) (0.094) (0.088) (0.106) 
ALMP (Ref. none)     
Training 0.261*** 0.262*** 0.237** 0.258*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.089) (0.077) 
Subsidy 0.181* 0.181* 0.174+ 0.181* 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.091) (0.078) 
Adap_Occup 0.043 0.042 0.046 0.042 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.089) (0.077) 
NAdap_Occup -0.235** -0.235** -0.245** -0.237** 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.091) (0.078) 
Job -0.025 -0.024 -0.054 -0.026 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.090) (0.077) 
Education (Ref. specific 
education) 
    
General education 0.107* 0.109* -0.247** 0.107* 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.076) (0.045) 
Gender (Ref. male)     
female 0.022 0.022 0.209*** 0.023 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.052) (0.045) 
0
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Age (Ref. 35)     
40 -0.004 -0.006 -0.015 -0.004 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.082) (0.071) 
45 -0.033 -0.033 -0.040 -0.034 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.082) (0.070) 
50 -0.154* -0.153* -0.066 -0.155* 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.083) (0.071) 
55 -0.553*** -0.554*** -0.538*** -0.554*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.081) (0.070) 
Children (Ref. none)     
1 child -0.018 -0.018 -0.040 -0.017 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.074) (0.064) 
2 children -0.093 -0.092 -0.161* -0.093 
 (0.064) (0.063) (0.074) (0.064) 
3 children -0.122+ -0.122+ -0.173* -0.119+ 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.075) (0.064) 
Civil Status (Ref. none)     
Divorced 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.022 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.064) (0.055) 
Single -0.198*** -0.198*** -0.140* -0.198*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.064) (0.055) 
Hobby (Ref. none)     
Swim 0.179** 0.179** 0.179** 0.100 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.075) 
Cultural 0.027 0.025 0.027 -0.097 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.074) 
Volunteer 0.148* 0.148* 0.148* 0.049 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.075) 
Nationality (Ref. Swiss)     
not Swiss -0.160** -0.140+ -0.160** -0.230*** 
 (0.052) (0.074) (0.052) (0.061) 
Experience (Ref. public)     
private 0.023 0.023 0.066 0.024 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.053) (0.045) 
Language (Ref. German)     
Native CH&other -0.006 -0.005 0.014 -0.006 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.053) (0.045) 
Occupation (Ref. Accountant)     
HR -0.859*** -0.751*** -0.854*** -0.860*** 
 (0.053) (0.077) (0.050) (0.053) 
CG 0.243*** 0.323***  0.242*** 
 (0.054) (0.077)  (0.054) 
Interaction Terms     
Interaction Education     
Referral # general education   0.116  
   (0.131)  
Job Center # general education   0.158  
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   (0.126)  
Interaction Nationality     
Referral # not Swiss    -0.116 
    (0.128) 
Job Center # not Swiss    0.029 
    (0.124) 
Interaction occupation     
Referral # HR  -0.197   
  (0.135)   
Referral # CG  -0.081   
  (0.137)   
Job Center # HR  -0.230+   
  (0.132)   
Job Center # CG  -0.238+   
  (0.134)   
Constant 7.170*** 7.081*** 7.319*** 7.131*** 
 (0.137) (0.140) (0.159) (0.142) 
Variance Constant 0.449*** 0.443*** 0.568*** 0.443*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) 
Variance Residual 0.488*** 0.480*** 0.411*** 0.480*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) 
ll -11443.7 -11395.3 -7560.0 -11397.3 
aic 22945.4 22856.5 15180.0 22856.6 
N vignettes 5674 5674 3798 5674 
N respondents  537 537 513 537 
Note: Models with random intercept and clustered standard errors at the respondent level. 
Standard error in parentheses. *** significant at the 0.1%-level, ** significant at the 1%level, 
*significant at the 5%-level, + significant at the 10%-level.  
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Table A8: Random- and fixed-effects models 
 (1) (2) 
 Model 1: Random 
effects 
Model 2: 
Fixed-effects 
 b/se b/se 
Recommendation (Ref. none)   
Current Employee 0.251*** 0.244*** 
 (0.056) (0.058) 
PES 0.102+ 0.108+ 
 (0.054) (0.056) 
ALMP (Ref. none)   
Training 0.261*** 0.278*** 
 (0.077) (0.081) 
Subsidy 0.181* 0.192* 
 (0.078) (0.075) 
Adap_Occup 0.043 0.051 
 (0.077) (0.075) 
NAdap_Occup -0.235** -0.227** 
 (0.078) (0.079) 
Job -0.025 -0.020 
 (0.077) (0.079) 
Education (Ref. VET)   
General education 0.107* 0.109* 
 (0.045) (0.052) 
Gender (Ref. male)   
female 0.022 0.018 
 (0.045) (0.047) 
Age (Ref. 35)   
40 -0.004 -0.000 
 (0.071) (0.067) 
45 -0.033 -0.028 
 (0.070) (0.068) 
50 -0.154* -0.144+ 
 (0.071) (0.075) 
55 -0.553*** -0.556*** 
 (0.070) (0.075) 
Children (Ref. none)   
1 child -0.018 -0.027 
 (0.064) (0.070) 
2 children -0.093 -0.104 
 (0.064) (0.070) 
3 children -0.122+ -0.125+ 
 (0.064) (0.069) 
Civil Status (Ref. none)   
Divorced 0.021 0.021 
 (0.055) (0.050) 
Single -0.198*** -0.194*** 
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 (0.055) (0.051) 
Hobby (Ref. none)   
Swim 0.179** 0.169** 
 (0.064) (0.060) 
Cultural 0.027 0.014 
 (0.064) (0.065) 
Volunteer 0.148* 0.140* 
 (0.064) (0.063) 
Nationality (Ref. Swiss)   
not Swiss -0.160** -0.169*** 
 (0.052) (0.048) 
Experience (Ref. public)   
private 0.023 0.021 
 (0.045) (0.049) 
Language (Ref. German)   
Native CH&other -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.045) (0.044) 
Occupation (Ref. Accountant)   
HR -0.859*** -0.868*** 
 (0.053) (0.085) 
CG 0.243*** 0.226** 
 (0.054) (0.082) 
Constant 7.146*** 7.195*** 
 (0.136) (0.122) 
Variance Constant 2.425***  
 (0.167)  
Variance Residual 2.612***  
 (0.052)  
Sigma u  1.679 
Sigma e  1.619 
Rho  0.518 
ll -11397.9 -10490.0 
aic 22853.8 21032.0 
N vignettes 5674 5674 
N Respondents 537 537 
Note: Both models include clustered standard errors at the respondent 
level.  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
***significant at the 0.1%-level; **significant at the 1%-level, *significant 
at the 5%-level, +significant at the 10%-level. 
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Table A9: Model with control variables at 
respondents level 
 (1) (2) 
 Model 1: 
Controls 
Model 2: 
Interaction 
PES 
 b/se b/se 
Vignette Variables   
ALMP (Ref. none)   
Training 0.334*** 0.332*** 
 (0.083) (0.083) 
Subsidy 0.245** 0.242** 
 (0.084) (0.084) 
Adap_Occup 0.044 0.041 
 (0.082) (0.082) 
NAdap_Occup -0.247** -0.249** 
 (0.084) (0.084) 
Job -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.083) (0.083) 
Recommendation (Ref. none) 
Current employee 0.230*** 0.274*** 
 (0.060) (0.068) 
PES 0.125* 0.133* 
 (0.058) (0.067) 
Education (Ref. specific education) 
General education 0.082+ 0.082+ 
 (0.049) (0.049) 
Gender (Ref. male)   
female 0.007 0.008 
 (0.048) (0.048) 
Age (Ref. 35)   
40 -0.026 -0.024 
 (0.076) (0.076) 
45 -0.049 -0.049 
 (0.075) (0.075) 
50 -0.190* -0.191* 
 (0.076) (0.076) 
55 -0.618*** -0.617*** 
 (0.075) (0.075) 
Children (Ref. none) 
1 child -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.068) (0.068) 
2 children -0.090 -0.090 
 (0.068) (0.068) 
3 children -0.129+ -0.130+ 
 (0.068) (0.068) 
Civil Status (Ref. none) 
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Divorced 0.046 0.045 
 (0.059) (0.059) 
Single -0.202*** -0.200*** 
 (0.059) (0.059) 
Hobby (Ref. none)   
Swim 0.147* 0.149* 
 (0.068) (0.068) 
Cultural 0.018 0.019 
 (0.068) (0.068) 
Volunteer 0.129+ 0.129+ 
 (0.069) (0.069) 
Nationality (Ref. Swiss) 
not Swiss -0.176** -0.177** 
 (0.056) (0.056) 
Experience (Ref. public) 
private 0.027 0.030 
 (0.048) (0.049) 
1b.Langauge 
vignette 
0.000 0.000 
Language (Ref. German) 
Native CH&other 0.001 0.003 
 (0.048) (0.048) 
Occupation (Ref. Accountant) 
HR -0.861*** -0.860*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) 
CG 0.258*** 0.260*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) 
Respondent level   
Year of birth 0.019+ 0.019+ 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Sector of activity (Ref. Gastronomy) 
Banking and 
Insurance 
0.816 0.801 
 (0.675) (0.675) 
Construction 0.195 0.181 
 (0.786) (0.786) 
Consulting 1.225+ 1.215+ 
 (0.669) (0.669) 
Health 0.815 0.807 
 (0.696) (0.696) 
Retail 0.291 0.282 
 (0.697) (0.698) 
Chemistry & 
Synthetic 
0.814 0.802 
 (1.002) (1.002) 
Education 1.111 1.098 
 (0.732) (0.732) 
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Metal and Machine 0.912 0.901 
 (0.681) (0.681) 
Electronics 0.039 0.032 
 (0.750) (0.750) 
Public Admin 1.360* 1.349* 
 (0.656) (0.657) 
Transportation 1.257+ 1.244+ 
 (0.756) (0.756) 
Leather and Wood 1.398 1.388 
 (1.250) (1.250) 
Other 0.929 0.918 
 (0.643) (0.643) 
Experience -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Educational attainment (Ref. Mandatory School) 
Applied High 
School Diploma  
0.814 0.812 
 (0.849) (0.849) 
High School 
Diploma 
1.001 1.001 
 (1.017) (1.017) 
Secondary 
Education II 
-0.049 -0.049 
 (0.496) (0.496) 
Applied University 0.030 0.031 
 (0.506) (0.506) 
University  0.235 0.235 
 (0.502) (0.502) 
Gender (Ref. Female) 
Male  -0.102 -0.103 
 (0.164) (0.164) 
Announce to PES 0.061 0.117 
 (0.185) (0.194) 
Announce to PES * 
Employee referral 
 -0.186 
  (0.140) 
Announce to PES * 
PES referral 
 -0.038 
  (0.139) 
Constant -30.318 -30.538 
 (22.118) (22.120) 
Variance Constant 0.370*** 0.371*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) 
Variance Residual 0.490*** 0.489*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
ll -10012.5 -10011.6 
aic 20127.0 20129.2 
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N vignettes 4989 4989 
N respondents  537 537 
Notes:  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
***significant at the 0.1%-level; **significant at the 
1%-level, *significant at the 5%-level, +significant at 
the 10%-level. 
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Table A10 : Contrasts of predictive margins  
 Contrast Std. Error 
Occupations    
Employee recommendation    
Accountant 0.344** 0.096 
HR 0.147 0.096 
Housekeeper 0.263** 0.097 
PES recommendation   
Accountant 0.258** 0.094 
HR 0.028 0.093 
Housekeeper 0.020 0.095 
Education   
Employee recommendation   
Vocational education 0.178* 0.093 
General education 0.295** 0.092 
PES recommendation   
Vocational education 0.056 0.088 
General education 0.214** 0.090 
Migrants    
Employee recommendation   
Native  0.338** 0.111 
Non-native 0.222** 0.064 
PES recommendation   
Native 0.081 0.106 
Non-native  0.110* 0.063 
Notes: Contrast of predictive margins from model 2, 3, 4 in table A7. **Contrast significant 
on the 95%-level, *contrast significant on the 90% level.  
The reference category is always a candidate without recommendation. For example, 
candidates applying to an accountant position with an employee recommendation were on 
average 0.344 point higher rated than those applying to the same position but without 
recommendation. 
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Table A11 : Contrasts of predictive margins  
 Contrast Std. Error 
Education General vs vocational 
No recommendation -0.247** 0.076 
Employee recommendation -0.130 0.107 
PES recommendation -0.089 0.103 
Non-natives vs natives    
No recommendation -0.140* 0.074 
Employee recommendation -0.255** 0.106 
PES recommendation -0.111 0.100 
Accountant vs HR   
No recommendation -0.751** 0.077 
Employee recommendation -0.948** 0.110 
PES recommendation -0.981** 0.106 
Accountant vs. housekeeper   
No recommendation 0.323** 0.077 
Employee recommendation 0.242 0.111 
PES recommendation 0.086*** 0.108 
Notes: Contrast of predictive margins from model 2, 3, 4 in table A7. **Contrast significant 
on the 95%-level, *contrast significant on the 90% level. 
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Chapter 2  
The signalling value of labour market programmes 
Fabienne Liechti, Flavia Fossati, Giuliano Bonoli, and Daniel Auer4 
2017, European Sociological Review 33(2): 257-274 
Abstract 
This paper investigates how employers interpret participation in labour market programmes 
when assessing job candidates. We hypothesise that employers use programme participation 
to sort applicants. On the basis of a factorial survey experiment, we simulated the recruitment 
process for two positions requiring different skills in the hotel sector. Recruiters were asked to 
evaluate fictitious candidates that differ in their participation in active labour market 
programmes. Our results show that employers take programme participation into account 
when assessing a candidate. Its impact can be positive or negative depending on the 
candidate’s distance from the labour market. Candidates more distant from the labour market 
are evaluated better if they have participated in a programme. For stronger candidates, 
instead, participation can act as a stigma and worsen the assessment made by the recruiter.  
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Introduction 
Over the last three decades, OECD countries have invested vast amounts of public funds in 
labour market programmes for unemployed people. These programmes, which aim at 
bringing jobless people back into employment, include a broad range of interventions, such as 
training courses, wage subsidies and employment programmes in the public or non-profit 
sector. These interventions, collectively known as “active labour market policies” (ALMPs), 
have been subjected to detailed scrutiny by several disciplines of the social sciences. However, 
it is somewhat surprising that very little research has focused on the perception employers 
have of these policies. There are a few exceptions (e.g. Ingold and Stuart, 2014; Martin, 2004; 
van der Aa and Berkel, 2014) but the reality is that we know little about what employers think 
of these important labour market instruments. Yet, their perspective seems essential, since it 
is ultimately employers who decide who gets a job and who does not.  
In particular, we do not know how employers consider participation in active labour market 
programmes when assessing an applicant. Does participation improve the assessment of a 
candidate by a recruiter? Intuitively, since these interventions aim at increasing jobseekers’ 
chances to find employment, we would expect a positive impact of participation on employers’ 
perceptions. On the other hand, however, since some of these programmes are meant for 
disadvantaged jobseekers, participation could also act as a stigma or negative signal.  
Theoretically, we rely on literature on statistical discrimination and sorting. When recruiting 
new staff, employers act in a situation of uncertainty, which is induced by asymmetric 
information. They need to uncover the true qualities and productivity of the various 
candidates in a short time, with the latter having a strong incentive to hide their weaknesses 
and to emphasize their strengths. In such a context, employers apply statistical reasoning and 
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use observable characteristics (signals and group characteristics) to sort the applicants 
according to unobserved abilities (Weiss, 1995).  
In empirical studies, employers’ reliance on signals like education (e.g. di Stasio, 2014) and 
group characteristics like ethnic origin (for an overview, see Zschirnt and Ruedin, 2016) are 
well documented. There is, however, little research on how employers interpret the 
information “participated in a labour market programme”. The few available studies, which 
focus mostly on specific sub-groups or programmes, suggest that at least in some cases 
programme participation conveys a negative signal that can offset or even exceed the potential 
benefit of the programme. This is the case with wage subsidies (Burtless, 1985; Baert, 2016) or 
for participation in low ambition training (Falk et al., 2005). 
In this paper we take this line of inquiry further in two ways. First, we adopt a more 
encompassing perspective and compare employers’ views on the most common types of 
ALMPs. Second, we examine how participation in labour market programmes is interpreted 
by employers in interaction with different jobs and candidate features. In fact, as we will argue 
below we expect employers’ interpretation of participation in these programmes to depend 
both on the characteristics of the job and on the candidate’s distance from the labour market.  
Usually, the effectiveness of these programmes is assessed by analysing their impact on 
participants’ employment rate (for a synthesis see Greenberg et al., 2003; Kluve, 2010). Kluve 
(2010) shows that wage subsidies, as well as services and sanctions, are most effective in 
reintegrating the unemployed into the labour market. Training programmes have a modest 
positive effect, while employment programmes tend to be detrimental. Whether a programme 
is effective or not, eventually depends on two factors: the behaviour of a candidate, that is, 
programme participation might increase job search skills, human capital or motivation, and 
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the perception employers have of the candidate. In our study, we contribute to the 
understanding of the second important determinant of effectiveness: employers’ 
interpretation of programme participation.  
Empirically, we rely on a factorial survey experiment, carried out with employers in the hotel 
sector in Switzerland, which we describe in detail below. The article proceeds as follows. In 
the next section, we briefly review the relevant literature. We then provide some information 
on ALMPs in Switzerland (section 3) and present our theoretical framework (section 4). Section 
5 presents the experimental design and the estimation strategy. In section 6, we present and 
discuss our results and we conclude in section 7 by summarising the main contribution of the 
paper and highlighting some promising avenues for future research.  
Literature  
The selection of candidates is a task that involves uncertainty because the productivity and 
other qualities of a candidate are not directly observable in the initial stage of the recruitment 
process. What employers can observe are the applicant’s group memberships, such as age or 
gender, as well as some imperfect signals of a worker’s productivity, like education, or the 
impression he or she makes at the job interview. According to the model of statistical 
discrimination, when confronted with incomplete information, an employer will turn to 
statistical reasoning to assess the candidates. Thereby, entire groups may be avoided if their 
average productivity is assumed to be too low. In addition, employers are expected to rely on 
signals that convey relevant information (Arrow, 1971; Spence, 1973). For example, 
educational attainment may signal certain qualities (cognitive and non-cognitive skills). A vast 
empirical literature suggests that employers interpret and consider a large variety of 
observable candidate characteristics.  
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To identify the information employers use to select candidates, one needs to analyse 
employers’ behaviour while holding preferences and search behaviour of the candidates 
constant (Kübler and Schmid, 2015). This is the case in experimental settings, where the 
researcher manipulates the variable of interest and controls the information available to the 
employer. Studies relying on experimental settings have demonstrated that employers make 
use of all sorts of observable information when sorting candidates. Well investigated is the 
effect of ethnicity (see Bertrand and Duflo, forthcoming; Zschirnt and Ruedin, 2016). Some 
experimental studies are also available for the effect of gender (e.g. Riach, 2015), age (e.g. 
Ahmed et al., 2012; Lahey, 2008), unemployment (Oberholzer-Gee, 2008; Eriksson and Rooth, 
2014) and sexual orientation (e.g. Baert, 2015; Weichselbaumer, 2003).  
Regarding the participation in labour market programmes, there is only selective evidence for 
specific measures. In Germany, Kübler and Schmid (2015) show that youths who have been 
out of school for two years, benefit from participating in publicly funded training 
programmes. In Switzerland, Falk et al. (2005) found that unemployed people, who attended 
a course on basic computing skills and then applied for positions that actually required such 
skills, were less likely to be invited for a job interview after the course than before. The most 
likely explanation of this result is that employers interpreted participation in this course as a 
signal of limited competence in computing.  
Recent studies on the effect of wage subsidies provide a similarly mixed picture. In 
Switzerland, wage subsidies were found to be ineffective or even counterproductive for 
applicants at the end of their vocational training, but helpful for clients of a job coaching 
service (Deuchert and Kauer, 2014). In a Belgian study, disabled candidates with and without 
a subsidy reached about the same call-back rate (Baert, 2016). The authors of these studies 
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explain the somewhat counterintuitive results by distinguishing between a positive 
substantive effect (reduction of labour cost) and a negative signalling effect (problematic 
candidate) that in many cases even each other out.  
The limited number of studies available on employers’ perception of labour market 
programmes suggests that participation can be seen positively or negatively, and that the 
substantive positive effect may be offset by the negative signal associated with some of these 
programmes. Existing studies have focused on specific subgroups like youths or disabled, and 
on a limited range of programmes, mostly wage subsidies. By providing a systematic 
assessment of employers’ perceptions of all the main programmes and by focusing on 
interactions with job type and candidate characteristics, our study constitutes a step forward 
in this strand of analysis.  
Labour market programmes in Switzerland 
Over the last 20 years, Switzerland has developed a rather comprehensive system of ALMPs 
(Bertozzi et al., 2008). The public employment service (PES) and the administration of ALMPs 
are decentralized at the cantonal level. Compared to other OECD-countries Switzerland has a 
generous benefit system with a strong emphasis on job-search requirements and incentives to 
move into jobs. The ratio of active to passive labour market expenditure is above OECD-
average and over a quarter of all registered jobseekers participate in at least one activation 
programme (Duell et al., 2010). Switzerland is a country with low unemployment rates, in fact, 
at the time of our experiment, in November 2015, the unemployment rate reached merely 3.4% 
(SECO, 2015).  
In order to receive unemployment benefits, eligible persons must register with the local PES. 
They are then assigned to a caseworker who monitors their job search activities. The 
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caseworker can offer participation in a labour market programme, but can also impose it. In 
theory, programmes are chosen together with the jobseeker and should ideally reflect his or 
her career plan. However, labour market programmes tend to be used also as monitoring tools 
and for putting pressure on claimants. Typically, jobseekers who are believed to engage in 
undeclared work or are found to be insufficiently active in their job search can be required to 
participate in low skill unrewarding employment programmes provided by the public or non-
profit sector. If jobseekers refuse to participate, they can be subjected to sanctions consisting 
of benefit reductions1.  
A theoretical framework 
Building on the literature discussed above, in this section we develop a theoretical framework 
that allows us to generate hypotheses with regard to how employers are likely to interpret and 
thus make use of the information pertaining to participation in labour market programmes.  
We expect programme participation to convey three types of potentially relevant information 
to an employer. First, participation can have a substantive effect. This may refer to an 
improvement in human capital or a reduction in the labour costs (with a wage subsidy). In 
principle, if we rule out the possibility that participation destroys human capital, this effect 
cannot be negative. Second, participation can directly signal a quality of the applicant, such as 
a given level of cognitive skills or motivation. For instance, to be able to follow a foreign 
language course or a computing course, a given level of skills is required. This effect is likely 
to be positive, but can also be negative, like in the study by Falk et al. (2005) on basic computing 
courses mentioned above. Third, participation can convey information with regard to the 
assessment a caseworker makes of an applicant. Some programmes are more likely to be used 
for job-seekers who are deemed difficult to place or unmotivated. In this respect, participation 
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could also act as a negative signal. Thereby, ALMPs introduce a third actor in the signalling 
process, the caseworker, whose assessment is likely to be related to the true qualities of the 
applicant and hence considered by recruiters. We will refer to this indirect effect as the 
“caseworker signalling effect”.  
The overall effect of programme participation on the assessment that an employer makes of a 
candidate will thus depend on the way in which the three effects described above are 
combined. This is likely to vary across programmes, but also among applicants with different 
characteristics. Let us first look at how we expect the three effects to play out in the three 
different programme types that are investigated in our study. 
Training programmes - There are various types of training programmes, including language 
courses and short vocational courses in various professions (Bieri et al., 2006). To access 
training, jobseekers have to be proactive by proposing a particular course to the caseworker. 
Unmotivated jobseekers are unlikely to be assigned to training programmes. Assignment thus 
implies a positive caseworker signalling effect. In addition, since some cognitive skills are 
needed to be considered for a course (Focus group interviews1), participation acts as a positive 
signal regarding the applicant’s qualities. Consequently, we expect the overall impact of 
participation in training programmes to be positive, because of both, the substantive value of 
the course in terms of human capital improvement and because of its signalling value, direct 
or in terms of the caseworker’s assessment. 
Wage subsidies - For unemployed people who are considered particularly difficult to place, the 
PES can provide a wage subsidy of up to 40% of the wage costs for the first 6 months of 
employment, which can produce a positive substantive effect. As mentioned above, however, 
previous research has shown that the financial incentive of a wage subsidy may be offset by 
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its negative signalling effect (Baert, 2016). Possibly, the fact that someone is entitled to a wage 
subsidy reflects a negative assessment by the caseworker. Therefore, whether the overall effect 
is positive or negative depends on whether the substantive or the negative caseworker effect 
prevails. 
Temporary employment programmes - Employment programmes are provided by the public (or 
non-profit) sector and aim to provide an activity to jobseekers. Officially, their objective is to 
maintain the skills of unemployed people and they could therefore produce a positive 
substantive effect. In reality, these programmes entail mostly low skill activities, such as 
recycling or crafting objects. In this respect, participation (especially completion of the 
programme) may be interpreted as acceptance of physically demanding and unrewarding 
work (positive signal of applicant’s qualities). Although jobseekers can participate on a 
voluntary basis, these programmes are often imposed by caseworkers to jobseekers that seem 
unmotivated in their job search effort (Focus group interviews1) and therefore entail a negative 
caseworker signalling effect.  
Table 1 summarises our hypotheses about how programme participation affects employers’ 
perception of a candidate. Participation in a particular programme can generate different 
effects which either go in the same direction (training programme) or against each other 
(employment programmes and wage subsidies). Table 1 shows that we expect some 
programmes (employment programmes and wage subsidies) to generate opposite effects. We 
argue that the outcome of these contrasting effects will depend on the interaction between the 
type of programme and (1) the candidate’s distance from the labour market, and (2), the job 
someone applies to. 
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Table 1: Expected effects of programme participation on employers’ assessment of 
candidates 
Programme Type of effect Hypothesised 
interpretation 
Sign of effect 
Training  Substantive effect Increase in human capital  Positive 
Signal of applicant’s qualities Motivation / cognitive 
skills 
Mostly 
positive  
Signal of caseworker’s 
assessment 
Motivation / cognitive 
skills 
Positive 
Wage 
subsidy 
Substantive effect Reduction in labour costs  Positive 
Signal of applicant’s qualities Nil  
Signal of caseworker’s 
assessment 
Low productivity, hard to 
place worker 
Negative 
Temporary 
employment 
programme 
(low skill) 
Substantive effect Increase in or preservation 
of human capital 
Positive 
Signal of applicant’s qualities Motivation and acceptance 
of unrewarding working 
conditions 
Mostly 
positive 
Signal of caseworker’s 
assessment 
Lack of motivation; 
suspicion of undeclared 
work 
Mostly 
negative 
 
First, by distance from the labour market we mean the fact of displaying socio-demographic 
characteristics that are known to be associated with bigger difficulties in re-entering the labour 
market, such as old age, immigrant background or low education (see e.g. Oesch and 
Baumann, 2015). In a nutshell, we expect that candidates perceived as more distant from the 
labour market will benefit more respectively suffer less from programme participation. We 
argue that this is due to a change in the caseworker signalling effect. Since candidates closer 
to the labour market (like a young native jobseeker with upper-secondary education) are 
expected to find employment without help, participation in a low skilled temporary 
employment programme or entitlement to a wage subsidy are most likely interpreted as a 
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negative assessment by the caseworkers. In contrast, for candidates who are more distant from 
the labour market (e.g. an older migrant with compulsory education only), wage subsidies and 
low skilled employment programmes are common. These profiles are the intended target 
group of such programmes. As a result, the signal of the caseworker’s assessment is consistent 
with the profile of the candidate and does not add any new information for the employer. In 
the latter case, we can expect the other two effects, substantive and direct signal of the 
candidate’s qualities, to prevail. Accordingly, the overall effect should, by tendency, be 
positive.  
Second, employers can deduce applicant’s qualities from the job this person is applying to. 
Jobseekers applying to low-skilled, unrewarding, badly paid jobs can be assumed to face 
obstacles in re-entering the labour market. Otherwise they would apply to better jobs. As a 
result, we expect candidates who apply for this type of low quality jobs to gain more 
respectively suffer less form programme participation than candidates applying for more 
attractive mid-skilled positions. 
To sum up these complex patterns of interactions, we can say that the more distant from the 
labour market a candidate is, the less likely he or she is to suffer from the negative effect of a 
caseworker’s assessment and the more likely he or she profits from the potentially positive 
effects (both substantive and signalling). In contrast, the more a candidate is perceived as being 
close to the labour market the more he or she is likely to suffer from the caseworker signalling 
effect in a way that can offset the other, potentially positive, effects.  
Obviously, our reasoning assumes that employers are aware of the use that is made of labour 
market programmes by the PES. This assumption is reasonable, since the hotel sector is one 
with unstable employment and recruitment difficulties, and we can expect the majority of 
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hotels to have had contact with the PES at some stage. Qualitative studies have shown that in 
general employers know how the PES operates (Larsen and Vesan, 2012).  
Study design 
Our study is based on a factorial survey (FS) experiment. FS are a widely used method to study 
decisions and preferences, but has seldom been applied to study employers’ hiring behaviour 
(for exceptions see Biesma et al., 2007; Damelang and Abraham, 2016; de Wolf and van der 
Velden, 2001; Di Stasio and Gërxhani, 2015; Di Stasio, 2014, Protsch and Solga, 2014). In such 
experiments, participants are presented with descriptions of fictitious candidates and are 
asked to evaluate them. Candidates’ profiles consist of a random combination of several 
characteristics. FS have the advantage to be less prone to social desirability bias than item 
based questionnaires. Auspurg et al. (2014) show that for socially sensitive phenomena, such 
as gender-based wage discrimination, FS minimized social desirability bias compared to direct 
questions. A further advantage of FS is that one can fully control the information available to 
the respondent, thereby limiting potential biases due to unobservable characteristics. 
We decided to run our experiment in the hotel sector because it is a large source of 
employment for low skilled workers. Low skilled individuals are the main beneficiaries of 
labour market programmes and are more likely to be dependent on welfare state transfers than 
mid- and high skilled people. What is more, the sector is characterised by a relatively strong 
mismatch between supply and demand. On the one hand, the unemployment rate of 9.9% in 
the hotel sector at the time of the survey was above the Swiss average of 3.4% (SECO 2015). 
On the other hand, employers indicate that 15.9% of the positions that require vocational 
training are hard to fill (which is above the average of 9.7% for the service sector) (FOS 2015). 
Hence, we can expect ALMPs to play an important role in this sector.  
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The experiment 
We ran two separate experiments for two different jobs: receptionist and room cleaner. Beside 
our main independent variable, the participation in a labour market programme, we focused 
on the influence of five additional dimensions, which were varied randomly (table 2). All 
applicants were presented as having been unemployed for a period of six months and as 
having lost their previous job because of the closure of the hotel where they previously 
worked. In addition, we specified that all applicants completed their education in Switzerland 
to ensure the comparability of education credentials for candidates with foreign nationality. 
The experiment started with a description of a vacancy followed by the presentation of four 
fictitious candidates per job. Participants were asked to indicate the likelihood to hire the 
candidate on a scale from 1 to 10 (not at all likely - very likely).  
The training programme was operationalized as a Russian language course (Table 2). We 
chose this type of course because language courses are by far the most common training 
programmes financed by the job centre (Bieri et al., 2006). We did not choose courses in English 
or in another national language because mastering these languages is a basic requirement for 
a receptionist. Moreover, we wanted to avoid that training participation is interpreted as a 
negative signal (limited knowledge of important foreign languages). Since only 12% of the 
hotels in our survey need Russian language we can interpret a positive effect as a signalling 
rather than a substantive (improvement in human capital) effect.  
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Table 2: Dimensions and levels of vignettes 
Dimension Level 
ALMP - (nothing mentioned) 
 - Russian course paid by the public employment service (training) 
 - 40% wage subsidy paid by the public employment service 
(subsidy)  - Temporary employment program (temp) involving clothes 
recycling  - Two temporary employment programs (2 temp): one involving 
clothes recycling and the other consisting of packaging objects 
Gender - Mr. 
 - Ms. 
Nationality  - Swiss citizen, unmarried, without children 
 - Portuguese citizen, unmarried, without children 
 - Serbian citizen, unmarried, without children 
 - Senegalese citizen, unmarried, without children 
Age - Is 25 years old 
 - Is 32 years old 
 - Is 40 years old 
Education1 - Completed obligatory school in Switzerland  
 - Completed a 3-year VET- program as merchandiser (receptionist) 
 - Completed a 2-year VET-program as hotel employee (cleaner) 
Hobbies2 - Likes listening to music 
 - Two times a week plays checks in the local association 
 - Two times a week practices kick-boxing 
 - Two times a week plays soccer (volleyball for female) in the local 
association 
 - Volunteers for an association taking care of the elderly  
1 Switzerland has a strong vocational education and training system (VET) similar to the German one, where the majority of 
adolescents follows a dual track program that combines practical training in the company with theoretical classes of one or two days. 
There exist programs for over 230 occupations of, most are three or four year VET programs with a federal diploma, there exist shorter 
programs of 2 years with a federal certificate. The two-year VET program as hotel employee consists of courses in laundry service, 
looking after guests, housekeeping, logistic, interior decoration. The three-year VET program as merchandiser consists of course in 
German, foreign language, economics, communication, and administration.  
2Beside the effect of ALMPs we were also interested in whether employers use hobbies as a sorting criteria. However, we found no 
significant results. For the sake of completeness we included them in our models.  
 
The subsidy, which would be awarded to the new employer, consisted in the payment of 40% 
of the candidates’ salary by the PES for a period of six months. For the temporary employment 
programme, we chose two variants. The first consists of a programme in clothes recycling. In 
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the second variant, applicants attended two such programmes, one in clothes recycling and 
one in packaging. These programmes where chosen because they do not increase the 
unemployed individuals’ human capital in ways that are relevant for either of the two 
positions used for the experiment (room cleaner and receptionist). It is thus possible to 
interpret a (negative or positive) effect as being a signalling rather than a substantive effect.  
The combination of all the features listed in table 2 yields a number of profiles that is far bigger 
than our survey sample. Following standard practice in factorial surveys, we drew a d-efficient 
sample of 200 profiles. A d-efficient design maximizes the orthogonality of the profiles, 
thereby maximizing the statistical power one can obtain from a given number of observations 
(see Auspurg and Hinz, 2015).  
The data was collected in November 2015 using an online survey. 1,982 managers of hotels, all 
members of the major Swiss hotel employer association, were invited to participate. 
Employers were first contacted by regular mail to announce the study, and then the survey 
link was sent by email. Those who did not take the survey were reminded one and two weeks 
after the link was circulated2. In total 238 participants completed the survey, yielding a 
response rate of 12 percent3, which is not unusual for this type of population (Damelang and 
Abraham, 2016).  
Estimation Strategy 
In order to identify the effect of the different characteristics we attributed to our fictitious 
candidates, the rating of the candidate (which was assumed to be metric) was regressed on the 
six dimensions. Figure S1 in the supplementary material shows that the dependent variable is 
approximately normally distributed. We estimated models with interaction terms between 
programme participation and education, nationality respectively to detect variation in the 
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effect of programme participation with other vignette dimensions. Data obtained from survey 
experiments is structured hierarchically as each respondent rates several profiles. To adjust for 
the dependency of the error term within respondents, we estimated linear multilevel models 
with random intercepts (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). In 
these models the intercept is not fixed but is allowed to vary across level-2 units, in our case 
respondents4. Thereby, we followed the standard procedure suggested in the literature for 
nested data structures in vignette studies (Auspurg and Hinz, 2015). As robustness tests, we 
estimated models controlling for respondents’ characteristics and contextual variables at the 
level of the Swiss cantons, as well as a respondent fixed-effects model. These alternative 
estimation strategies yield the same results (see tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix).  
Results and Discussion 
As expected and shown in figure 1, participating in most labour market programmes has an 
impact on employer’s assessment of a candidate. Most effects differ in sign for the two 
positions: effects tend to be positive for those applying for a cleaning position and negative for 
those applying for a receptionist position.  
First, a Russian language course has a positive but statistically insignificant impact on the 
rating of candidates for either position. According to a question asked elsewhere in the survey, 
Russian is needed in only 12 percent of the hotels in our sample, and the effect is similar across 
all hotels, regardless of whether they need Russian as a working language. The absence of a 
significant effect might indicate that the signalling and substantive impacts of this measure are 
too weak to manifest themselves for the positions we considered. 
A more intriguing result is found for the wage subsidy, which has a positive effect for 
candidates applying for a position as room cleaner but not for those wishing to work as 
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receptionists. On the basis of our theoretical understanding we argue that this difference in 
outcomes must be understood with reference to the substantive and signalling effects that play 
out differently for the two jobs. For the receptionist, the two effects, i.e. the positive substantive 
effect and the negative caseworker signalling effect, cancel each other out (as in Baert, 2016). 
For the position of room cleaner, instead, the positive substantive effect dominates. We argue 
that applicants for the cleaning position are less likely to suffer from a negative caseworker 
signalling effect, because among the applicants to this job, one is more likely to find jobseekers 
who are rather distant from the labour market. Those applying to such a position can be 
assumed to be individuals who face some obstacles in accessing employment, otherwise they 
would apply for more attractive jobs. Qualitative evidence supports the idea that employers 
hiring in the low skill segment of the labour market are aware of this (Zamudio and Lichter 
2008; Bonoli and Hinrichs, 2012). As a result, being entitled to a subsidy does not add much 
relevant information on the candidate and the negative signalling effect is limited or inexistent.  
Let us now turn to participation in temporary employment programmes. These measures train 
skills that are largely irrelevant to the jobs included in the study, so that we can rule out any 
substantive effect. We hypothesised that participation in these programmes may signal 
acceptance of physically demanding and unrewarding work, a quality that is essential for a 
room cleaner, but largely irrelevant for a receptionist. This helps to understand why the overall 
impact of participation is positive for those applying to work as room cleaner. In order to 
explain the negative impact for the candidates for a job as receptionist, we need to turn to the 
caseworker signalling effect. Candidates to this more attractive occupation are expected to be 
closer to the labour market, and as a result unlikely to be sent to a largely irrelevant low skill 
employment programme. If this happens, it will be interpreted as a signal that “something is 
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wrong” with the candidate, for example lack of motivation in job search or suspicion of 
undeclared work. The positive signalling effect prevails for the low-skilled occupation, while 
the negative caseworker effect is dominant for the mid-skilled position.  
The results obtained by comparing the effects for the two positions corroborate our main 
hypothesis, i.e. that the positive effects prevail over negative ones for candidates applying to 
the low-skilled position and negative effects prevail for those applying to the mid-skilled 
position.  
 
Figure 1: Effects of programme participation on the rating of the fictitious candidate for the 
cleaning (left panel) and receptionist (right panel) position. 
Notes: Plotted coefficients for the ALMP-variable from model 1 (table A1 in the appendix) and model 4 (table A2 in the appendix). 
Dots represent the difference in the rating compared to the reference category, i.e. no programme participation (vertical line). 
Horizontal bars represent the 95% confidence intervals; the vertical segments at the bar represent the 90% confidence intervals.  
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We further expect the signalling value of labour market programmes to interact with other 
features that determine a candidate’s distance from the labour market: educational attainment 
and nationality. First, we focus on the education level. In figure 2, we provide marginal effects 
of programme participation at different levels of education for the two positions. For the room 
cleaner, the effect of participation is strongly related to the education level. Basically, all the 
positive effects observed in figure 1 concern the candidates with compulsory education only. 
There is no positive effect for the candidates with a vocational qualification. This result is in 
line with our hypothesis. Candidates with a vocational degree are closer to the labour market 
and if sent to a low skill employment programme or if deemed eligible for a wage subsidy, 
have probably been assessed by a caseworker as being somewhat problematic. This negative 
signal cancels out the putative positive signal or the positive substantive effect (acceptance of 
harsh working conditions or reduction in wage cost). In contrast, for a candidate with 
compulsory education only, it is not unusual to be required to participate in an employment 
programme or to be eligible to a wage subsidy. Hence, in this case, the positive signalling 
and/or substantive effect is not offset by the (weaker) negative signal. 
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Figure 2: The effect of ALMP participation for different levels of education. 
Notes: Average marginal effects obtained after the estimation of model 7 (cleaning) and model 8 (receptionist) (table A3 in the 
appendix). The dots/triangles represent the rating of a fictitious candidate with upper secondary/compulsory education for the 
different programmes (indicated at the x-axis). The vertical lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. The horizontal lines 
represent the ratings for the reference category (no programme participation). Contrast can be found in the supplementary material 
online (Table S5) 
 
Let us now turn to the receptionist position. Here the main effects are present in a roughly 
similar way at both levels of education, except training, which is more positive for the 
candidate with vocational training. 
With regard to a candidate’s nationality (figure 3), the negative caseworker assessment signal 
for the receptionist position prevails for the Swiss and is smaller for the foreign candidates. 
This is in line with our expectation that the effects of programme participation are less negative 
for candidates that are farther away from the labour market (migrants) than for closer 
candidates (natives). Most of the negative effect associated with participation in low skill 
employment programmes concerns the Swiss candidate.  
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Figure 3: The effect of ALMP participation for Swiss and foreign candidates 
Notes: Average marginal effects obtained after the estimation of model 9 (cleaning) and model 10 (receptionist) (table A3 in the 
appendix). The triangles /dots represent the rating of a fictional candidate with Swiss/foreign nationality for the different 
programmes (indicated at the x-axis). The vertical lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. The horizontal lines represent the 
ratings for the reference category (no programme participation). Contrast can be found in the supplementary material online (table 
S6). 
 
Things are different for the other occupation, room cleaner. We expect the overall effect to be 
more positive for foreign than for Swiss candidates. However, our results show that the effects 
are very similar across nationalities. Presumably, for a Swiss candidate it is so unusual to apply 
for this kind of position that in this case employers drop the assumption that Swiss candidates 
are less distant from the labour market. As a result, positive and negative effects play out in 
similar ways regardless of the nationality.  
Conclusion 
This study is among the first attempts to systematically investigate the way in which 
employers interpret participation in labour market programmes. Our theoretical model 
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assumes three possible effects: a substantive effect, a direct signalling effect of the applicant’s 
qualities and an indirect signalling effect of the caseworker’s assessment of the candidate. 
Moreover, these effects can reinforce or offset each other 
Our results show that different ALMPs entail different substantial and signalling effects 
depending on the job and characteristics of the candidate. We have also shown that the extent 
of the negative signal depends on the candidates’ assumed distance from the labour market. 
Applicants who, on paper, are not expected to need particular help or pressure to re-enter the 
labour market are more likely to suffer from negative signalling effects. In our experiment, this 
is the case of applicants to a mid-skilled job (receptionist), of applicants who have upper-
secondary education, and of natives. These individuals have a comparatively good level of 
employability. Thus, if entitled to measures meant for candidates who are rather distant from 
the labour market (like wage subsidies or employment programmes), they are likely to suffer 
more from negative signals than candidates who can be assumed to face difficulties re-entering 
the labour market. The fact that we do not observe the expected positive effect for training 
suggests that the training programme, as it was operationalized here, does not entail a 
sufficiently strong signal of motivation and/or – as intended by design – only a marginal 
increase in human capital.  
Our study does not come without limitations. The participants evaluate hypothetical 
situations and not real hiring decisions where employers have access to more information than 
we provided here. Also, in reality employers’ assessment of candidates is likely to be 
influenced by the composition of the candidate pool. At the same time, survey experiments 
reduce the ethical concerns linked to more realistic experimental methods, such as 
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correspondence testing and maximise the flexibility of the study design allowing to test 
multiple interactions. 
Our findings are relevant for our understanding of why some programmes are more effective 
than others. In particular, in line with existing studies, it confirms the potentially ambivalent 
effect of wage subsidies, which may combine a positive substantive effect with a signal of low 
productivity (Baert, 2016). Participation in a low skill employment programme generates a 
similar mix of positive and negative signals. The positive signal may be acceptance of 
physically demanding and unrewarding work. This signal is likely to prevail if the candidate 
is more distant from the labour market and if these qualities are important for the job he or she 
applies to. In contrast, for a candidate who is closer to the labour market and applies for a 
position where acceptance of physically demanding work is not relevant, the negative signal 
prevails. 
The fact that the negative signalling effect can offset and even replace a positive substantive 
effect may help to understand why employment programmes have sometimes been found to 
have a negative impact on the employment chances of participants (Kluve 2010).  
In conclusion, our study highlights the importance of considering the employer’s perspective 
when evaluating the effectiveness of ALMPs. In particular, our findings speak in favour of a 
very careful consideration of individual and job characteristics before assigning jobseekers to 
programmes, and before deciding whether or not to reveal eligibility/ participation to a 
prospective employer.  
These findings, we believe, are significant beyond the narrow field of labour market 
programmes. Our results suggest that the process of interpreting information on candidates is 
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highly complex, and effects should not be assumed to be constant across occupations and 
applicants’ characteristics (see also Auer et al., forthcoming).  
Future research should take these insights forward. Our paper allowed us to glimpse into 
interactions and how different signals are combined to produce an assessment of a candidate. 
Clearly, we need a more sophisticated thinking than a simple one-dimensional model where 
candidates are ranked from best to worst according to the presence-absence of a given signal. 
We also call for studies that control for job type. Our findings strongly suggest that signals can 
only be interpreted in relation to the job that is being applied for.  
The apparent sophistication of signalling processes could also benefit from qualitative 
research based on in depth interviews with employers. True, direct interviewing is exposed to 
the risk of a social desirability bias. However, there are some studies suggesting that at least 
some employers are willing to reveal their true preferences to researchers (e.g. Author 2012; 
Pager and Karafin, 2009). This type of qualitative research could be helpful in understanding 
the meaning behind the signalling effects highlighted by the experimental literature.  
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Endnotes 
1 To gain information on the use that is made of ALMPs we carried out two focus group 
interviews with caseworkers of the PES, in Bulle (French speaking, 27.11.2015) and Murten 
(German speaking, 17.02.2016).  
2 A detailed experimental protocol can be found in the supplementary material online. 
3 The descriptive statistics of the respondents (table S4) and a correlation matrix for the 
vignette dimensions and independent variables (tables S1 and S2) is presented in the 
supplementary material. Since every vignette is rated by several respondents and the vignette 
dimensions are only weakly correlated, we do not consider the low response rate as 
problematic. Some hotel-level variables (language region, city type, number of hotel stars) are 
available for the whole population. There is no systematic response-bias with respect to these 
variables between respondents and non-respondents (table S3 in the Appendix).  
4 The random intercept represents the effect of omitted respondent-specific covariates on the 
candidate’s rating. Including covariates at the respondent-level can lead to cluster-level 
confounding: the random intercept is correlated with covariates at the respondent-level. A 
Hausman test for endogeneity between the fixed and random-effects model indicates that the 
difference between the coefficients of the two models is not systematic. The distribution of the 
error term is presented in the supplementary material (figure S2).  
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Appendix  
Table A1: Multilevel Models for the Determinants of Employers’ rating of the 
Candidate for the Cleaning Position 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 Baseline 
Multilevel 
Respondent and 
Regional 
Covariates 
Fixed Effects 
Vignette Dimensions    
ALMP (Ref.: None)    
Training 0.086 0.065 0.141 
 (0.182) (0.185) (0.186) 
Subsidy 0.384* 0.384* 0.425* 
 (0.182) (0.185) (0.186) 
Temp 0.167 0.172 0.227 
 (0.183) (0.186) (0.187) 
2 temp 0.352+ 0.337+ 0.391* 
 (0.182) (0.186) (0.186) 
Education (Ref.: 
Compulsory) 
   
Upper Secondary 1.055*** 1.069*** 1.070*** 
 (0.114) (0.117) (0.116) 
Gender (Ref.: Male)    
Female 1.255*** 1.280*** 1.254*** 
 (0.115) (0.117) (0.116) 
Nationality (Ref.: Swiss)    
Portugal 0.306+ 0.286+ 0.302+ 
 (0.162) (0.166) (0.165) 
Serbia -0.166 -0.183 -0.175 
 (0.162) (0.165) (0.164) 
Senegal -0.284+ -0.287+ -0.283+ 
 (0.162) (0.166) (0.164) 
Age (Ref.: 25 years)    
32 years 0.134 0.145 0.140 
  (0.140) (0.143) (0.143) 
40 years -0.130 -0.131 -0.137 
 (0.144) (0.148) (0.147) 
Hobby (Ref.: None)    
Volunteer 0.247 0.221 0.255 
 (0.185) (0.188) (0.189) 
Team -0.020 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.186) (0.189) (0.190) 
Kick -0.244 -0.236 -0.224 
 (0.184) (0.188) (0.188) 
Chess -0.044 -0.035 -0.010 
 (0.184) (0.187) (0.188) 
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Respondent 
Characteristics 
   
Gender (Ref.: Male)    
Female  -0.168  
  (0.194)  
Age  -0.044***  
  (0.010)  
Education (Ref.: Below upper secondary)   
Upper Secondary  -0.290  
  (0.773)  
Tertiary  -0.263  
  (0.784)  
Other  -0.322  
  (0.829)  
Regional Characteristics     
Number of Employees  0.003*  
  (0.001)  
Language Region (Ref.: German-Speaking)   
    
French  -0.654*  
  (0.332)  
Italian  -0.587  
  (0.372)  
Romansh  1.550*  
  (0.772)  
Unemployment  0.234+  
  (0.127)  
Constant 4.704*** 5.724*** 4.640*** 
 (0.241) (0.998) (0.230) 
Random Effects 
Parameters 
   
Var (Constant) 1.727* 1.340  
 (0.231) (0.201)  
Var (Residual) 3.018 3.057  
 (0.160)* (0.164)  
Rho   0.450 
Log Likelihood -2031.4 -1953.0 -1748.6 
AIC 4098.8 3962.0 3529.20 
N Vignettes  958 928 958 
N Employers 237 232 237 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance Level: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01.  
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Table A2: Estimated Models for the Determinants of Employers’ rating of the 
Candidate for the Receptionist Position 
 Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
 Baseline linear 
Multilevel 
Respondent and 
Regional 
Covariates 
Fixed Effects 
Vignette Dimensions    
ALMP (Ref.: None)    
Training 0.174 0.135 0.228 
 (0.187) (0.190) (0.191) 
Subsidy 0.069 0.041 0.078 
 (0.189) (0.192) (0.193) 
Temp -0.338+ -0.367+ -0.330+ 
 (0.190) (0.193) (0.194) 
2 temp -0.622** -0.703*** -0.632** 
 (0.190) (0.193) (0.194) 
Education (Ref.: 
Compulsory) 
   
Upper-Secondary 0.833*** 0.817*** 0.839*** 
 (0.119) (0.121) (0.121) 
Gender (Ref.: Male)    
Female 0.792*** 0.790*** 0.784*** 
 (0.120) (0.121) (0.122) 
Nationality (Ref.: Swiss)    
Portugal -0.897*** -0.963*** -0.900*** 
 (0.167) (0.169) (0.169) 
Serbia -1.067*** -1.126*** -1.064*** 
 (0.167) (0.169) (0.169) 
Senegal -1.257*** -1.332*** -1.252*** 
 (0.167) (0.170) (0.168) 
Age (Ref.: 25 years)    
32 years 0.166 0.166 0.215 
 (0.147) (0.150) (0.151) 
40 years -0.599*** -0.603*** -0.579*** 
 (0.149) (0.152) (0.152) 
Hobby (Ref.: None)    
Volunteer -0.040 0.013 -0.030 
 (0.192) (0.196) (0.197) 
Team -0.217 -0.165 -0.259 
 (0.190) (0.194) (0.194) 
Kick -0.424* -0.422* -0.458* 
 (0.192) (0.195) (0.196) 
Chess -0.244 -0.271 -0.286 
 (0.190) (0.193) (0.194) 
Respondent 
Characteristics 
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Gender (Ref.: Male)    
Female  0.021  
  (0.215)  
Age  -0.036**  
  (0.011)  
Education (Ref.: Below upper secondary)   
Upper Secondary  -0.280  
  (0.859)  
Tertiary  -0.543  
  (0.872)  
Other  -0.350  
  (0.923)  
Regional Characteristics     
Number of Employees  -0.003+  
  (0.002)  
Language Region (Ref.: German-Speaking)   
French  -0.196  
  (0.368)  
Italian  -0.994*  
  (0.413)  
Romansh  1.136  
  (0.858)  
Unemployment  0.009  
  (0.141)  
Constant 5.493*** 7.201*** 5.477*** 
 (0.251) (1.105) (0.238) 
Random Effects 
Parameters 
   
Var (Constant) 2.063** 1.790  
 (0.266) (0.246)  
Var (Residual) 3.271** 3.251  
 (0.172) (0.174)  
Rho   0.465 
Log Likelihood -2097.55 -2005.53 -1805.02 
AIC 4231.11 4056.06 3642.05 
N Vignettes  967 931 967 
N Employers 243 233 242 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance Level: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01.  
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Table A3: Linear Multilevel Models for the Effect of Candidate’s Characteristics on 
Employers Evaluation with Interaction Effects  
 Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) 
 Interaction 
ALMP 
Education 
Interaction 
ALMP 
Education 
Interaction 
Education, 
Nationality 
ALMP  
Interaction 
Education, 
Nationality 
ALMP 
Dependent 
Variable  
Employers 
Rating 
Cleaning  
Employers 
Rating 
Reception 
Employers 
Rating 
Cleaning 
Employers 
Rating 
Reception 
ALMP (Ref.: 
None) 
    
Training 0.412 -0.059 0.526+ 0.113 
 (0.262) (0.285) (0.306) (0.322) 
Subsidy 0.800** 0.075 0.802* 0.265 
 (0.268) (0.285) (0.312) (0.321) 
Temp 0.528* -0.496+ 0.240 -0.304 
 (0.267) (0.286) (0.304) (0.322) 
2 temp 0.691** -0.585* 0.705* -0.203 
 (0.267) (0.289) (0.315) (0.324) 
Gender (Ref.: 
Male) 
    
Female 1.253*** 0.792*** 1.290*** 0.790*** 
 (0.114) (0.119) (0.115) (0.120) 
Nationality (Ref.: Swiss)    
Portugal 0.334* -0.918***   
 (0.163) (0.167)   
Serbia -0.169 -1.099***   
 (0.162) (0.168)   
Senegal -0.258 -1.262***   
 (0.162) (0.167)   
Nationality (Ref.: Foreigner)    
Swiss   -0.255 1.617** 
   (0.463) (0.574) 
Age (Ref.: 25 
years) 
    
32 years 0.142 0.145 0.103 0.084 
 (0.139) (0.148) (0.140) (0.149) 
40 years -0.120 -0.589*** -0.103 -0.538*** 
 (0.144) (0.149) (0.146) (0.150) 
Education (Ref.: Compulsory)    
Upper Secondary 1.645*** 0.694* 1.491*** 0.546 
 (0.279) (0.293) (0.332) (0.340) 
Hobby (Ref.: 
None) 
    
Volunteer 0.222 -0.063 0.238 -0.013 
148 
 
 (0.185) (0.193) (0.189) (0.196) 
Team -0.017 -0.235 -0.008 -0.148 
 (0.185) (0.190) (0.190) (0.197) 
Kick -0.216 -0.434* -0.195 -0.400* 
 (0.184) (0.192) (0.187) (0.194) 
Chess -0.025 -0.266 0.002 -0.229 
 (0.184) (0.191) (0.187) (0.192) 
ALMP x Education (Ref.: None x Compulsory) 
Training x Upper 
Secondary 
-0.672+ 0.469   
 (0.400) (0.422)   
Subsidy x Upper 
Secondary 
-0.872* -0.029   
 (0.410) (0.430)   
Temp x Upper 
Secondary 
-0.743+ 0.331   
 (0.409) (0.425)   
2 temp x Upper 
Secondary 
-0.687+ -0.090   
 (0.402) (0.423)   
ALMP x Education x Foreigner (Ref.: None x Foreigner x Compulsory) 
None x Swiss x 
Upper Secondary 
  0.411 0.362 
   (0.628) (0.709) 
Training x 
Foreigner x Upper 
Secondary 
  -0.645 0.408 
   (0.462) (0.481) 
Training x Swiss x 
Compulsory 
  -0.505 -0.683 
   (0.667) (0.752) 
Training x Swiss x 
Upper Secondary 
  -0.786 0.485 
   (0.849) (0.905) 
Subsidy x 
Foreigner x Upper 
Secondary 
  -0.807+ 0.087 
   (0.484) (0.510) 
Subsidy x Swiss x 
Compulsory 
  0.039 -0.666 
   (0.646) (0.741) 
Subsidy x Swiss x 
Upper Secondary 
  -0.382 -0.725 
   (0.795) (0.878) 
Temp x Foreigner x 
Upper Secondary 
  -0.430 0.490 
   (0.463) (0.485) 
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Temp x Swiss x 
Compulsory 
  1.187+ -0.899 
   (0.652) (0.722) 
Temp x Swiss x 
Upper Secondary 
  0.299 -0.185 
   (0.857) (0.933) 
2 temp x Foreigner 
x Upper Secondary 
  -0.764 -0.246 
   (0.473) (0.480) 
2 temp x Swiss x 
Compulsory 
  0.081 -1.926* 
   (0.669) (0.802) 
2 temp x Swiss x 
Upper Secondary 
  -0.084 -0.593 
   (0.813) (0.906) 
Constant 4.392*** 5.599*** 4.409*** 4.347*** 
 (0.275) (0.301) (0.278) (0.297) 
Var (Constant) 1.728 2.068 1.765 2.0221 
 (0.230) (0.266) (0.235) (0.263) 
Var (Residuals) 2.996 3.257 3.006 3.232 
 (0.158) (0.171) (0.159) (0.170) 
Log Likelihood -2028.64 -2096.11 -2031.69 -2091.03 
AIC 4101.27 4236.21 4121.39 4204.05 
N Respondent  242 243 242 243 
N Vignettes 958 967 958 967 
Note: Standard error in parentheses.  
Significance level: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Supplementary Material 
Experimental Protocol 
Date Step 
9 november 
2015 
Postal letter announcing the survey and a leaflet with more 
information on the survey 
11 november 
2015 
Electronic survey link 
16 november 
2015 
Reminder to those that did not yet respond 
23 november 
2015 
Second reminder to those that did not yet respond 
19 january 2016 Survey closed  
 
First screen vignette experiment 
 
Second screen vignette experiment 
 
 
Recruitment Decision Receptionist  
In this section we would like to capture your staff requirements the best possible. Instead of traditional question 
batteries, we will therefore present you four candidate profiles and ask you to evaluate them.  
The following candidates apply for a position as a receptionist in your hotel. All four candidates hand in a written 
application and have already worked as a receptionist in different hotels in Bern. They have lost their current 
position due to the closed down of the hotel six months ago and are currently unemployed and are looking for a 
new position.  
Please indicate for each candidate the likelihood that you would engage him for a position as a 
receptionist.  
(1=very unlikely; 10=very likely) 
You receive the written application of the candidates below.  Both have already worked as a receptionist in 
different hotels in Bern. They have lost their current position due to the closed down of the hotel six months ago 
and are currently unemployed and are looking for a new position.  
 Candidate 1 Candidate 2 
 Mr. G. 
 
Serbian citizen, unmarried, no children 
 
Is 32 years old 
 
Has completed a 2-years education as 
hotel employee  
 
Is currently in an occupational programme 
for the recycling of old cloths, before he 
completed one in packaging.  
 
In his free time he is volunteering for an 
organisation that support elderly people 
 
Ms. F 
 
Swiss citizen, unmarried, no children 
 
Is 40 years old 
 
Has completed compulsory education in 
Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
 
In her free time she likes to listen to music.  
Hiring (--)                           (++) 
      1   2   3    4    5   6   7    8   9   10 
(--)                           (++) 
      1   2   3    4    5   6   7    8   9   10 
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Third screen vignette experiment: two additional candidates in the same form as on the second 
screen 
Forth screen vignette experiment: All four candidates were presented next to each other and 
participants were asked to bring them in their preferred order from 1 (liked best) to 4 (liked 
least).  
This experiment was followed by a second one for the position of a room-cleaner. The set up 
was the same as presented above.  
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Correlation Matrix for candidate’ attributes  
The tables below show the correlation between the different vignette dimensions from the 
rated vignettes as well as the correlation between the vignette dimensions and the 
respondents’ characteristics. Since not every vignette of the whole vignette universe was 
rated but we draw a d-efficient sample the vignette dimensions are correlated with each 
other but this correlation should be close to 0. The correlation between the observed 
respondent characteristics and vignette dimensions indicate whether the random allocation 
of vignettes to respondent has worked out. The vignette dimensions should not be correlated 
with the respondent characteristics. Meaning for example that female respondent should not 
have rated significantly more female vignettes than male respondents. The correlation 
indicated below show that randomization was successful, all correlations are close to 0 and 
non-significant.  
Table S1: Pairwise Correlation for the rated Cleaning Position Vignettes 
Vignette 
Variables Gender 
Nationalit
y Age Education ALMP Hobby 
Gender 1      
Nationality 0.0092 1     
Age 0.0047 0.0399 1    
Education 0.0441 -0.0087 0.0785** 1   
ALMP 0.0092 0.0214 0.0597* -0.005 1  
Hobby 0.0072 -0.0246 0.0404 -0.0011 -0.0015 1 
Respondent Variables 
Gender -0.0048 -0.0027 -0.0123 -0.0027 0.0069 0.0041 
Age -0.0009 -0.0042 0.0078 -0.0042 0.1350 0.0044 
Education 0.0047 -0.0050 -0.0170 -0.0050 0.0138 -0.0053 
N Employees -0.0010 -0.0023 -0.0054 -0.0023 0.0029 -0.0196 
Lang. Region -0.0004 0.0021 -0.0030 0.0021 0.0003 -0.0138 
Unemployment  0.0034 -0.0020 0.0012 -0.0020 0.0040 -0.0007 
Note: **Significant on the 5%-level, *Significant on the 10%-level.  
 
Table S2: Pairwise Correlation for rated Receptionist Vignettes 
Vignette 
Variables Gender Nationality Age Education ALMP Hobby 
Gender 1      
Nationality 0.0443 1     
Age 0.0049 0.0112 1    
Education -0.0102 -0.0615* 0.0293 1   
ALMP 0.0378 0.0176 0.08** -0.0465 1  
Hobby 0.0407 0.0361 -0.0129 -0.0131 0.0198 1 
Respondent Variables 
Gender 0.0119 -0.0025 0.0032 -0.0048 -0.0079 0.0002 
Age 0.0122 -0.0027 0.0057 -0.0173 0.0107 0.0071 
Education 0.0086 0.0068 -0.0038 -0.0104 -0.0047 -0.0076 
N Employees 0.0275 -0.0014 -0.0163 0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0083 
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Lang. Region 0.0006 0.0036 -0.0075 0.0006 -0.0054 0.0020 
Unemployment  0.0037 -0.0004 -0.0135 0.0028 -0.0082 -0.0065 
Note: **Significant on the 5%-level, *Significant on the 10%-level.  
Response Bias in Hotel Variables 
Table S3: Descriptive Statistics for Respondents and Non-Respondents  
 Non-Respondents Respondents  
Language Region   
Geman-speaking 68.69% 68.95% 
French-speaking 20.65% 20.97% 
Italien-speaking 7.79% 8.06% 
Romanesque-speaking 2.88% 2.02% 
City Type   
Central city of 
agglomeration 
26.01% 29.44% 
Agglomeration 22.72% 25.40% 
Isolate city  2.25% 2.42% 
Rural area 49.02% 42.74% 
Hotelstars   
1star 0.87% 1.22% 
2 stars 9.13% 6.91% 
3 stars 47.09% 46.34% 
4 stars  23.55% 23.58% 
5 stars 4.48% 6.50% 
Swisslodge 11.28% 10.57% 
Other classification 3.60% 4.88% 
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Descriptive Statistics of Respondents  
Table S4: Descriptive Statistics of Respondent and 
Regional Variables 
Respondent Level Variables 
Gender  
Male 54.47%  
Female 45.53% 
Age Mean: 31.54 
Sde: 10.23 
Hiring Experience (years of 
experience in recruiting)  
Mean: 15.43 
Sde: 9.66 
Nationality   
Swiss 79.59% 
German 8.57% 
French 3.27% 
Other 8.57% 
Educational Attainment  
Compulsory Education not 
completed 
1% 
Co pulsory Education 1% 
Pre-vocational Training VET 
Certificate 
15% 
Vocational Training VET 
Diploma 
51% 
Professional Training 24% 
University or Applied 
University 
8% 
Size  
Small (1-19 employee) 45.45% 
Medium (20-60 employee) 37.60% 
Large (more than 60 employee) 16.94% 
Contextual Variables  
Language Region  
German speaking 69% 
French speaking 21% 
Italian speaking 8% 
Romansh speaking 2% 
Unemployment rate Mean: 3.25 
Sde: 1.05 
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Distribution of Dependent Variable  
 
Figure S1: The Distribution of the Dependent Variable for the Cleaning Position (left 
panel) and Receptionist Position (right panel) 
Note: Dependent variable is measured on a Scale from 1-10. The vertical line represents the mean (5.98 for the cleaning position and 
5.02 for the receptionist position).  
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Contrasts of Predictive Margins  
Contrasts show the difference between the rating of a candidate of the reference category (no 
programme participation) and those with participation in the respective programme.  
Table S5: Contrasts of predictive margins of ALMP for compulsory and upper-
secondary education 
 Compulsory Education Upper-Secondary 
Education 
Cleaning (Model 7 table 
A3) 
  
Training vs. None 0.412 (0.262) -0.260 (0.277) 
Subsidy vs None 0.800 (0.268)** -0.072 (0.280) 
Temp vs. None 0.528 (0.267)* -0.215 (0.281) 
Temp vs None 0.691 (0.267)** 0.004 (0.275) 
Receptionist (Model 8 table 
A3) 
  
Training vs. None -0.059 (0.285) 0.410 (0.280) 
Subsidy vs None 0.075 (0.285) 0.046 (0.287) 
Temp vs. None -0.496 (0.286)+ -0.165 (0.285) 
2 Temp vs None -0.585 (0.289)* -0.675 (0.280)* 
Note: Standard error in parentheses. Predictive margins are obtained after the estimation 
of a multilevel model (respective model in parentheses). Significance level: +p<0.1 
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 
 
Table S6: Contrasts of predictive margins of ALMP for Swiss and Foreigners.  
 
Cleaning (Model 9, table 
A3) 
Receptionist (Model 10, 
table A3) 
Training vs None, Foreigner 0.223 (0.2159 0.299 (0.221) 
Training vs None, Swiss -0.380 (0.404) -0.175 (0.411) 
Subsidy vs None, Foreigner 0.422 (0.217)+ 0.293 (0.226) 
Subsidy vs None, Swiss 0.394 (0.379) -0.610 (0.399) 
Temp vs None, Foreigner 0.037 (0.216) -0.094 (0.226) 
Temp vs None, Swiss 0.759 (0.410)+ -1.063 (0.413)* 
2 Temp vs None, Foreigner 0.324 (0.223) -0.310 (0.225)** 
2Temp vs. None, Swiss 0.499 (0.382) -1.545 (0.418) 
Note: Standard error in parentheses. Predictive margins are obtained after the estimation 
of a multilevel model. Significance level: +p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01. Contrasts of predictive 
margins obtained after estimation of a linear multilevel model (respective model in 
parentheses).  
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Residual Diagnostic 
An important assumption when estimating regression models is that the error term behaves 
well. Since one respondent rated several vignettes, the assumption of independency of the 
error term is violated. As explained in the text we addressed this issue in estimating a linear 
multilevel model. In addition, the error term should have zero mean and be normally 
distributed.  
Zero mean 
Table S7: Mean of Residuals for Models 1-10 
Model Mean Residual Levels 1  Mean Residual Level 2 
1 -4.43e-10 (0.909) 8.12e-10 (1.094) 
2 -1.34e-09 (0.917) -1.38e-09 (0.922) 
3 -1.49e-09 (2.179) N.A. 
4 9.14e-10 (0.906) -4.74e-10 (1.214) 
5 -6.95e-10 (0.910) -2.79e-09 (1.109) 
6 .9585538 (2.464) N.A 
7 -7.06e-11 (0.909) -1.32e-09 (1.096) 
8 -1.40e-10 (0.906) -2.03e-09 (1.218) 
9 8.23e-10 (0.908) -3.19e-09 (1.111) 
10 -9.25e-10 (0.906) 1.13e-09 (1.201) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses  
 
The above table shows the mean of error terms. They should be 0. As one can see, this 
condition is fulfilled. The error terms for all models are close to 0.  
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Normality of the error term 
Furthermore, the error term should follow a normal distribution. We tested this assumption 
graphically. The distribution of the error term for all estimated models is plotted in Figure 
S1. Although there are some deviations for the normality line this assumption seems not to 
be violated.  
 
Figure S2: Distribution of the Residuals for all estimated models. For multi-level models 
Residual on level-1 on the left panel, for level-2 on the right panel. 
Note: Histogram represents the residuals, blue line the normal density.  
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Chapter 3 
Employers’ interpretation of active labour market policies in 
hiring decisions  
Flavia Fossati, Fabienne Liechti, Anna Wilson5 
Abstract 
Active labour market policies (ALMPs) are widely diffused measures that aim to re-integrate 
jobseekers into the labour market. Despite their crucial role in acting as gatekeepers to 
employment, the literature scarcely takes into account employers’ perspective on these 
measures. We analysed whether and how employers consider ALMP participation in the hiring 
process. We developed a theoretical argument about how employers interpret ALMP 
participation and identified assumed agency, i.e. whether employers believe that the agency for 
initiating ALMP participation lies with the jobseeker (voluntary participation) or the job centre 
(mandatory participation), as a crucial factor that determines whether employers’ evaluation 
of ALMPs is positive or negative. To examine our expectations, we conducted qualitative 
interviews with employers hiring for low-skilled occupations in Switzerland and Sweden – 
two countries with comprehensive ALMP systems. We find that the interpretation of ALMP 
programmes differs depending on assumed agency. In fact, if employers believe that 
participation is voluntary, then they interpret it as a signal of motivation; however, if 
employers believe that participation is mandatory, then it is interpreted as a signal of lower 
productivity.  
                                                          
5 We would like to thank Giuliano Bonoli, Manuel Fischer, Gemma Scalise for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. This work was supported by the NCCR on the move, which is funded by the Swiss National Science 
Foundation [Project 7] 
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Introduction 
Active labour market policies (ALMPs) are a key element of modern welfare states. These 
measures address the increasingly high levels of unemployment by adapting the skills and 
capabilities of unemployed individuals to the changing needs of the fast-evolving labour 
market. ALMPs consist of a set of diverse measures that focus mainly on the labour supply 
side and that include training, employment programmes and wage subsidies (Bonoli, 2010; 
Filges et al., 2010 ).  
Economic evaluations of these policies have mostly focused on their supply side effects. Only 
recently, there has been a growing interest in the involvement of employers in the 
implementation and provision as well as the perception and evaluation of ALMPs (Bredgaard, 
2017; Ingold and Stuart, 2015; Ingold and Valizade, 2017; van der Aa and van Berkel, 2014). 
Scarce existing evidence suggests that employers rely on information provided by ALMP 
participation when sorting candidates (Falk et al., 2005; Liechti et al, 2017; van Belle et al., 
2018). However, the effects of such measures are ambiguous. While some measures seem to 
have a positive effect, others have no or even a negative effect on employers’ hiring decisions. 
Overall, we know little about employers’ motives to consider ALMP measures when hiring. 
However, such knowledge is essential to fully understand the effects of ALMPs and for 
ameliorating these policies to ensure that ALMP participation is perceived as an asset rather 
than as a stigma.  
In the light of the limited research on employers’ preferences regarding ALMPs, in this paper, 
we investigate whether and why employers consider ALMPs for their hiring decisions. As 
ALMPs target foremost low-skilled individuals and these workers are most likely to be 
affected by unemployment, due to post-industrialization as well as the newest labour market 
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transformations (automation, robotisation), we focus on this segment of the labour market. 
Thus, we investigate how ALMPs affect employers’ evaluation of applicants for low-skilled 
service-oriented jobs, which we define as occupations that do not necessarily require formal 
training but that can be quickly learned on the job. Such occupations include, for instance, 
sales personnel in supermarkets, cleaning staff, waiters in restaurants and bars, or kitchen 
help. In a service economy employers seek two different types of qualities. Beyond basic 
qualifications, employers in the low-skilled labour market increasingly demand soft skills, 
particularly the “right attitude” for front-line service work (Belt and Richardson, 2005; Moss 
and Tilly, 2001; Nickson et al., 2012; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003).  
We develop a theoretical argument that expects ALMPs to influence employers’ hiring 
behaviour through two mechanisms. First, participation in ALMPs can directly increase the 
employability of a candidate by adding relevant human capital (e.g., Kluve, 2010; Breedgard, 
20151). Second, ALMPs provide relevant signals with regard to a candidate’s productivity 
(Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973). Because the real productivity of a candidate is not directly 
observable, employers have to rely on other information that acts as a signal for productivity 
and the right attitude. Ideally, and as is desirable from social policy perspective, the signalling 
effect of ALMPs should be positive. However, it can also be negative, for instance, when it 
allows employers identifying a lack of relevant skills or is used to identify unproductive 
candidates and, therefore, is stigmatising (Liechti et al., 2017).  
Our main hypothesis is that whether employers consider participation in ALMPs as a positive 
or negative signal depends on to whom the employer attributes the agency about initiating 
programme participation. In other words, the nature of the ALMP signal depends on whether 
employers believe that the main agency of programme participation was exerted by the state, 
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the job centre, or the caseworker and thus was the result of an institutional constraint; or 
whether they believe that the unemployed person took an active role in the decision to 
participate. In the latter case, participation is likely to be interpreted as a positive signal (i.e., 
motivation). Conversely, when agency is assumed to lie with the caseworker, ALMP 
participation should entail a negative signalling effect (e.g. sanction). Importantly, for these 
effects to manifest, employers do not need to know how the system of ALMP allocation 
actually works, but the interpretation depends on their beliefs about how they assume 
participants are allocated to ALMPs (Stryker, 19802).  
From a social policy perspective, the signalling effect of ALMPs should be positive and thus 
have a beneficial effect for the participants. This is all the more important because especially 
individuals from lower social classes, including immigrants, perform low-skilled service jobs. 
Accordingly, from a sociological perspective, it would be essential to ensure that these policies 
also have a positive effect on their labour market (re-)integration chances to ensure economic 
independence and possibly social mobility. However, in the light of previous research, it is 
plausible that ALMPs may have a negative effect on employment chances because they allow 
employers to identify a lack of relevant skills or because they use such programmes to identify 
unproductive candidates. Accordingly, we expect that ALMPs may be stigmatising in certain 
instances (Liechti et al., 2017).  
To test our theoretical argument, we carried out semi-structured interviews with employers 
in the retail and hotel sectors, two sectors that rely heavily on low-skilled labour, in Sweden 
and Switzerland. These countries are interesting because they are characterised by an 
extensive investment in ALMPs focusing on human capital enhancement and because they 
offer extensive (re-)training schemes (Bertozzi et al., 2008; Köhler et al., 2008).  
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ALMPs and employability: developing the theoretical argument  
In this section we develop our theoretical argument and formulate some expectations about 
how and why employers consider individual ALMP participation when taking hiring 
decisions. Research on this topic is still scarce. The existing evidence indicates that employers 
are rather sceptical of ALMPs and these policies exert only a limited influence on employers’ 
hiring behaviour. Breedgart (2017) develops a typology of employers’ engagement in ALMPs 
and submits it to an empirical test with Danish employers. The results reveal that a majority 
of employers is of the dismissive or passive type, meaning that they do not actively participate 
in ALMPs and hold either negative (dismissive) or positive (passive) attitudes towards 
ALMPs. Ingold and Valizade (2017) conceptualize agencies delivering ALMPs as labour 
market intermediaries and test how ALMPs affect employers hiring behaviour of 
disadvantaged groups. Their results demonstrate the ALMPs have only a limited influence on 
employers’ hiring behaviour and are negligible when compared to firm size and employer’s 
selection criteria. Finally, Liechti et al. (2017) rely on a factorial survey experiment simulating 
a hiring process and find that ALMPs matter for hiring decision but that employers’ evaluation 
of ALMP participation depends on the ALMP type and the candidate’s distance to the labour 
market (i.e. employability). Temporary employment programmes had a positive influence on 
candidates that were, in terms of education and migration background, more distant form the 
labour market but a negative one for candidates with otherwise good labour market prospects.  
Overall, the results from previous studies suggest that employers consider ALMPs but are 
sceptical about their usefulness. Clearly, what these findings leave open is the employers’ 
reasoning on why they consider ALMPs or not for their hiring decision and what kind of 
measures they perceive as useful for different groups of applicants.  
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Before we formulate our expectations about how specific ALMP measures influence hiring 
behaviour, we develop a general argument of why ALMPs should theoretically have an impact 
on employers’ hiring decisions. Basically, ALMPs influence employers’ hiring behaviour for 
two reasons. First, ALMP measures can have a substantive effect on a jobseekers’ ability or 
employability, for example by increasing a candidate’s human capital or reducing wage costs 
(Breedgard, 2015). Second, participation in ALMPs can have a signalling effect. This effect 
occurs due to the uncertainty with regard to an applicant’s productivity. Participation in 
ALMPs conveys additional information regarding, for instance, a candidate’s trainability and 
motivation, which is considered by employers to reduce uncertainty (Liechti et al., 2017). As 
forcefully argued by several scholars, in the low-skilled sector, employers are on the lookout 
for motivation and a positive attitude towards work (Belt and Richardson, 2005; Moss and 
Tilly, 2001; Nickson et al., 2012; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). Thus, employers will try to 
extrapolate relevant information about candidates’ attitude (also) from their participation in 
ALMP measures. From a social policy perspective, it is desirable that ALMP measures are 
designed in such a way that they convey positive signals. In practice, however, they can also 
act as negative signals and thus carry unintended negative consequences (Burtless, 1985, van 
Belle et al., 2018, Falk et al., 2005). We argue that the nature of the signal depends on whom 
the employers attribute the main agency of programme participation. Employers can attribute 
–correctly or incorrectly – the decision to participate to either the jobseeker her- or himself or 
to the caseworker. In other words, we expect that these signalling effects unfold independently 
of whether the assumption about how the ALMP system works – and therefore who has the 
agency – is correct or incorrect. It is employers’ beliefs that affect their decision behaviour 
(Stryker, 1980). Even without knowing the exact features of the ALMP-system, employers have 
some beliefs about how the system works and base their interpretation on these beliefs.  
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ALMP participation serves as positive signal when employers believe that the main agency 
about the decision to participate lies with the jobseeker. When employers believe that the 
unemployed themselves asked to be assigned to an ALMP measure, then this action would be 
an excellent way to detect their motivation (positive signal). In such cases, programme 
participation should signal a positive attitude towards work, as it conveys the willingness to 
do whatever it takes to find employment. Completion of a more demanding measure might 
also reflect a certain level of skills and cognitive capabilities (see also Liechti et al., 2017).  
However, employers can also attribute the main agency about programme participation to the 
caseworker or institutional constraints. If this is the case, and ALMP participation is perceived 
for instance as mandatory or imposed by the caseworker, the positive signalling value of a 
programme is lost. Depending on the programme, participation then reveals a lack of relevant 
skills or problematic behaviour. At best, participation is no longer meaningful because 
assignment is assumed to happen automatically after a certain period of unemployment.  
The expectation is that these two effects, the substantive effect and especially the signalling 
effect, play out differently for different programme types. In the following we focus on the 
main ALMP interventions, namely training, employment programmes (TEP), and wage 
subsidy (Martin and Grubb, 2001). Job search assistance was excluded from our analysis, as 
this is typically not revealed and thus unlikely to be considered by employers. 
In terms of signalling effects, training programmes are often assigned upon a jobseekers’ request 
(see PES interviews3) Thus, participation can signal a jobseeker’s motivation to update relevant 
skills or adequate cognitive capabilities and programme completion reveals the participant’s 
perseverance. However, sometimes participating in a training programme can also reveal a 
lack of skills (Falk et al., 2005) and therefore entail a negative signalling effect. In fact, when it 
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is assumed that jobseekers are assigned to a specific programme by the caseworker, 
assignment to a training programme can be interpreted as a caseworker’s assessment of a skill 
deficit. In terms of substantial effects, training programmes are implemented to close gaps in 
relevant skills. In the low-skilled sectors many candidates have low or obsolete qualifications 
due to rapid technological change (see Bonoli, 2005). Thus, employers should value training-
based ALMPs because they increase the human capital and, in turn, the expected productivity 
of a candidate. However, we expect training programmes to unfold a substantive positive 
effect most of all when they teach specific skills that are directly relevant for a job (see Kluve, 
2010: 905).  
Participation in TEPs might be especially valued in the low-skilled segment of the labour 
market when employers assume voluntary participation, as this signals the willingness to 
engage in the unrewarding and repetitive activities that are typical for these occupations. 
Sometimes caseworkers use TEPs as a sanctioning tool when clients do not comply with job 
search requirements (Liechti et al., 2017; Duell et al., 2010; Filges and Hansen, 2017). 
Consequently, if employers believe that TEPs are assigned to sanction recalcitrant jobseekers, 
they can use participation to identify unproductive candidates. Finally, we do not expect a 
substantial positive effect of TEPs because the setup of these measures hardly increases the 
human capital of participants (Gerfin and Lechner, 2002). Tellingly, these strategies are also 
referred to as “parking strategies” (Considine, 2001, Van Berkel et al., 2007). However, these 
programmes can serve as a framework to structure the jobseeker’s day and provide 
networking opportunities (see Auer and Fossati, 2016; Bonoli, 2013; Duell et al. 2009).  
Concerning wage subsidies, we do not expect a positive signalling effect related to a jobseeker’s 
agency, as employers should be aware that jobseekers cannot request wage subsidies but that 
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these are assigned by caseworkers without consultation with the unemployed person. 
However, the signalling value of wage subsidies can be negative because it may suggest that 
the ability of the candidate is below average (see also Liechti et al., 2017) and allows employers 
to identify unproductive candidates (Baert, 2016; Burtless, 1985). However, by reducing the 
monetary consequences of a “riskier” hiring behaviour, wage subsidies should have a 
straightforward positive substanftive effect (Kluve, 2010; Breedgard, 2015).  
In summary, we expect that the crucial difference between situations in which employers 
perceive ALMPs as a signal of motivation (positive) and instances where they use ALMPs to 
avoid candidates (negative signal) depends on their assumption about who has the main 
agency in the decision to participate in a measure. If employers perceive participation as an 
active decision by the jobseeker, then we expect even low-skilled ALMPs to be an asset for 
jobseekers in the low-skilled labour market. If instead the agency is assumed to lie with the 
caseworker, then ALMPs might reveal shortcomings or behavioural problems. Finally, if 
employers assume that ALMPs are assigned automatically, then ALMP participation should 
not carry a signal.  
Case Selection 
As described above, our interest is to uncover the general mechanisms of how employers 
interpret ALMPs for hiring decisions in the low-skilled sector of the labour market. For this 
purpose, we conducted interviews with employers in Switzerland and Sweden. These 
countries provide good cases for analysing ALMPs, as the PES offers extensive counselling 
services and an encompassing set of different ALMP measure are available, thereby making a 
great effort to re-integrate unemployed individuals into the labour market. In fact, to obtain a 
reliable assessment of how employers perceive ALMPs, it is important to choose countries in 
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which these instruments are well developed and widely used. Within the sample of countries 
with comprehensive ALMPs, we chose two cases that are most different in terms of their 
welfare state traditions, i.e., a Social Democratic welfare state regime in Sweden and a 
“continental welfare state with a liberal face” in Switzerland (Armingeon, 2001). These 
countries are interesting because they are characterised by an extensive investment in ALMPs 
focusing on skill enhancement and because they offer extensive (re-)training schemes (Bertozzi 
et al., 2008; Köhler et al., 2008). By analysing different institutional settings, our aim is to allow 
for conclusions that are more generalizable than insights relying on a single case.  
In terms of ALMP organisation, both countries are similar: the PES offers extensive services, 
including a vast choice of different ALMPs. In particular, human capital-centred measures 
such as skill enhancement or re-training are a core pillar in both countries and a substantive 
investment is dedicated to these measures (Sweden and Switzerland invest 0.15% and 0.18% 
of GDP, respectively, in training measures, see Kriesi et al, 2019; OECD, 2017). At the same 
time, the PES closely monitors job search progress and has strict sanctioning schemes to punish 
non-compliance (Duell et al., 2010; Köhler et al., 2008; Løedmel and Trickey, 2001; Sianesi, 2008: 
372).  
Also, the economic conditions are comparable. Unemployment is low and unemployment 
provision is extensive for both passive and active schemes (Duncan and Paugam, 2000; Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Kriesi et al., forthcoming, figure 3.2). Furthermore, Sweden and Switzerland 
have a skill system biased towards specific skills and are characterised by a wage bargaining 
system that is coordinated at the industry level (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001).  
However, there are differences as well. Sweden has a long tradition of ALMPs starting already 
in the 1940s and it has played a pioneering role regarding activation policies (Bonoli, 2013; 
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Köhler et al., 2008; Swenson, 2002). In Switzerland, these policies were adapted only in the 
1990s as a reaction to the rapidly deteriorating labour market (Bertozzi et al., 2008). The extent 
to which the unemployed resort to the PES is higher in Sweden than in Switzerland (Köhler et 
al., 2008; OECD, 2017). In the former, 81% of jobseekers contact the PES to find work, whereas 
in the latter, only approximately 52% do the same (OECD, 2015: 165). Similarly, participation 
in ALMP programmes is very common in Sweden. For instance, in the period 2004-2015 
between 3.0 and 5.22% of the total labour force participated in an ALMP. In contrast, the 
participation rates in Switzerland varied between 1.0 and 1.6% of the total labour force (Duell 
et al., 2010; Köhler et al., 2008; OECD, 2017). Moreover, in many respects, Switzerland comes 
closer to liberal type of welfare state than Sweden (Armingeon, 2001). However, among the 
Nordic countries, Sweden’s labour market policy also contains clear elements of 
commodification (Furåker et al., 1990).  
Our case selection was guided by the intention to obtain a reliable assessment of how 
employers perceive ALMPs. To this aim it is important to choose countries in which these 
instruments are well developed and widely used. Moreover, within the sample of countries 
with comprehensive ALMPs, we chose two cases that are most different in terms of their 
welfare state traditions. If similar results are obtained in different settings, our conclusions will 
be more easily transferrable to other settings with a comprehensive ALMP system but different 
welfare institutions (Gesthuizen and Sheepers, 2010).  
Data and Method 
To understand the meaning that employers attach to ALMPs in their hiring decisions, we 
conducted semi-structured interviews in the hotel and retail sector. We asked questions about 
the desirable qualities in candidates, the employers’ hiring strategies and their perception of 
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candidates. The interviews focused on the employers’ view off the three most common ALMP 
interventions, training courses, TEPs, and wage subsidies. We also chose these ALMPs because 
they are easily observable by employers, other measures, such as counselling and monetary 
sanctions, are unlikely to affect employers’ hiring behaviour because they are unable to 
observe these measures. 
The employers were sampled according to size of the establishment and by ensuring that they 
have a person responsible for hiring (HR-manager, HR-assistant or similar) and whether the 
site is easily accessible. This also means that the establishment needed to be of a certain size in 
terms of employees. These criteria were chosen to make sure that the interviewed employers 
all had hiring experience and that the hiring procedure they apply are relevant for a none-
negligible portion of jobseekers. Within these criteria employers were chosen on the basis of 
convenience. Since our sample covered large retail chains that are present all over the country, 
we decided to interview a smaller sample of retail establishments. In these cases, we 
interviewed HR-responsible from the middle-management to make sure to capture the 
company’s overall recruitment strategy. The number of interviews was not fixed but we 
decided to stop interviewing once we had the feeling additional interviews did not add any 
new insights.  
We conducted the interviews between September 2016 and March 2018 in Sweden 
(Malmö/Örebro) and Switzerland (Bern/Zürich/Basel). They were recorded (except for two 
cases where informed consent was not given) and subsequently transcribed in the original 
language. We carried out 17 interviews in Switzerland and 14 in Sweden (31 interviews in 
total). Regarding our respondents, 14 were male and 17 female; 24 interviews were carried out 
in hotels, with the remaining interviews being conducted in retail enterprises. The experience 
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of the interviewees varied from less than 5 years to well over 10 years, and the interviewees 
had different functions: 12 were involved in the hiring process as HR professionals, 7 were line 
managers, and 12 were in management positions or the owner of the hotel (see table A1 in the 
appendix for more details).  
We developed a coding scheme (table 1) to classify employers’ statements into different 
categories. The coding procedure was theory led but inductively refined, meaning that we 
capture the reasoning employers gave for considering (or not) the three main ALMP types 
(training, TEP and subsidy) in their hiring process. As outlined in the theory section, these 
reasons could either be classified as substantive effects, in terms of human capital or reduction 
of wage costs, or in terms of positive or negative signals. Within the categories “awareness of 
ALMPs”, “type of programme”, and “reasoning”, the categories are exclusive.  
If employers were not aware of ALMPs, their answers concerning how they would evaluate 
candidates who participated in such measures were still coded. Because, as we explained in 
the theory section, it is not absolutely necessary to fully understand or know the ALMP 
system, rather we expect that employers’ hiring behaviour is influenced by beliefs of how the 
system works.  
The coding scheme was validated several times by choosing some interviews that were (re-) 
coded by all the authors. This iterative procedure allowed adjusting unclear codes or 
discussing difficulties in the categorisation of specific interview parts (Charmaz, 2001; Yin, 
2003). After this validation process, each author was responsible for coding a number of 
interviews. First, the relevant passages were assigned to thematic fields, i.e., awareness of 
ALMPs and type of programme. Second, within each thematic group, the statements4 were 
assigned to different lines of reasoning as to how ALMP participation was interpreted.  
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Table 1: Coding Scheme 
Step 1:  Thematic Fields  
Awareness of ALMPS  
 Is aware of ALMPS 
 Is not aware of ALMPs 
Type of programme  
 Training (further vocational training or specific courses) 
 Temporary employment programmes 
 Wage subsidy  
Step 2:  Reasoning 
Reasoning for considering 
ALMPs 
 
 Human capital 
 Incentives to hire (wage subsidy) 
 Screening device:  
 -Positive signal 
 -Negative signal 
 Neutral  
 
Results  
How employers interpret ALMP participation  
In this section, we discuss first whether employers take ALMPs into account when hiring; then, 
we proceed to their perception of different ALMPs and analyse whether this depends on the 
assumed agency of ALMP participation.  
In general, our findings show that employers in both countries are not very familiar with 
ALMPs and their allocation process. Nevertheless, they consider ALMP participation when 
hiring. This result shows that it is not necessary to have specific knowledge about how the 
system works to interpret an information, rather employers try to make sense of any kind of 
information that is provided and use it to improve their assessment of a candidate. This is in 
line with other studies showing that employers pay attention to different kind of information, 
including hobbies, attractiveness, social background and many more (see e.g. Rooth 2011, 
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2012). The results further show that there are no systematic differences between employers in 
the two countries, Switzerland and Sweden, regarding their interpretation of ALMPs.  
Overall, only a minority thinks that ALMP participation is altogether irrelevant. Such 
employers draw a clear distinction between the person and her skills and her unemployment 
experience. Consequently, they do not consider a person’s ALMP experience when evaluating 
the candidate, therefore ALMP participation results in a neutral signal. 
Employers who instead consider ALMPs when hiring can be divided into two groups. 
According to our theoretical argument, some believe that ALMPs are mandatory either by law 
or are imposed by the caseworker – possibly as a sanctioning tool. Employers who believe that 
ALMP participation is imposed automatically once someone is unemployed tend to read little 
into this information (neutral signal). This way of interpreting ALMPs is nicely summarized 
by this respondent:  
The way I see it, it is not the person per se who can be held responsible for the fact that 
they have gone through these measures. They have to do it: they have to do something 
according to the PES. Those are the rules, so I don’t think anything of that. […] Their 
experience with these programmes doesn’t signal anything in particular. (Hotel5SWE)  
A substantial number of employers indeed believed that ALMP participation is voluntary and 
thus at least partly actively initiated by the unemployed person. In instances where ALMP 
participation is assumed to reflect an individual decision by the unemployed individual, ALMP 
participation is also considered a relevant positive signal and is associated with a particularly 
high motivation to work. In this regard, employers often mentioned that ALMP participation 
shows the motivation to work.  
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This shows me that there is the will to work. I think this is an important sign. (Hotel3CH) 
That’s great because I think it is much better to do something like that than sit at home 
and do nothing. (Hotel8SWE) 
These findings are in line with our expectation that, depending on the attribution of agency, 
the signals of specific programmes may be altered. Finally, we find that a minority of 
employers interpreted programme participation as a clear negative signal of behavioural or 
other shortcomings of a candidate.  
Whether or not and in which way employers considered ALMPs in their recruitment decisions 
did not seem to vary systematically among different types of employers. The only difference 
emerging was that larger companies with a more professionalized HR- management seemed 
to be more likely to hire from disadvantage groups, such as migrants or long-term 
unemployed with little experience, and were more willing to offer training opportunities to 
this population. Often, employers highlighted their social responsibility as a reason for why 
they give a chance to weaker candidates. A manager of a big hotel chain puts it the following 
way:  
This is also something nice, if you can even give someone a chance. […] So it is also a 
responsibility of the employers somehow that they find a way back into working life. 
(Hotel13CH) 
Smaller establishments could instead less easily afford to take the risk of hiring the wrong 
person, or as a hotel manager told us: 
So far this has not happened. Because we have too little support capacities. (Hote7CH) 
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So it would certainly give me an incentive to try someone you wouldn't try otherwise. 
Someone who feels like I don't know exactly, but then you would say "ok, try it". 
(Hotel3CH) 
If they were willing to hire jobseekers with wage subsidies, they often mentioned the financial 
aspect of the subsidy that would allow them giving a chance to a potentially “problematic” 
candidate: 
So, [a wage subsidy] would certainly give me an incentive to try someone you wouldn't 
try otherwise. Someone who feels like I don't know exactly, but then you would say "ok, 
try it". (Hotel3CH) 
Table 2 Identified reasoning 
Substantive effect 
Human capital   ALMPs allow collecting experience in relevant tasks (training and 
TEP)  
 Basic training is not enough, therefore ALMPs are needed 
 Training must match the job  
Wage subsidy  Allows for a testing period  
 Does not have time to supervise (low-productivity) candidates 
 Important not to exploit the person but to hire her after subsidies 
expire  
Screening device 
Positive signal  It is good that the person does something and has a daily 
structure (TEP)  
 Shows that someone is motivated and really wants to work (TEP)  
Negative signal  TEPs do not correspond to the reality, generate expectations that 
are too high  
 TEPs: Reveal problems: What is the reason why someone needs a 
TEP?  
 Basic training: Reveals a lack of competences  
 Wage subsidy: Reveals a lack of productivity  
Neutral  It is better than nothing (TEP)  
 It must match with the job (training and TEP)  
 
176 
 
Let us now discuss how employers evaluate the substantive and signalling value of the 
different programmes. In Table 2, we summarise these interpretations based on the categories 
developed in the theoretical argument, distinguishing between substantive and signalling 
effects and discuss them in detail in the following sections.  
Temporary employment programmes 
We assumed that participation in TEPs either signals the acceptance of unrewarding work and 
high motivation to re-integrate into the labour market. Alternatively, we expected that TEPs 
might be used to screen for unproductive candidates, meaning that participation in such 
programmes can have a negative signalling effect.  
Most of the respondents said that TEP participation was better than doing nothing and that it 
might be a way of providing the jobseekers with a daily structure. 
I would say: “Okay, but at least this person has done something, not just being 
unemployed and collecting money. They probably want to do something and want to feel 
useful, and they have a drive” – that’s what I would like to look into. (Hotel7SWE). 
Approximately one-fourth of the respondents use programme participation to detect 
motivation, i.e. a service oriented attitude, and said that following such a programme shows 
them that the candidate is motivated to work and can carry out basic monotonous work:  
I have already said that with the breakfast buffet, that is more like basic work, and when 
someone keeps up with doing that [participating in a TEP] for five months, he will also 
keep up with the breakfast buffet even though it is kind of monotonous work. (Hotel3CH) 
Clearly, however, the respondents’ interpretation of ALMPs is influenced by their 
understanding of how TEPs are assigned to the unemployed. The respondents who mentioned 
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positive signalling effects often attributed agency to the unemployed individual. That these 
employers judged programme participation as showing the jobseeker’s willingness to re-
integrate into the labour market reveals that they are not familiar with the working of the PES 
and programme allocation, which can be enforced by caseworkers as a sanctioning tool. 
The respondents who were aware of the allocation process were more critical regarding TEPs:  
Yes, I mean the question always arising is why? Why does a person reach that point [of 
being assigned to a TEP]? (Retail 10CH) 
As we expected, taking part in a less rewarding ALMP can be interpreted in different ways. 
On the one hand, if agency is attributed to the jobseeker, it can signal motivation and 
willingness to work. On the other hand, if agency is attributed to the caseworker, it might be 
interpreted as an indication of behavioural or other problems and therefore have a negative 
signalling effect, which may explain why some evaluations of TEPs find that this type of 
measures has a negative effect (Card et al., 2010; Kluve, 2010). However, the majority of 
employers were either neutral regarding TEPs or interpreted participation as a signal of high 
motivation.  
Training 
Training programmes are expected to have a positive substantive effect on the human capital 
endowment of a jobseeker since these programmes should provide skills that are lacking. 
However, the interviews reveal that oftentimes training programmes do not teach the skills 
needed for the job. Some employers doubt that training is useful either because these skills are 
soon forgotten or because most of the time these measures do not target the occupation for 
which a candidate is applying. Two hotel managers explain that training is relevant only when 
close to their business needs:  
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I mean, it’s not a bad thing. But, then, I don’t know if that certain course can help. Let’s 
say, someone took a course in cooking for two years, comes here and asks for a job. It’s 
more likely that we take that person than someone who has not. So, it’s not a bad thing. 
But [it needs to be] close to our business. (Hotel6SWE) 
The benefit of it is limited because the computer course they had to do would be our 
booking system and this cannot be offered by the PES. (Hotel6CH) 
This finding suggests that training programmes are not used for assessing the level of 
trainability of a candidate, probably because the occupations require only basic skills.  
Some respondents in Switzerland stated that the only training programmes that they consider 
are those offered in the private market and that provide the participants with an official 
diploma. This finding reflects the importance of skills certification in the Swiss labour market. 
Although certification might matter less for low-skilled positions, documentation of formal 
qualification might still be important, as the quote of this HR-manager in retail suggests:  
Yes, or a computer course. I don’t know; if the PES would say we have paid a “SIZ” 
[specific computer course] or a “BEC” [language diploma] or an “Alliance 
Français” [language diploma] or something like that, then this has more weight for me. 
(Retail16CH).  
The following quote supports the expectation that the negative signalling effect of training 
programmes, as revealing a lack of relevant skills, is likely to manifest only when hiring for 
mid- to high-skilled positions.  
But if the vice director did a computer course, he would not be suitable for me. Or even a 
receptionist; here, you expect that the candidate already has this knowledge. (Hotel3CH)  
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The situation is different for candidates with a migration background. For these jobseekers 
most programmes seem to have a positive substantive effect. In these cases employers 
appreciate the effort made to learn the language or to acquire the specific knowledge necessary 
in the kitchen or for housekeeping: 
Such stories, for migrant workers, where they can do an apprenticeship after some time, 
that is brilliant. And this is also a very good sign. (Hotel3CH) 
And I know that we also have people in the kitchen who also come from that Snabbsparet 
[a programme called “Fast track to employment”]. […] Some of them are just new 
in Sweden: they come from Syria, Afghanistan […]. The main thing is that their Swedish 
is not very good, so that’s what they help them with. (Hotel7SWE) 
Such programmes are judged positively by almost all of our respondents because they match 
with the tasks that are carried out on the job and provide relevant experience.  
Yes, it [such a programme] is a plus because he [the candidate] was already in the 
working structure, he already knows what to expect, he has already heard about hygiene 
regulations. (Hotel5CH). 
Overall, our findings regarding training suggest that these programmes are valued only if they 
provide knowledge that is directly relevant to the job and are mostly interpreted according to 
their substantial effect. This is especially the case for migrants, for them, training programmes 
might compensate for the disadvantage that they experience due to discrimination (Liechti et 
al., 2017; Pager et al., 2009). In the low-skilled sector, training programme participation is 
almost never interpreted as a positive signal of motivation and hardly ever as a negative signal 
of a lack of skills.  
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Wage subsidies 
As subsidies reduce wage costs, they should have a positive substantive effect. However, as 
shown in previous research, wage subsidies might also be used by employers to sort out 
unproductive candidates (Baert, 2016, Liechti et al., 2017) Our interviews provide more 
evidence for a negative signalling effect than for a positive substantive effect. Many 
respondents suggested that applicants eligible for wage subsidies are less employable. Those 
employers who would consider hiring candidates eligible for a wage subsidy mentioned at 
the same time that it is important to not exploit the person or the system and to employ the 
person only when, after the subsidy expired, a job can be offered, as two respondents specify:  
I think that it is important not to exploit someone but that there is a real hiring prospect 
later, that there is a supervisor who can work the person in [and] show her everything. 
(Retail15CH)  
Then, I think, when he had become so good that he could work full-time, then they [the 
PES] offered us to go subsidised full-time for two years! […] With us paying 10% of his 
salary. But, then, we said, “Ah, no… that’s not right.” Because […], in reality, he is 
substituting another guy at the moment. […] It felt so wrong towards the guy, who had 
shown that he was good and would be able to do the job. And we had that position to offer! 
So, we hired him. (Retail2SWE)  
In most cases, the respondents said that they use wage subsidy as a testing period. In fact, 
employers are eager to see whether a candidate integrates well into the team and is friendly 
with customers. In other words, this measure provides a legal way to “try” candidates for a 
period of time without financial risk:  
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For me, it would be an incentive to try someone whom you would otherwise not hire. 
Someone, where you have the feeling that you are not so sure, but then, [with the 
subsidy] you would say, “Okay, I’ll try.” You cannot lose much. (Hotel3CH) 
However, most respondents were sceptical and stated that a wage subsidy would not 
incentivise them to hire someone. In fact, they associated the wage subsidy with lower 
productivity and higher costs of supervision for which they do not have the necessary 
resources: 
So, having someone who is like free or who has financial help or someone who doesn’t 
know how to work, who is lazy, then I prefer to have someone regular. Because it is just 
a waste of time. If we have a person for free [e.g., on subsidies] who doesn’t do anything, 
we need to pay another person to do the job. (Hotel1SWE) 
Other employers say that they would pay attention to any possible behavioural problems of a 
candidate who comes with a subsidy and that they would perform a background check. This 
result is in line with the findings of Baert (2016) and Liechti et al. (2017) who show that 
employers most likely use wage subsidies as a screening device to identify unproductive 
candidates.  
Discussion 
Our findings suggest that employers in both countries (Switzerland and Sweden) are not very 
familiar with ALMPs and their implementation. Employers were unaware of whether 
unemployed individuals could request participation in an ALMP or whether caseworkers 
assigned these measures (also as punishment). However, we found that precisely the belief 
about whom to attribute the agency had a deep impact on how ALMP-related signals are 
interpreted by employers. In order to interpret the information that someone participated in 
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an ALMP, it is not necessary to know how the system works, rather the interpretation depends 
on beliefs about how the system works.  
In general, the findings with regard to employers’ interpretation of ALMPs are at best 
modestly positive. Employers’ interpretation of ALMP participation seems also to depend on 
the candidate’s distance to the labour market. For candidates that are generally perceived as 
having a harder time to find a job, ALMP participation is evaluated more positively than for 
stronger candidates.  
Employers value training programmes for migrants the most because these programmes 
directly prepare migrants for basic work in the low-skilled sector of the labour market 
(substantive effect). For other candidates the use of training programmes is questioned. The 
skill-level of the job also has consequences for employers’ judgement of ALMP participation. 
Employers interpret TEPs as positive signals for low-skilled tasks that do not require any 
formal qualifications, such as room cleaning or working at the breakfast buffet in hotels. 
However, employers evaluate the measures positively only when they assume that 
individuals decided to participate on a voluntary basis; because then it suggests the “right 
work attitude”. Otherwise, employers use programme participation to sort out unproductive 
candidates or view ALMP participation as a waste of time.  
As our research reveals, a better understanding of the system and the awareness of the practice 
of using TEPs as a sanctioning tool, is likely to increase the unintended negative signalling 
effect. Therefore, our research questions the utility of TEPs from the employers’ perspective, 
not only because they are not perceived as providing a substantial added value but also 
because they can be interpreted as a negative signal. Finally, whether ALMP training is more 
useful in higher-skilled occupations remains an open question. However, our argument 
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suggests that employers hiring for skilled jobs may interpret course participation as a lack of 
human capital rather than focusing on the possible substantive advantages linked to increased 
human capital, likely because training is oftentimes not targeted to a specific occupation.  
Conclusion  
Employers in the low-skilled sector are increasingly likely to be confronted with jobseekers 
who participated in ALMP measures. These programmes have been widely implemented in 
OECD countries to address high levels of structural unemployment and the mismatch of 
labour supply and demand (e.g., Bonoli, 2013). While the aim of social policy interventions 
should be to help re-integrating unemployed into the labour market, the effectiveness of these 
measures is controversial (Card et al., 2010; Kluve, 2010). The suspicion is that some ALMPs 
unfold unintended negative consequences –including stigma effects- that prevent the 
unemployed from successfully re-accessing the labour market. 
We argued that to better understand why some programmes are more effective than others, it 
is important to consider the employers’ perspective and to analyse both, the substantive and the 
signalling value these measures unfold. In particular, we theorised that ALMPs are successful 
only if employers consider them an asset in a resume and that this is most likely to be the case 
if employers perceive the jobseeker to have the main agency in the decision to participate in 
such a measure (positive signalling effect) or if there are non-trivial substantive effects (i.e., 
monetary benefit).  
Our results reveal that indeed employers’ evaluation of ALMP varies with the assumed 
attribution of agency. Especially, TEPs unfold their positive signalling effect only when the 
agency is attributed to the jobseeker and not to the caseworker, otherwise, these measures are 
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used to identify weak candidates. Training programmes are evaluated positively only for 
migrants and people who are further away from the labour market.  
Future research should inquire how other characteristics such as the length of the 
unemployment spell, the gender, and other factors, which are known to influence labour 
market outcomes, intervene with employers’ interpretation of ALMP participation. As 
especially low-skilled are affected by ALMPs, due to their higher risk and duration of 
unemployment, it is important to create measures that are helpful for these individuals and 
do not further penalize them in their labour market integration.  
The fact that the attributed agency influences how these measures are perceived by employers 
poses a dilemma for public policy: on the one hand, increasing employers’ engagement in such 
measures could be helpful in improving the link to the labour market (van der Aa and van 
Berkel, 2014); on the other hand, deeper knowledge of these measures might incline employers 
to use programme participation to sort out unproductive candidates. This trade-off should be 
analysed more in depth by future research.  
Policy makers are undoubtedly confronted with a dilemma that is difficult to solve. However, 
given the high amount of financial resources devoted to these programmes over the last three 
decades, a closer examination of the reasons why some of these programmes may develop 
unintended consequences seems crucial in order to address their shortcomings. In fact, in the 
foreseeable future atypical work biographies – and with them frequent unemployment spells 
and ALMP participation – will likely become even more common than they are today. 
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Endnotes 
1 Breedgard (2015: 439) defines this as the “participation effect”. 
2 As argued by Stryker (1980), beliefs can have real actions as consequences. 
3 We conducted interviews with PES employees who confirm that these programmes are 
considered ways to occupy the day of the unemployed rather than to provide meaningful 
training. See the summary table A1 in the appendix 
4 We define statements as units of sentences where the interviewees make an argument or a 
point. When a statement refers to two analytical categories, we code it twice. 
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Appendix  
Table A1 : Details about the respondents  
Code Gender  Position  
Hiring 
experience ALMP experience  Sector Country  
Hotel1CH male HR-manager < 5 years 
yes, but no 
experience hotel CH 
Hotel2CH male 
manager of 
the hotel 5 - 10 years no hotel CH 
Hotel3CH female HR-manager 5 - 10 years 
yes, has 
experience hotel CH 
Hotel4CH male 
manager of 
the hotel 5 - 10 years no hotel CH 
Hotel5CH male 
manager of 
the hotel > 10 years 
yes, has 
experience hotel CH 
Hotel6CH female HR-manager < 5 years 
yes, has 
experience hotel CH 
Hotel7CH female line manager 5 - 10 years no hotel CH 
Hotel8CH female HR-manager 5 - 10 years no hotel CH 
Hotel9CH male 
manager of 
the hotel > 10 years 
yes, but no 
experience hotel CH 
Retail10CH female HR-manager < 5 years 
yes, but no 
experience retail CH 
Retail11CH male HR-manager > 10 years 
yes, has 
experience retail CH 
Hotel12CH female HR-manager < 5 years no hotel CH 
Hotel13CH female HR-manager 5 - 10 years no hotel CH 
Hotel13CH female line manager 5 - 10 years no hotel CH 
Retail14CH male HR-manager > 10 years 
yes, has 
experience retail CH 
Retail15CH female HR-manager 5 - 10 years 
yes, but no 
experience retail CH 
Retail16CH female HR-manager > 10 years 
yes, has 
experience retail CH 
Hotel1SWE male 
manager of 
the hotel  < 5 years 
yes, has 
experience hotel SWE 
Hotel2SWE female line manager 5 - 10 years 
yes, but no 
experience hotel SWE 
Hotel3SWE female line manager 5 - 10 years no hotel SWE 
Hotel4SWE male 
manager of 
the hotel > 10 years 
yes, has 
experience hotel SWE 
Hotel5SWE female 
manager of 
the hotel > 10 years 
yes, has 
experience hotel SWE 
Hotel6SWE male line manager > 10 years 
yes, has 
experience hotel SWE 
Hotel7SWE female 
manager of 
the hotel > 10 years 
yes, has 
experience hotel SWE 
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Hotel8SWE female line manager 5 - 10 years 
yes, has 
experience hotel SWE 
Hotel9SWE female HR-manager < 5 years 
yes, has 
experience hotel SWE 
Hotel10SWE male 
manager of 
the hotel > 10 years 
yes, has 
experience hotel SWE 
Hotel11SWE female 
manager of 
the hotel < 5 years 
yes, but no 
experience hotel SWE 
Hotel12SWE male 
manager of 
the hotel 5 - 10 years 
yes, has 
experience hotel SWE 
Retail1SWE male 
manager of 
the 
supermarket > 10 years 
yes, has 
experience retail SWE 
Retail2SWE male line manager > 10 years 
yes, has 
experience retail SWE 
PES 
interview1 female 
Caseworker at 
PES - - - CH 
PES 
interview2 female 
Caseworker at 
PES - - - CH 
 
 
